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AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF Ellen Linnea Trygstad for 
the Master of Arts in Speech Communication presented 
May 10, 1989. 
Title: Cultural Relativism in Intercultural Communication 
Theory: A Descriptive and Heuristic Study 
APPROVED BY THE MEMBERS OF THE THESIS COMMITTEE: 
Larry A. Steward 
The purpose of this descriptive study was to determine 
how the concept of "cultural relativism" is used in the 
current literature pertaining to intercultural 
communication . This concept is central to much of the work 
being done on face-to-face intercultural communication, but 
a preliminary review of that literature indicated ambiguity 
and lack of concurrence among authors' views regarding the 
concept. This research was designed to describe the range 
of authors' views on cultural relativism as well as to 
provide some historical and critical perspective regarding 
"cultural relativism." 
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The research data were obtained from the literature of 
early and current anthropology, and from the area of 
intercultural communication. A descriptive methodology was 
employed for obtaining, organizing, and analyzing the data 
from these three literature groups. Data were examined in 
terms of four basic categories: authors' definitions, 
applications, and stated advantages and disadvantages of 
cultural relativism. The data within each category were 
organized thematically to facilitate a comparative analysis. 
The results of the review of the intercultural 
communication literature substantiated the preliminary 
findings, namely, that references to cultural relativism in 
the intercultural communication literature are varied, and 
generally, inadequately stated. For example, out of the 
forty-four works reviewed which contained the term "cultural 
relativism," or a similar term, less than one-third of the 
authors defined the term, and of these, half were implied, 
not explicit, definitions. Furthermore, among the authors 
who did indicate definitions, four different definitions of 
cultural relativism were found. 
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Many similarities were found between the views of the 
intercultural communication authors and those of the three 
major early anthropology authors reviewed for this study. In 
the early anthropology literature, variance was also found 
among the definitions of cultural relativism, in addition to 
differences in emphasis regarding its use. It is 
noteworthy that none of the intercultural communication 
authors make reference to any historical connections. One 
of the conclusions of this study is that this is a 
shortcoming in the intercultural communication literature. 
This study concludes with a brief review of 
representative, negatively critical views of cultural 
relativism in the current anthropology literature. In 
contrast to the almost blanket support for cultural 
relativism in the intercultural literature, a lively, often 
acerbic, debate prevails in the current anthropology 
literature. Ten works were reviewed for representative 
criticisms of cultural relativism from anthropology, the 
implications of which were discussed in the conclusion of 
this study. 
The central conclusion of this study was that, in the 
intercultural communication literature, cultural relativism 
needs to be reexamined in light of the goals of the field. 
Instead of the multiple definitions now being used, a 
single, clear definition needs to be chosen, based on stated 
assumptions. Other definitions of the term now being used 
should be assigned different names, to avoid the confusion 
which now prevails as to exactly which concept an author is 
employing. A suggested definition of ''cultural relativism" 
appropriate for intercultural communication is offered in 
the summary of the study. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The concept of cultural relativism is implicit to much 
of the work presently being done on face-to-face 
intercultural communication and appears throughout the 
intercultural communication literature. However, a review 
of this literature revealed that authors differ in their 
perspectives on cultural relativity. Because no studies 
exist which specifically examine the role of "cultural 
relativism" in the area of intercultural communication, 
exactly how it is defined and used in this area of study 
remains unknown. It is also not known how views on cultural 
relativism in the area of intercultural communication 
compare with views on cultural relativism in the field of 
anthropology where it was first established in the social 
sciences. 
The primary focus of this study, therefore, is to gain 
an in-depth understanding of cultural relativism in the area 
of intercultural communication theory. In the beginning of 
this study, there is a brief description of the writings of 
the early anthropologists who helped establish cultural 
relativism as a key concept in anthropology. This provides 
some understanding of the historical roots of cultural 
relativism in intercultural communication theory. 
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The main body of the text of this study presents the 
data obtained from the research of the intercultural 
communication literature pertaining to cultural relativism. 
Organized thematically, it describes the range of authors' 
views pertaining to definitions, applications, disadvantages 
and advantages of cultural relativism. 
This paper also summarizes some of the criticisms of 
cultural relativism in the current anthropology literature. 
In contrast to the generally positive support cultural 
relativism is given in the intercultural communication area, 
a strong challenge to the viability of cultural relativism 
exists in anthropology. Thus, a brief discussion of 
representative criticisms from the anthropological 
literature was included because of the possible implications 
these criticisms may have for the use of cultural relativism 
in the intercultural communication area. They help provide 
greater insight with which to identify possible problems and 
areas in intercultural communication needing further 
research. 
Intercultural communcation is an applied field 
related to both the fields of speech communication and 
anthropology. Thus, an understanding of intercultural 
communication theory in light of developments in the broader 
theoretical arenas is important. There is, in general, 
... a lack of theory integrating the 
communication and culture concepts and a lack 
of systematic study in this field (Holmes 
1978, 18). 
In particular, " ... the important and practical 
theoretical task ... is the identification and clarification 
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of the key concepts of our field" (Becker 1969, 4, quoted in 
Holmes 1978, 19). In this last decade, efforts have been 
made to consolidate and systematize the diverse material on 
intercultural communication for the purpose of developing 
theory. However, cultural relativism still remains largely 
unaddressed in the intercultural communication literature. 
The task of clarifying the concept of cultural 
relativism undertaken by this study is both relevant and 
timely. It provides a more precise and comprehensive 
understanding of a fundamental concept which, to date, 
remains unclarified in intercultural communication research. 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this study is to examine and clarify 
the concept of "cultural relativism" in the current 
literature pertaining to intercultural communication. 
To achieve this purpose, three research questions were 
identified. 
Research Questions 
1. What is the historical context of cultural 
relativism in early anthropology? 
2. How is cultural relativism used in the area of 
intercultural communication? 
3. What are some of the representative criticisms of 
cultural relativism in the contemporary literature of 
anthropology? 
DEFINITION OF TERMS 
In this study, the following definitions apply: 
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1. Communication--According to Mortensen (1972, 15-
21), communication is the assigning of "significance to 
message-related behavior" such that the communicants attain 
a shared sense of meaning. The experience is dynamic (i.e., 
we are constantly creating associations, and manipulating 
and selecting stimuli, physiologically), irreversible and 
unrepeatable, proactive (total involvement of the individual 
engaged in communication), reciprocal (" ... a mutual 
influencing process among countless factors, each 
functioning conjointly so that changes in one set of forces 
affect the operations of all constituent activity in a total 
field of experience," and contextual (including both 
physical setting and the sociocultural situation of the 
interaction) . 
Included in the definition for this study is the 
concept that communication is approximate: 
No one ever sees all, for each abstracts in 
accordance with his past experience and 
emerging needs. Where men construe events 
similarly, they can expect to understand and 
agree readily; where they construe events 
differently, agreement is more difficult 
(Barnlund 1968, 7). 
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Communication involves approximations of the experiences and 
meanings of another. 
2. Cultural Relativity--One of the early proponents 
of this concept, Melville J. Herskovits, stated: 
The principle of cultural relativism ... is as 
follows: Judgments are based on experience, 
and experience is interpreted by each 
individual in terms of his own encul tura ti on 
(Herskovits 1948, 63). 
To Herskovits, cultural relativity referred to the 
culture-boundness of judgment. Significant variations on 
Herskovits' definition existed amongst his contemporaries 
and those who preceded him, and these variations persist 
today. These are examined in the main text of this study. 
The term "cultural relativism" will be used in this study to 
refer generically to the many definitions of the term. 
Variations as they occur in the literature will be 
identified as such. 
3. Culture--" ... the cumulative deposit of knowledge, 
experience, meanings, beliefs, values, attitudes, religions, 
concepts of self, the universe, and self-universe 
relationships, hierarchies of status, role expectations 
spatial relations, and time concepts acquired by a large 
group of people in the course of generations through 
individual and group striving. Culture manifests itself 
both in patterns of language and thought and in forms of 
activity and behavior" (Samovar and Porter 1976, 7). 
4. Current Literature--works written within 
approximately the last twenty-five years. 
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5. Face-to-Face Intercultural Communication--the 
interaction between individuals having different cultural 
backgrounds where cultural behavior and value differences 
are known to exist. Such communication interaction takes 
place in each other's presence (Porter and Samovar 1988, 
15). The term "intercultural communication" will be used to 
refer to the field of study itself. When different aspects 
of the field are referred to, such as the interactive 
process of face-to-face intercultural communication, the 
text will indicate this. 
SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
To present a profile of "cultural relativism" in the 
area of intercultural communication, this study focuses on 
four select topics: 1) authors' definitions of cultural 
relativism, 2) authors' applications of cultural relativism, 
3) advantages of cultural relativism identified by authors, 
and 4) disadvantages of cultural relativism identified by 
authors. 
7 
While the main sources of data were authors of works 
pertaining to intercultural communication, two additional 
sources were utilized. One is the literature from early 
anthropology, to which reference was made for information 
regarding the original views on cultural relativism in 
anthropology. These early views provide helpful background 
information. The second is the current anthropological 
literature, which reflects an active debate on cultural 
relativism and its viability for the field of anthropology. 
A summary of some of these criticisms was included in this 
paper because of the potentially important implications they 
have regarding the use of cultural relativism in 
intercultural communication theory. 
Due to time and availability restrictions, most of the 
data is from literature by authors from the United States. 
Where possible, culturally diverse sources have been 
included in this study. 
As a description of cultural relativism in the area of 
intercultural communication, this paper is limited in other 
ways. For instance, the influence of socio-political 
contexts upon the development of cultural relativism is 
excluded, as is the historical development of the concept of 
cultural relativism before this century. 
It should be noted that subjects such as "linguistic 
relativity" and Einstein's "theory of relativity" are quite 
distinct from the topic of this study and have no bearing 
upon it. The reader should note, however, that terms other 
than "cultural relativism'' have been used in the literature 
to refer to the concept of cultural relativism, and may 
appear in this study as well. 
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Further, because of its descriptive and heuristic 
nature, it is not the goal of this study to champion any one 
view on cultural relativism but rather, to present a current 
profile of the range of views on cultural relativism in the 
area of intercultural communication. This limited focus of 
study contributes to the groundwork needed for further 
research on cultural relativism in face-to-face 
intercultural communication. 
METHODOLOGY 
Description of Research Methodology 
A review of the literature on cultural relativism 
reveals that there are no studies of the specific uses of 
"cultural relativism" in the area of intercultural 
communication. A thorough historical and philosophical 
analysis of cultural relativism in the related field of 
anthropology, however, can be found in Cultural Relativism 
and Anthropology by Edwin Hatch (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1983). 
Previous studies can of ten serve as the basis for new 
studies (Cooper 1984, 30). However, Hatch's study is too 
dissimilar in purpose to base the present study on it. The 
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book offers historical and critical insight into the concept 
of cultural relativism helpful for this study, but the 
historical and philosophical methodologies employed do not 
serve the descriptive goals of this study. Furthermore, it 
does not present information about cultural relativism in 
intercultural communication theory. 
Because of the absence of related studies, the 
methodology for this study was based on the methodology 
outlined for descriptive studies in Methods for Research 
(Good and Douglas 1954). The descriptive method is useful 
because it provides procedures for 
... studies that purport to present 
concerning the nature and status 
facts 
of 
of anything ... a group of persons ... a system 
thought ... (Good and Douglas, 259). 
Descriptive studies are useful for providing 
information on which professional judgments may be based. 
The accumulation of data can affect practice due to the 
increased insight afforded by the information (Good and 
Douglas, 258). Since the goal of this study is to provide 
information on the "nature and status" of cultural 
relativism in intercultural communication theory, and to 
explore the implications of this information for the theory 
and practice of intercultural communication, the descriptive 
method is appropriate for this study. 
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The methodology of this study has four parts: 
(1) collection of data, (2) organization and presentation of 
the data, (3) analysis of data, and (4) summary, 
conclusions, and suggestions for future research. 
Collection of Data 
The data for this study are from written works. The 
primary data on cultural relativism consist of authors' 
views on cultural relativism from the intercultural 
communication literature. The data from the intercultural 
communication literature are viewed as representing 
"intercultural communication theory." 
The secondary data utilized in this paper derive from 
authors' views on cultural relativism found in the 
anthropological literature. These views are included to add 
depth of understanding. Such auxiliary data are often used 
in research to throw light on the conditions or to give 
additional meaning to the facts (Good and Douglas, 269). 
All the data were obtained from original sources. No 
secondary sources were used for the collection, presentation 
or analyses of the data, although such secondary sources do 
exist. The purpose of the use of original material was to 
enable insights to emerge without previous bias derived from 
the influence of others' assessments. 
Because systematic collection of data is essential, 
categories were selected in terms of their perceived 
effectiveness for organizing the data (Good and Douglas, 
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538-539). To facilitate the gathering of "specific and 
definite" data and to present them in a systematic fashion 
(Good and Douglas, 269), four categories were selected. The 
most efficient way to gather information about something is 
to sample representative components of ''the whole~ of that 
being studied (Good and Douglas, 357). The four categories 
chosen for this study as representative of "cultural 
relativism" are: 
1. authors' definitions of cultural relativism 
2. authors' applications of cultural relativism 
3. advantages of cultural relativism stated by 
authors 
4. disadvantages of cultural relativism identified 
by authors 
Organization of the Literature Data 
A preliminary perusal of the intercultural 
communication literature led to the identification of 
various themes which tend to occur throughout the 
literature. These themes were observed to be predominant in 
the anthropological literature also. Therefore, these 
themes served as a framework with which to organize the data 
within each category for all the literature. 
This organizational process had several steps. 
First, the intercultural communication data was obtained for 
each category (definitions, applications, advantages and 
disadvantages). Then, within each of the categories, 
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authors' views identified as similar in theme were grouped. 
Topical variations within each theme group were noted. For 
instance, in the applications category, fifteen of the 
intercultural communication works were observed to refer to 
causes of cultural relativism. Within this theme, the 
causes to which the authors referred divided into two 
topics: (~) cultural relativism resulting from a formal 
learning context, and (£) cultural relativism resulting from 
an informal learning context. Nine works addressed topic 
"a" and six addressed topic "b." 
The themes which emerged from the intercultural 
communication data were used to organize the data from the 
early and current anthropological literature as well. A 
presentation of all of the data grouped by thematic 
similarity was seen as more useful than data randomly 
itemized or inconsistantly organized. This approach of 
grouping items within categories facilitates economy of 
thought and helps to bring new properties into focus (Good 
and Douglas, 493). 
While most of the concepts in the current anthropology 
literature easily fit within the thematic framework, some 
did not. These were identified accordingly in the early and 
current anthropology chapters. For example, one of the 
early anthropology definitions ("subjectivism'') did not fit 
into any of the four definitional themes which had emerged 
from the intercultural communication literature. 
The basic categorical themes generated from the 
intercultural literature and used for classifying the data 
within each category are as follows: 
Definitional Themes 
1. Cultural Diversity--the "fact" of the 
diversity of cultures 
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2. Cultural Validity--the "fact" of the validity 
and equal valuableness of all cultures, 
or/and cultural values and practices 
3. Attitudes Toward Difference--various 
attitudes toward cultural differences 
(influencing one's experience of 
cultural differences) ranging from 
neutral to positive (i.e., tolerance, 
respect, non-evaluation, positive 
evaluation) 
4. Contextualization--achieving accurate 
understanding of other cultures, or 
aspects of cultures, through 
contextualization 
Application Themes 
1. Causes of Cultural Relativism 
2. Consequences of Cultural Relativism 
3. Theoretical Dimensions 
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Advantage Themes 
1. Facilitation of Internal, Attitudinal Changes 
2. Facilitation of Accurate, Cultural 
Knowledge and Understanding 
3. Facilitation of External, Interactive Results 
Disadvantage Themes 
1. Difficulties of Assumption of Cultural 
Relativism 
2. The Avoidance of Ethical Judgments 
3. The Permeability vs. Impermeability of 
Cultural Boundaries 
The data, organized as previously described according 
to categories and themes, is presented in three separate 
chapters. The first describes views on cultural relativism 
in early anthropology, the second presents the data derived 
from the intercultural communication literature, and the 
third provides a brief description of representative views 
from the anthropological literature negatively critical of 
cultural relativism. 
In the final chapter of the study, the early 
anthropology, current anthropology and 
inter cultural communication data are compared 
and discussed, and implications for future 
study are suggested. 
Analysis of the Data 
Comparison is one of the things normally done with 
descriptive data and provides a way for finding 
tt ••• additional meaning in the status of any phenomenon" 
(Good and Douglas, 260). The first step in the comparison 
of data consisted of making a multi-dimensional profile of 
the data. This summary of the data from the three 
literature sources was done in chart form (Table 1). 
Presenting the data in each of the four categories 
(definitions, applications, advantages and disadvantages), 
this multi-dimensional profile served as a means for 
comparing the data. 
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The procedure was as follows: The categories were 
entered as horizontal headings, and the themes used to 
organize the data from all of the literature were listed 
under the corresponding headings. Then, each work used for 
collecting data was assigned a symbol to represent that 
work. Works from the intercultural literature were assigned 
numbers, and those from the current anthropological 
literature were assigned letters. Each of the authors from 
the early anthropology literature was given one of the 
following symbols (* & @) All of these identifiers were, 
in turn, entered in the categories under the appropriate 
themes in accordance with the findings presented in each 
data chapter. 
This procedure resulted in a visual profile of the 
various views examined in the study. It provided an easy 
way to compare views among and between each of the three 
literature sources (since each type of literature was 
assigned a different type of symbol). It also facilitated 
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the identification of correspondences between categories 
(whether or not, for example, authors having the same 
definition of cultural relativism stated the same, or 
different, advantages and disadvantages). The number of 
authors sharing a view could also be readily seen in graphic 
form. 
In this concluding chapter, significant themes and 
problems revealed through the data analysis are identified 
and discussed. Recommendations for areas ~eeding possible 
further study are presented. 
OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
This study is organized into five chapters. The first 
provides an introduction to the study. The next chapter 
gives some historical background regarding cultural 
relativism by briefly outlining the views held by three key 
proponents of the concept in early anthropology. 
The third chapter presents the views on cultural 
relativism found in the intercultural communication 
literature. The fourth presents various critical 
perspectives on cultural relativism from the current, 
anthropology literature. This chapter concludes the 
presentation of data. 
The results of the data collection are summarized and 
analyzed in the fifth chapter They are organized into an 
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overall profile of the varying views on cultural relativism 
discerned through the research. 
This final chapter provides an interpretation of the 
data and a summary of the study. The chapter concludes with 
a discussion of the implications of the findings of this 
study on cultural relativism for the theory and practice of 
intercultural communication. 
CHAPTER II 
CULTURAL RELATIVISM IN EARLY ANTHROPOLOGY 
INTRODUCTION 
The concept of cultural relativism was adopted and 
developed in the early twentieth century in Europe and in 
the United States in the emerging branch of anthropology 
called cultural anthropology (the study of ''culture"). At 
that time, cultural anthropologists were struggling to 
establish cultural anthropology as an accepted and credible 
field of study to both the general public and the 
established scientific community. 
Several of the key issues debated amongst 
anthropologists in the early decades of this century 
involved cultural relativism: Euro-American ethnocentrism, 
cultural conditioning, objectivity, and the idea of culture 
as an integrated whole. 
To provide some conceptual background for the 
consideration of cultural relativism in this study, a brief 
overview of these topics is included here, followed by a 
presentation of the views of the three, early proponents of 
cultural relativism in anthropology. 
As described in the methodology for this study, the 
data is organized by category. Where several themes and 
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topics are reflective of the data, a brief overview and 
outline is presented at the beginning of each category. 
Theme numbers (i.e., Theme #1, Theme #2) correspond to the 
respective intercultural communication themes. Topics 
listed in the outlines are preceeded by lower case letters 
which correspond to those used in the intercultural 
communication chapter. For an profile of all the themes and 
topics, the reader is referred to Table 1 in Chapter V. 
Overview 
In the early twentieth century, prevailing views in 
Europe and America about "culture" were dominated by the 
belief in the superiority of white, European and American 
cultures (Boas 1938, 5). Other races and cultural groups 
were generally perceived as insignificant, inferior, and 
morally deficient. The early twentieth century was still 
part of the era of massive European and American colonial 
exploitation which was facilitated (i.e., justified) by the 
devaluing of people culturally (and technologically) 
different. The ethnocentrism of the public fostered little 
interest in "lower" cultures. 
The efforts and findings, therefore, of cultural 
anthropologists were met with either disinterest or vehement 
negativity. The general public either couldn't understand 
why people would bother to study "inferior," "heathen," 
"uncivilized" beings or, perceived such study as an inquiry 
into the bizarre curiosities of the world. 
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The concept of ethnocentrism was the means by which 
anthropologists explained and challenged the prevailing 
basis of group identification, namely, blood heredity 
(Benedict 1934, 16), and its fundamental assumption that 
"race determines mental behavior and culture," a view which 
Boas, for example, saw as deriving from "strong, emotional 
values", not fact (Boas 1955, 39). "The recognition of the 
cultural basis of race prejudice is a desperate need in 
present Western civilization" (Benedict 1934, 11). 
One of the prevailing views in early anthropology was 
that culture influences ("conditions") its group members 
(Boas 1940, 261). Though the degree to which this occurs 
was, and still is, debated, the early proponents of cultural 
relativism perceived the conditioning influence of culture 
to be profound. 
This concept, however, created difficulties for 
anthropologists. If one is culture-bound, either 
completely, or to some degree, can one understand cultures 
different from one's own, and if so, to what degree? In 
addition, is there a means for increasing one's capacity to 
understand other cultures, and if so, what? 
The implications of these questions extended to the 
description, explanation and evaluation of culture and 
cultural practices. Authors wrote about "objectivity," 
where one was free, to some degree, from one's cultural 
conditioning (Herskovits 1948, 78). They also addressed the 
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concept of "contextualism," which reflected the assumption 
that the elements of culture were integrated (Benedict 1934, 
46-7), and which provided a methodological means for 
understanding meaning within cultures. 
In the context of these conceptual and methodological 
concerns, cultural relativism appears in the works of the 
early anthropologists who attempted to establish the 
validity of "culture[s]" in the face of an ethnocentric 
public, who addressed the challenges of defining culture, 
and who sought to clarify their dual roles as scientists of 
cultures, and also members of a culture. 
The three anthropologists most frequently cited as 
having fostered and influenced the development of cultural 
relativism in early anthropology are Franz Boas, Ruth 
Benedict, and Melville Herskovits. The following is a brief 
description of their views on cultural relativism as 
expressed in their written works. 
FRANZ BOAS (1858-1942) 
The anthropologist, Franz Boas, is described as 
" ... largely responsible for developing cultural relativism 
in American anthropology" (Hatch 1983, 38). Interestingly, 
neither the term "cultural relativism" nor any similar term 
appears in his works. Hence, no information is presented 
here which can be specifically claimed to be Boas' views on 
cultural relativism, per se. 
However, many of the themes of cultural relativism 
...,..., 
"""" 
identified in this paper in the intercultural communication 
literature (summarized in the methodology section of Chapter 
I) are clearly present in Boas' writings. In the balance of 
this study, authors' views are organized according to 
themes, either the intercultural communication themes, or 
additional ones which were found in the literature reviewed. 
Because Boas does not identify any of his views as 
"relativism," the intercultural themes were used to bring 
into relief Boas' views which are concurrent. This was 
deemed relevant because one of the goals of this study is to 
identify concurrence, or lack thereof, between the 
intercultural literature and that of the founding authors of 
cultural relativism in anthropology. 
BOAS' VIEWS AND THE DEFINITIONAL THEMES 
Overview 
In reviewing Boas' various works, three of the four 
intercultural communication definitional themes were found: 
Theme #1: Cultural Diversity 
Theme #3: Attitudes Toward Difference 
Theme #4: Contextualization 
No reference was found to the second theme of "equal 
cultural validity." 
Presentation of the Data 
Definitional Theme #1: Diversity of Cultures. Boas 
addresses this theme extensively. He concludes that th~re 
is, for example, no "one" absolute value system. An 
examination of the so-called "objective'' field of science 
reveals that people think there are absolutes, but we 
deceive ourselves, he says, into thinking so: 
Even in the domain of science the favorite 
method of approaching problems exerts a 
dominating influence over our minds. The 
passionate intensity with which these ideas are 
taken up, leading to a temporary submersion of 
all others and to a belief in their value as 
sufficient basis of inquiry, proves how easily 
the human mind is led to the belief in an 
absolute value of those ideas that are 
expressed in the surrounding culture (1962, 
205) . 
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Boas writes that, in fact, the social ideals of other 
cultures are, in fact, 
... so different from our own that the 
valuations given by them to human behavior are 
not comparable. What is considered good by one 
is considered bad by another" (1962, 204). 
In other words, social ideals and values vary regarding 
human behavior from culture to culture, and thus, the 
meanings of human behaviors differ. 
Definitional Theme #3: Attitudes Toward Difference. 
Boas states that the experiences of an individual " ... are 
largely determined by the culture in which he lives" (1940, 
250). He points out that culture conditions us, physically, 
mentally, linguistically and behaviorily, though, because we 
grow up within a culture, we tend to be unaware of our 
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conditioning (1940, v). Even our " ... emotional reactions 
which we feel as natural are in reality culturally 
determined" (1940, 635). 
Boas observes that all people are influenced and 
biased by their cultures. In research, this colors our 
understanding of other cultures. One must seek to become 
free from one's cultural valuations, and approach other 
cultures in the rasulting ''objective" state for the purpose 
of scientific accuracy: 
It would be an error to assume that our own 
social habits do not enter into judgments of 
the mode of life and thought of alien people. 
A single phenomenon like our reaction to what 
we call 'good ruanners' illustrates how strongly 
we are influenced by customary behavior. We 
are exceedingly sensitive to differences in 
manners ... the valuation of our own manners 
tinges our description of the alien forms. 
The scientific study of generalized social 
forms requires therefore, that the investigator 
free himself from all valuations based on our 
culture. An objective, strictly scientific 
inquiry can be made only if we succeed in 
entering into each culture on its own basis, if 
we elaborate the ideals of each people and 
include in our general objective study cultural 
values as found among different branches of 
mankind (1962, 204-5). 
The powerful influence culture has in shaping a 
person's behavors and thoughts is demonstrated, Boas states, 
by the great difficulty people experience in suspending 
their culturally biased way of perceiving and evaluating 
phenomena (1962, 205-6). Indeed, 
We are apt to follow the habitual activities of 
our fellows without a careful examination of 
the fundamental ideas from which their actions 
spring. Conformity in action has for its 
sequel conformity in thought. The emancipation 
from current thought is for most of us as 
difficult in science as it is in everyday life. 
The emancipation from our own culture, 
demanded of the anthropologist, is not easily 
attained ... " (1962, 205-6). 
According to Boas, the more a researcher is aware of 
cultural diversity, the more objectively a researcher can 
study culture (1938, 685). The degree of objectivity is 
contingent upon the degree of awareness of diversity. The 
attempt to suspend one's own cultural values in studying 
other cultures is necessary because the social ideals of 
other cultures are different from one's own. 
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Boas does not advocate indefinite suspension of value 
judgment such that 0ne ~ould refrain from all evaluation. 
Indeed, the study of cultural multiplicity facilitates the 
evaluation of our own culture as well as the formulation of 
generalizations about culture: 
The objective study of types of culture that 
have developed on historically independent 
lines or that have grown to be fundamentally 
distinct enables the anthropologist to 
differentiate clearly between those phases of 
life that are valid for all mankind and others 
that are culturally determined. Supplied with 
this knowledge, he reaches a standpoint that 
enables him to view our own civilization 
critically, and to enter into a comparative 
study of values with a mind relatively 
uninfluenced by the emotions elicited by the 
automatically regulated behavior in which he 
participates as a member of our society. 
The freedom of judgment thus obtained depends 
upon a clear recognition of what is organically 
and what [is] culturally determined. The 
inquiry into this problem is hampered at every 
step by our own subjection to cultural 
standards that are misconstrued as generally 
valid human standards. The end can be reached 
only by patient inquiry in which our own 
emotional valuations and attitudes are 
conscientiously held in the background. The 
psychological and social data valid for all 
mankind that are so obtained are basal for all 
culture and not subject to varying valuation. 
The values of our social ideals will thus 
gain in clarity by a rigid, objective study of 
foreign cultures (1962, 207). 
,..,,... 
... o 
Evaluation of our own culture, therefore, according to 
Boas, is achieved only when one has developed an "open mind" 
through a studied awareness of the multiplicity of cultures, 
attaining as great a degree of objectivity as one can. Boas 
underscores that it is an extreillely difficult task, 
requiring patience, time, and conscious effort. 
This theme of "Attitudes Toward Difference" which Boas 
refers to as objectivity, is prescriptive, in contrast to 
the first jefinitional theme which described cultural 
relativity as the fact of the multiplicity of cultural 
values. Here, one is informed of "how" to look at culture 
in terms of one's attitude. 
Definitional Theme #4: Contextualization. Boas 
advocates that the elements of a culture must be considered 
in terms of the cultural context: 
... the 
closely 
without 
Culture 
various expressions of culture are 
interrelated and one cannot be altered 
having an effect upon all the others. 
is integrated (1962, 256). 
We must study cultures as whole units to learn the meaning 
of behaviors, values, concepts, etc., because, while these 
cultural expressions may have the same outward appearance in 
different cultures, they may, in fact, assume very different 
meaning within different cultures: " ... The way in which 
these characteristics manifest themselves depends upon the 
culture in which the individuals live" (1938, 133). 
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This definitional theme of cultural relativism is also 
prescriptive. It instructs us as to how culture should be 
understood, namely, contextually, because culture is an 
integrated entity. 
However, understanding is not limited to just the 
examination of cultural elements within cultural boundaries. 
As previously noted, Boas, believed that "comparative 
appraisals" might be possible. He argues that the task of 
anthropologists is to gather ''in context" ~thnological data 
first, and only after this is achieved, might 
generalizations about cultures be made, for example, about 
possible cultural universals, as well as generalizations 
regarding which aspects ~f culture are organic in origin and 
which are humanly created (1962, 205). 
Summary 
Though the definitional themes highlighted here 
overlap somewhat, they remain distinctly different. The 
"Cultural Diversity" theme is descriptive. Boas writes, in 
particular, about cultural values, stating that multiple 
sets of values exist among cultures because multiple 
perceptual screens exist. 
enculturation. 
It assumes the process of 
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The third theme of ''Attitudes Toward Difference" is 
addressed by Boas in terms of objectivity, based on the 
assumption that the suspension of one's cultural values is 
possible through the acquired awareness of cultural 
diversity, to the extent that one is aware of that 
diversity. This theme is prescriptive, instructing us that 
to understand other cultures accurately, we must suspend our 
cultural-bound judgments. 
The fou~th theme of "Contextualis1a" is also 
prescriptive, but unlike the third theme, it does not focus 
on values. Instead, this theme instructs us that any item 
of culture we seek to understand must be considered within 
its respective cultural context. This theme is based on the 
assumption that culture is an integrated structure. 
It is difficult to say which of these definitional 
themes, if any, Boas himself would have termed "cultural 
relativism," since all three of them are present in his 
writings. 
APPLICATIONS 
Overview 
All three of the intercultural communication 
application themes were found in Boas' writing. The 
following topics were addressed within each theme: 
Theme #1: Causes of Cultural Relativism 
b. Informal Learning 
Theme #2: Consequences of Cultural Relativism 
c. In Research 
e. Judgment Formation 
Theme #3: Theoretical Dimensions 
a. Monocultural vs. Multicultural 
Perspective 
Presentation of the Data 
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Application Theme #1: Causes of Cultural Relativism. 
In terms of the definitional theme of "Attitudes Toward 
Difference," as can be seen in the previous section, Boas 
addresses the causes of cultural relativism (application 
theme #1). He describes how a person can become 
increasingly aware of his cultural conditioning, through the 
patient study of other cultures and the increasing of one's 
knowledge of cultural diversity. Boas calls this 
incremental awareness "objectivity," where " ... our own 
emotional valuations and attitudes are conscientiously held 
in the background" (1962, 207). 
Application Theme #2: Consequences of Cultural 
Relativism. Boas' discussion of both the definitional 
themes of "Attitudes Toward Difference" and "Contextualism" 
reveals that he also addressed the application theme #2 of 
consequences. He refers to the consequences of each largely 
in terms of their importance for scientific research of 
cultural phenomena (1962, 204-5). The former involves the 
''open mind" necessary for research (1962, 207) and the 
latter enables the researcher to accurately determine the 
meaning of phenomena within culture (1938, 133). 
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Boas' discussion of the "Attitudes Toward Difference" 
theme also describes the benefits that the findings of 
anthropology provides generally: "The general theory of 
valuation of human activities, as developed by 
anthropological research, teaches us a higher tolerance than 
the one we now profess" (1955, 225). 
Application Theme #3: Theoretical Dimensions. Much 
of Boas' writing is focused on clarifying issues of the key 
questions, assumptions, concepts, theories, and methods of 
anthropology. He clearly sought to further the development 
of cultural anthropology as a scientific field of study. 
His treatment of the definitional themes are part of this 
clarification endeavor and as such, address application 
theme #3 (Theoretical Dimensions) as well. 
ADVANTAGES 
Overview 
Boas' support for the concepts represented by the 
definitional themes is unmistakable. Boas cites several 
advantages for these concepts. The advantage themes which 
embrace them are as follows: 
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Theme #1: Facilitation of Internal, Attitudinal 
Changes 
a. Reduces Ethnocentrism 
b. Reduces Discrimination 
h. Increases Tolerance 
i. Counters Western Superiority Notion 
Theme #2: Facilitation of Accurate, Cultural 
Knowledge and Understanding 
a. Helps Understanding of Cultural Behaviors 
b. Helps Insight into Diversity of Cultural 
Truths and Norms 
Theme #3 (Facilitation of External, Interactive Results) is 
not explicitly addressed in Boas' work. 
Presentation of the Data 
Advantage Theme #1: Facilitation of Internal, 
Attitudinal Changes. Four of the intercultural 
communication topics related to this theme were found in 
Boas' work. One of his books addresses the issues of 
ethnocentrism extensively, (The Mind of Primitive Man, 
1938), presenting ethnological data to challenge the 
assumptions of that position. He says, for example, 
It appears that neither cultural achievement 
nor appearance is a safe basis on which to 
judge the mental aptitude of races. Added to 
this is the one-sided evaluation of our own 
racial type and of our modern civilization 
without any close inquiry into the mental 
processes of primitive races and cultures which 
may easily lead to erroneous conclusions (1938, 
30-31) . 
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The topic of discrimination is central to Boas' goals. 
He develops his case for the validity of the diversity of 
people, and the lack of justification for judging people's 
merits on "race." He concludes: 
Our tendency to evaluate an individual 
according to the picture that we form of the 
class to which we assign him, although he may 
not feel any inner connection with that class, 
is a survival of primitive forms of thought 
(1938, 241). 
Boas' support for the idea that awareness of diversity 
can lead to an increase of tolerance is evident from his 
statement that "the general theory of valuation of human 
activities, as developed by anthropological research, 
teaches us a higher tolerance than the one we now profess" 
(1938, 203). He discusses that the value we assign to our 
own civilization is because we participate in it, but that 
other traditions may be equally valuable. We have a 
difficult time realizing this because we have not grown up 
in those traditions (1938, 202-3). 
Another advantage topic found in Boas' writing within 
this theme is how the awareness of the diversity of cultures 
counters the Western superiority notion. Evidence of this 
is pervasive in Boas' works. The concluding statement of 
The Mind of Primitive Man demonstrates the degree to which 
Boas finds this superiority notion important to address: 
Freedom of judgment can be attained only when 
we learn to estimate an individual according to 
his own ability and character .... Then we shall 
treasure and cultivate the variety of forms 
that human thought and activity has taken, and 
abhor, as leading to complete s tagna ti on, all 
attempts to impress one pattern of thought upon 
whole nations or even upon the whole world 
(1938, 242). 
Advantage Theme #2: Facilitation of Cultural 
Knowledge and Understanding. Through his focus on the 
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importance of developing the greatest degree of objectivity 
possible, Boas addresses both topics found in this theme: 
(a) facilitation of the understanding of cultural behaviors, 
and (b) facilitation of insight into diversity of cultural 
"truths" and "norms." 
Objectivity, he says, is necessary for carrying out 
scientific study (1962, 204-5). The awareness of the 
diversity of thought results in a realization that our 
"truth" is not an absolute truth (1938, 201). This frees us 
to recognize, and possibly appreciate the value in, the 
variety of thought and behavior of other cultures (1938, 
203) . 
DISADVANTAGES 
Overview 
The intercultural communication disadvantage theme 
which refers to the difficulty of assuming cultural 
relativism is specifically addressed in Boas works. 
Presentation of the Data 
Disadvantage Theme #1: Difficulties of the Assumption 
of Cultural Relativism. Boas points out only one problem 
with any of the definitional concepts, namely, the 
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difficulty of casting off one's cultural conditioning. He 
does not say it is impossible; indeed, bicultural and 
multicultural people existed during his lifetime, though the 
quantity of literature about them did not parallel that of 
today. But, he cautions that it is likely to be experienced 
to a degree, one which he leaves open to the capabilities of 
the individual seeking to become an "objective," unbiased 
student of culture(s). 
* * * 
Fox, in the Social Science Encyclopedia, writes that 
Boas elaborated the "theoretical basis of cultural 
relativism" and passed this on to his students, one of whom 
was Ruth Benedict (1985, 28). The following section examines 
her views. 
RUTH BENEDICT (1887-1948) 
The importance of Benedict's contribution to the 
development of cultural relativism, and that of Herskovits, 
addressed in the next section, is underscored by Hatch, who, 
in his anthropological study of cultural relativism states 
that " ..• the thesis of relativism enjoyed its fullest 
flowering in the work of Ruth Benedict and Melville 
Herskovits" (1983, 35). 
Among her works, Benedict's views on cultural 
relativism are stated most specifically in her pioneering 
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book, Patterns of Culture. In it, however, she makes only 
three references to cultural relativism. 
DEFINITION 
Overview 
The intercultural communication definitional theme of 
"Cultural Diversity" is central to Benedict's writing on 
cultural relativism. 
Presentation of the Data 
Definitional Theme #1: Cultural Diversity. In the 
introduction to Patterns 0f Culture, Benedict indicates her 
definition of cultural relativism as the fact of diversity 
of cultures. She describes "traditional Anglo-Saxon 
intolerance" of other cultures, and says, 
... we have failed to understand the relativity 
of cultural habits, and we remain debarred from 
much profit and enjoyment in our human 
relations with peoples of different standards, 
and untrustworthy in our dealings with them 
(1934, 11). 
Benedict's second reference to relativism is a 
description of Wilhelm Dilthey's view regarding the 
"relativity" of philosophical systems evident in the history 
of thought. She indicates his view parallels her own view 
of cultural relativity. Again, she refers to cultural 
relativity as the idea that cultures are diverse, but she is 
more specific here, delineating more clearly the nature of 
"diversity." She says that diversity derives partly from 
the variety of integrated configurations of cultures, none 
of which is "final" (1934, 52): 
The significance of cultural behaviour is not 
exhausted when we have clearly understood that 
it is local and manmade and hugely variable. 
It tends also to be integrated. A culture, 
like an individual, is a more or less 
consistent pattern of thought and action .... 
... The whole, as modern science is insisting 
in many fields, is not merely the sum of all 
its parts, but the result of a unique 
arrangement and interelation of the parts that 
has brought about a new entity (1934, 46-7). 
Cultural relativity, to Benedict, therefore, is the 
existence of the humanly created, multiplicity of cultures 
which are diverse in their cultural expressions as well as 
in the overall cultural patterns within which these 
expressions occur. 
APPLICATIONS 
Overview 
Two of the three application themes were found in 
Benedict's work. Because Benedict defines cultural 
relativism as "cultural diversity," she does not focus on 
the causes of diversity, but rather, the consequences of 
this "fact" of multiplicity. She also addresses the 
importance of a multiplistic viewpoint for anthropological 
theory. The following themes and topics are discussed in 
this section: 
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Theme #2: Consequences of Cultural Relativism 
a. In Communication 
c. In Research 
e. Pertaining to Judgment Formation 
Theme #3: Theoretical Dimensions 
a. Monocultural vs Multicultural Perspective 
Presentation of the Data 
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Application Theme #2: Consequences of Cultural 
Relativism. In Benedict's work, cultural relativism is used 
in terms of the second intercultural communication 
application theme: consequences of cultural relativism. 
Benedict uses cultural relativism in her discussions which 
describe its importance for improved human relations 
(communication) and a better understanding of cultures and 
cultural diversity. She says, for example, that because we 
fail to understand cultural relativism, we " ... remain 
debarred from much profit and enjoyment in our human 
relations with people of different standards ... " (1934, 11). 
The understanding of cultural relativism, and the 
application of it in social sciences (such as research) is 
the basis on which we can form judgments on which to base 
social changes {1934, 278). 
Application Theme #3: Theoretical Dimensions. 
Benedict states that anthropology, distinct from other 
social sciences, includes the study of societies other than 
our own. The anthropologist, therefore, 
... is bound to av0id any weighting of one in 
favour of the other. He is interested in human 
behaviour, not as it is shaped by one 
tradition, our own, but as it has been shaped 
by any tradition whatsoever. He is interested 
in the great gamut of custom that is found in 
various cultures, and his object is to 
understand the way in which these cultures 
change and differentiate, the different forms 
through which they express themselves, and the 
manner in which the customs of any peoples 
function in the lives of the individuals who 
compose them (193(, 1-2). 
Benedict's entire book, Patterns of Culture, explains how 
"the relativity of cultural habits" facilitates 
anthropological theory b~cause of its multiplistic 
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perspective. In particular, she emphasizes the ethnocentric 
bias that can occur, and the importance of being aware of 
this bias when considering diverse cultures. 
ADVANTAGES 
Overview 
Concurrence with all of the advantage themes can be 
found in Benedict's writing, though she does not extensively 
address theme #3 (Facilitation of External, Interactive 
Results). The themes and topics which reflect her views are 
as follows: 
Theme #1: Facilitation of Improved, Attitudinal 
Changes 
a. Reduces Ethnocentrism 
b. Reduces Discrimination 
d. Increases Enjoyment of Difference 
h. Increases Tolerance 
i. Counters Western Superiority Notion 
Theme #2: Facilitation of Cultural Knowledge and 
Understanding 
a. Helps Understanding of Cultural Behaviors 
b. Helps Insight into Diversity of Cultural 
Truths and Norws 
Theme #3: Facilitation of External, Interactive 
Results 
a. Facilitates Intercultural Functioning 
Presentation of the Data 
Advantage Theme #1: Facilitation of Internal, 
Attitudinal Changes. Five of the intercultural 
communication topics which occurred within this theme were 
found in Benedict's writing. In her final reference to 
cultural relativism in Patterns of Culture, Benedict 
emphasizes the importance of the recognition and 
appreciation of cultural diversity as a key to dissolving 
the fetters of ethnocentrism and achieving increased 
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international understanding and cooperation. It " would 
do much to promote a rational social order" (Benedict 1934, 
10) • 
Benedict, however, does not require, in her advocacy 
of the recognition of cultural relativism, the dissolution 
of one's judgment regarding culture. She, instead, points 
40 
out the need for refocusing judgment. People must shift 
from the prison of ethnocentric judgment, which yields blind 
biases such as race prejudice based on the ignorance or fear 
of cultural differences (1934, 9-10) and form judgment based 
on the awareness of cultural diversity. To avoid 
discrimination, we need to, therefore, 
... become increasingly culture-conscious. We 
may train ourselves to pass judgment upon the 
dominant traits of our own civilization. It is 
difficult t:nough for anyone brought up under 
their powe::r to recognizt: them. It ls still 
more difficult to discount, upon nece::ssity, our 
predilection for them .... The possibility of 
orderly progress is shut off because the 
generation in question could not make any 
appraisal of its overgrown ins ti tut ions. It 
could not cast them up in terms of profit and 
loss becaus~ it had lost its power to look at 
them objectively (1934, 249). 
In other words, the loss of objectivity means the loss of 
the ability to step outside of one's own culture and seeing 
one's own cultural expressions as among many possibilities. 
Instead, the subjective view of seeing one's culture as the 
only right way prevails. One remains ignorant and fearful 
and thus, very likely to have a negative attitude toward 
cultural difference. Were we to understand cultural 
relativity, we would both profit from and enjoy cultural 
difference (1934, 11). 
Throughout her book, Benedict discusses how an 
awareness of cultural diversity helps to counter the notion 
of Western superiority (1934, 7-8). In our Western 
civilization, Benedict says, the degree to which we can free 
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ourselves from ethnocentrism and see creative options to the 
status quo is the degree to which, in turn, we become able 
to objectively evaluate our own culture (1934, 250). This 
is the basis for making "real improvements in the social 
order," and the problem of doing so, " ... is the most 
pressing this generati6n has to face ... " (1934, 249). 
Benedict concludes her book saying the overall results 
of all this is an increase in tolerance and new bases of 
tolerance (1934, 278). 
Advantage Theme #2: Facilitation of Accurate, 
Cultural Knowledge and Understanding. A se~ond advantage of 
cultural relativism is improved cultural understanding which 
is achieved when cultures are recognized as varying, 
integrated patterns. This includes the understanding of the 
whole pattern of a culture which involves perception, 
beliefs about "truth," and behaviors. The insights afforded 
by relativism are important for both the anthropologist in 
research, and for those engaged in fostering social change. 
The job of the anthropologist is to objectively gather 
information about cultures (1934, 1-2), having achieved 
" ... that degree of sophistication where we no longer set our 
own belief over against our neighbour's superstition." 
(1934, 4) The anthropologist recognizes that cultures are 
humanly created and, therefore, necessarily diverse. 
Additionally, the anthropologist understands that the 
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diversity of cultural expressions requir~s one to seek their 
meaning from within the complex of the culture: 
If we are interested in cultural processes, 
the only way in which we can know the 
significance of the selected detail of 
behaviour is against the background of the 
motives and emotions and values that are 
institutionalized in that culture (1934, 49). 
However, in gaining cultural understanding, we can 
never experience another culture as fully as one who has 
been brought up in that culture, but increased awareness of 
cultural diversity affords increased wisdom and tolerance, 
and an awareness that, just as we perceive our own culture 
to be significant, so the members of other cultures perceive 
their cultures to be significant also (1934, 37). Social 
change in a "more sane" direction requires that 
We need intimate understanding of their 
experiences, so that we shall learn to 
discriminate between what is truly socially 
dangerous and what is only another method of 
arriving at a sot.:ially d~sirablt: goal. The 
kinds of strength which the people of each area 
could use in a world organized for peace can 
only be those to which they have been bred. If 
we insist that they imitate another kind of 
strength, they will be powerless to contribute. 
If we, the people of tht: world, are ever to 
achieve a world organization which promises 
mutual benefits, we must be scientifically 
prepared to know the strength which different 
nations of the world can utilize to this end 
(1946, 164). 
The recognition of the diversity of cultures, with 
their varying integrated patterns, facilitates the cultural 
understanding on which to base such social changes. 
Research based on accurate cultural understanding will 
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enable us to recognize the variety of cultural strengths 
with which the peoples of the world have to work. 
Advantage Theme #3: Facilitation of External, 
Interactive Results. Benedict refers to improvements in 
social relations which result from cultural relativism, 
implying interactive results, but does not describing them, 
per se: 
Social thinking at the presi:=n t time has no 
more important task before it than that of 
taking adequati:= account of cultural relativity. 
In the fields of both sociology and psychology 
the implications are fundamental, and modern 
thought about contacts of peoples and about our 
changing standards is greatly in need of sane 
and scientific direction .... We shall arrive 
then at amore realistic social faith, accepting 
as grounds of hope and as new bases for 
tolerance the coexisting and equally valid 
patterns of life which mankind has created for 
itself from the raw materials of existence 
(1934, 278). 
DISADVANTAGES 
Overview 
Benedict mentions two disadvantages regarding cultural 
relativism. One, the difficulty of assuming cultural 
relativism, is embraced by one of the intercultural 
communication themes. The second, which refers to the 
phenomenon of "reverse ethnocentrism," falls outside the 
intercultural communication themes, and is, therefore, 
designated as an "additional disadvantag~." 
.. 
~ '* 
Presentation of the Data 
Disadvantage Theme #1: Difficulties of Assumption of 
Cultural Relativism. Benedict explains that people fail to 
realize that 
The great diversity of social 
man has worked out in different 
all equally possible on the 
original endowment" (1934, 14). 
solutions that 
cultures ... are 
basis of his 
She explains that it is difficult to understand 
cultural relativity ("the relativity of cultural habits") 
btcause the process of cultural conditioning tends to make 
people ethnocentric (1934, 5-6). People perceive their own 
cultures as the standard, and the norm, for all cultures 
because either they devalue other cultures, or they are 
ignorant of the existence of cultural alternatives. 
Benedict defines culture as the ideas and standards 
that members of a culture have in common (19JS, 16). She 
states emphatically that the failure to be culturally 
relative must be overcome. While it is evident that 
Benedict believes that ethnocentrism and its potential 
negative impact on other cultures can occur anywhere (1934, 
11), she focuses her appeal on contemporary western 
societies, saying they need to become aware of the diversity 
of cultural forms to become more appreciative of and 
tolerant of other cultures (1938, 16). 
Additional Disadvantage: Reverse Ethnocentrism. It 
is interesting that Benedict makes a point of saying that 
appreciation of difference does not ruean "a romantic return 
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to the primitive" (1933, 20). Sh~ says that one or dnother 
culture may appeal to people amidst an ''era of heterogeneous 
standards and confused mechanical bustle" (1938, 20). 
However, 
... it is not in a return to ideals preserved 
for us by primitive peoplt:s that our society 
will heal itself of its maladies. The romantic 
Utopianism that reaches out toward the simpler 
primitive, attractive as it sometimes may be, 
is as often, in ethnological study, a hindrance 
as a help (1938, 20). 
MELVILLE HERSKOVITS (1895-1963) 
In his book, The Development of Anthropological Ideas, 
Honigmann states that among the anthropologists who defended 
cultural relativity, none did so more "vehemently" than 
Melville Herskovits (1976, 260-61). 
DEFINITION 
Overview 
Herskovits' definition of cultural relativism was not 
encompassed by the intercultural communication themes. 
Therefore, it is referred to here as a "definition" to 
indicate that it fell outside the thematic framework. 
Presentation of the Data 
Additional Definition: Subjectivism. Herskovits 
refers to his definition of cultural relativism as follows: 
The principle of cultural relativism derives 
from a vast array of factual data, gained from 
the application of techniques in field study 
that have permitted us to penetrate the 
underlying value-systems of societies having 
diverse customs. This principle, briefly 
stated, is as follows: Judgments are based on 
experience, and experience is interpreted by 
each individual in terms of his own 
enculturation (1948, 63). 
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Herskovits' definition constitutes a new definition--
Subjectivism. Its distinction from Themes #1 and 2 are 
obvious. It differs from Theme #3 because Herskovits is 
referring to all inner experi~nces--perception, cognition, 
and evaluation (1958, 267), not just conscious attitudes 
toward difference. Herskovits' definition also differs from 
Theme #4. While it does have a contextual element in it, in 
contrast to ''contextualism," where a person consciously sees 
aspects of culture in terms uf the respective cultural 
context, it refers to the influence of cultural context upon 
people and their perceptions. 
Herskovits explains that "cultural relativism" has a 
"sure, psychological foundation," identified by Sheriff as 
the concept of "frame of reference'' (1948, 65). This is the 
psychological basis of social norms, internalized by 
individuals during enculturation, and comprising the measure 
against which an individual perceives reality (whether 
something is, for example, "normal" or "abnormal," "right" 
or "wrong") {1948, 66): 
Even the facts of the physical world are 
discerned through the enculturative screen, so 
that the perception of time, distance, weight, 
size, and other ''realities" is mediated by the 
conventions of any given group (1948, 64). 
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Thus, though a physical reality exists, cultural relativism 
is the "fact" that judgments of reality are relative to the 
cultural ''frame of reference." Necessarily, what may be 
"normal" or "good" in one culture, may be "abnormal," or 
"bad" in another {1948, 66). Because cultural frames of 
reference are the product of contacts between individuals 
{1948, 66), they have no ultimate origin other than the 
interaction of the individuals. They are all historical and 
human developments (1948, 64). Further, they can change: 
" ... The summation of behavior we call culture is flexible, 
not rigid, and holds many possibilities of choice within its 
larger framework" {1948, 64). The lack of an absolute set 
of values against which all others are measured is a basic 
assumption of cultural relativism. 
Herskovits makes a point of stating that to understand 
cultural relativism, one must <lifferentiate between 
absolutes and universals {1948, 76). Although there may be 
no absolutes, universals, inductively deduced, can be 
identified. For example, though there is no one absolute 
set of standards, the existence of standards can be found in 
every society. Morality is, thus, an example of a 
"universal" {1948, 76). 
APPLICATIONS 
Overview 
Herskovits states three basic applications of 
relativism: methodological, philosophical, and practical 
(1951, 24). He does not address how one becomes 
relativistic (Theme #1). His views are encompassed by the 
following: 
Theme #2: Consequences cf Cultural Relativism 
c. In Research 
e. Pertaining to Judgment Formation 
Theme #3: Theoretical DiIBensions 
a. Monocultural vs MulticultuLal Perspectiv~ 
Presentation of the Data 
Application Theme #2: Consequences of Cultural 
Relativism. Herskovits' discussions pertain primarily to 
research, and the implications of judgment formation in 
research. When cultural relativism is used as a method of 
inquiry, one strives to achieve, he says, 
... as great a degree of objectivity as 
possible ... one does not judge the modes of 
behavior one is describing, or seek to change 
them. Rather, one seeks to understand the 
sanctions of behavior in terms of the 
established relationships within the culture 
itself, and refrains from making 
interpretations that arise from a preconceived 
frame of reference (1951, 24). 
In other words, one is able to do research as free of bias 
as possible. A researcher, in recognizing his or her own 
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subjectivism, is sensitive to possible value judgments and 
thus seeks to exercise objectivity, "a primary requir~ment 
of our scientific endeavors" (1951, 25). 
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There are also implications of relativism which extend 
to how research findings are to be considered, namely, 
"within the frame of reference set by the culture we are 
studying ... analyzed in terms of its relevance to the total 
structure of cultural form ... " (1951, 26). 
Herskovits suggests that a third implication of the 
fact of relativism (subjectivism) is the recognition of 
cultural diversity (1951, JO). 
Cultural relativism in "practice" (in contrast to 
"research") is the application of the philosophical 
principles of relativism "derived from the method, to the 
wider, cross-cultural world scene'' (1951, 24). Cultural 
relativism, "on the level of application, stresses the 
importance of allowing, rather than imposing acceptances of 
cultural elements newly experienced" (1951, 30). 
Application Theme #3: Theoretical Implications. In 
his reference to philosophical applications, Herskovits 
highlights the theoretical dimensions cultural relativism 
can address. It (relativism) " ... concerns the nature of 
cultural values, and, beyond this, the implication of an 
epistemology that derives from a recognition of the force of 
enculturative condition in shaping thought and behavior" 
(Herskovits 1951, 24). Herskovits strongly indicates that 
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anthropologists have to squarely face questions such ~s 
"Whose standards?" (1958, 270) and "Whose objective 
reality?" (1958, 271) when they are involved in researching 
other cultures. 
It is clear from his works that Herskovits saw 
relativism as challenging and guiding the assumptive 
foundation of anthropology, generating a specific set of 
questions and influencing the methodology with wl1ich they 
can be addressed, particularily, in terms of the study of 
cultural values (1951, 24) . 
. . . an important factor in its [cultural 
relativism's] development is the increasingly 
felt need to expand the base of formal 
philosophical thought so as to include the 
entire range of human culture, rather than to 
continue its focus on the Graeco-Roman 
tradition which, from the point of view of the 
total cultural inventory of mankind, has 
limited its resources and its findings (1958, 
266) • 
ADVANTAGES 
Overview 
Herskovits addresses, primarily, Themes #1 and #2 from 
the intercultural literature. As can be seen from the 
following outline, fewer of the intercultural communication 
topics are addressed in Herskovits' work than in the work of 
either Boas or Benedict, the omissions being those topics 
which refer to interpersonal interactions. This seems to 
reflect the distinction Herskovits makes between the 
anthropologist involved in the intellectual process of 
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research, and the anthropologist in the role of citizen, 
interacting in society. Herskovits' views are organized as 
follows: 
Theme #1: Facilitation of Internal, Attitudinal 
Changes 
a. Reduces Ethnocentrism 
h. Increases Tolerance 
i. Counters Western Superiority Notion 
Theme #2: Facilitation of Cultural Knowledge and 
Understanding 
a. Helps Understanding of Cultural Behaviors 
b. Helps Insight into Diversity of Cultural 
Truths and Norms 
Presentation of the Data 
Advantage Theme #1: Facilitation of Internal, 
Attitudinal Changes. Herskovits states that one of the 
advantages of cultural relativism is that it brings into 
focus the " ... validity of every set of norms for the people 
whose lives are guided by them, and the values these 
represent" (1948, 76). The recognition and affirmation of 
multiplicity encourages understanding and tolerance between 
people of different cultures, in contrast to the 
judgmentalism and destruction which expectations of 
conformity to one's own code can foster (1948, 77). 
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Herskovits makes clear, however, that tolerance as 
applied to research is somewhat different than tolerance in 
social contexts: 
The answer to the problem raised by practical 
relativism remains one which cannot be resolved 
on the philosophical level. It must be 
repeated, there is no living in terms of 
unilateral tolerance, and when there is the 
appeal to power, one cannot but translate 
enculturated belief into action (1958, 271). 
A second benefit of relativism is that, through the 
awareness of the variety and significance of the diversity 
of cultures, cultural relativism helps us to lift ourselves 
" ... out of the ethnocentric morass in which our thinking 
about ultimate values has for so long bogged down" (1948, 
78). In so doing, it affords us a fre~h perspective on our 
own culture. We attain a different kind of objectivity 
(1948, 78). 
Herskovits differentiates between two kinds of 
ethnocentrism. The fi~st is that of people from cultures 
which " ... have a gentle insistence of the good qualities of 
one's own group, without any drive to extend this attitude 
into the field of action" (1948, 69). This form of 
ethnocentrism facilitates "individual integration and social 
adjustment" through exclusive identification with one's 
group. 
This contrasts with the ethnocentrism of Euro-
Americans, for example, where the tradition is to devalue or 
negatively evaluate cultural expressions which are different 
..... 
:i.) 
from the home culture, and to expect that they must be 
changed to match those of the home culture (1948, 69). The 
notion of "progress," its application in Euro-American 
tradition for dividing cultures into "inferior" and 
"superior," and the subsequent drive to change others to be 
like Euro-americans, is part of the problem of Euro-American 
ethnocentrism: 
What we too often fail to recognize is that 
superiority of this demonstrable kind will not 
necessarily convince a person from another 
culture that an art foreign to his own is also 
preferable, or that monotheism is better than 
polytheism .... Acceptance of European beliefs 
and values, coupled with the withholding of 
opportunity to achieve an equitable way of life 
under them - the most common form, over the 
world, of the contradictory situation that 
ensues on the imposition of Euroamerican 
controls - induces bewilderment, despair, and 
cyncism (1948, 69). 
Ethnoc~ntrism, such as that of the Euro-American tradition, 
rationalized and made the basis of programs of action 
detrimental to the well-being of other peoples, gives rise 
to serious problems (1948, 68). 
It is clear that Herskovits perceived cultural 
relativism as a concept rooted in Euro-American tradition 
addressing the Euro-Aamerican problem of ethnocentric zeal. 
He pointed out that both the dualism inherent in the concept 
(absolute/no absolutes) and the scientific methods upon 
which the concept is based, derive from Euro-American 
culture (1948, 76-77). However, he states that cultural 
relativism offers new conceptual direction: 
In a culture where absolute values are 
stressed, the relativism of a world that 
encompasses many ways of living will be 
difficult to comprehend (1948, 78). 
54 
Supported by ethnographic data, relativism shifts the focus 
from the idea of the singular authority of any one culture 
to the multiplicity of humanly created significance assigned 
by cultural members to their respective cultures. 
Additionally, because cultures are not closed systems, even 
within the entity of a "culture," values may vary just as, 
in the lives of succeeding generations, values and behaviors 
can change (1948, 64). Cultural relativism points out this 
variability, and at the same time, fosters insight into the 
commonalities of the human experience: 
Cultural relativism which stresses the 
universals in human experience as against 
ethnocentric concepts of absolute values, in no 
wise gives over the restraints that every 
system of ethics exercises over those who live 
in accordance with it. To recognize that 
right, and justi~e, and beauty may have as many 
manifestations as there are cultures is to 
express tolerance, not nihilism. As 
anthropology's greatest contribution, this 
position puts man yet another step on his quest 
of what he ought to be, in the light of the 
facts, as we know them, about what in his 
unity, no less than in his diversity, he is 
(1948, 655). 
Advantage Theme #2: Facilitation of Accurate, 
Cultural Knowledge and Understanding. Cultural relativism, 
applied as a method, is a means for understanding and 
describing behavior: " ... One seeks to understand the 
sanctions of behavior in terms of the established 
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relationships within the culture itself, and refrains from 
making interpretations that arise from a preconceived frame 
of reference" (1958, 24). This is applicable in the study 
of cultures where" ... one seeks to attain as great a degree 
of objectivity as possible" (1972, 32). 
Relativism, thus, affords the benefits of 
contextualism, which is essential for the accurate 
understanding of cultural difference (1948, 65). This 
difference extends to the perceptions of people, and their 
interpretations of reality (1958, 267). Herskovits 
specifies that the relativistic student of culture does not 
seek to judge or change, only to observe and understand 
(Herskovits 1951, 24). 
A second methodological benefit is the self-reflexive 
ability which the relativistic researcher can exercise. The 
scientist is aware of the influence of culture upon 
judgment, and thus can take note of both the conditions 
influencing that which he is studying, and the cultural 
conditions influencing himself (1948, 76). 
It is noteworthy that Herskovits, like Boas (1962, 
207) and Benedict (1934, 250), refers to this ability of 
"objectivity" as quantitative, such that one can have 
greater or lesser degrees of it. He implies one is less, or 
more, objective depending on the extent to which one 
refrains from making interpretations based on one's frame of 
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reference, and, in turn, succeeds in making interpretations 
based on a new frame ~f reference. 
DISADVANTAGES 
Overview 
The disadvantage Herskovits cites is not encompassed 
by the intercultural communication themes. Hence, it is not 
referred to here as a "theme" but rather, as a 
"disadvantage." 
Presentation of the Data 
Additional Disadvantage #1: The Illogical Logic of 
Cultural Relativism. Herskovits draws attention to the 
different uses of cultural relativism and warns that, when 
distinctions are not drawn between the methodological, 
philosophical, and practical aspects of cultural relativism, 
confusion can result. His concern is that there will be a 
confusion of logic between levels. He identifies as an 
example of this confusion those "instances of the rejection 
of relativism on philosophical grounds, by writers who 
attempt to reconcile the principle of absolute values with 
the diversity of known systems" (1972, 34, footnote). 
Herskovits, thus, perceives that, depending on its use, the 
implications of cultural relativism, defined by him as the 
culture-boundness of judgment, change. 
Another example of the problem of shifting levels 
involves the findings of science versus the applications of 
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the findings. This problem of ''scientist as citizen'" 
Herskovits seems to readily admit, is a dilemma "not only 
being faced by anthropologists, but by all scientists and, 
indeed, by scholars in the humanities as well" (1958, JO). 
This problem cannot be resolved on the philosophical level, 
however. The scientist exercises judgmental restraint, but 
as a citizen, "there is no living in terms of unilateral 
tolerance ... one cannot but translate enculturated belief 
into action" (1958, 30). 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
It is clear that Boas, Benedict, and Herskovits concur 
extensively on their anthropological assumptions regarding 
cultural relativism. Boas' work is so comprehensive that it 
encompasses a multitude of views regarding cultural 
relativism including: the multiplicity of cultural values, 
the problem of objectivity, and the understanding of 
cultures. Because Boas did not specifically use the term 
"cultural relativism, his own definition, if he had one, 
remains unknown. 
Benedict's definition of cultural relativism focuses 
on the "fact" of the existence of cultural multiplicity. 
Her application of the concept is to counter ethnocentrism 
and create tolerance of cultural differences. 
Herskovits' definition is much more narrow, focusing 
on the culture-boundness of judgment formation. He bases 
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his definition on the multiplicity of cultures, which he 
treats as an assumption, unlike Benedict who employs the 
idea of the cultural diversity as her very definition. Both 
Benedict's and Herskovits' definitions are descriptive, but 
their applications are prescriptive. 
It is interesting to observe that all three of these 
anthropologists were dedicated to alleviating what they 
perceived as the negative evaluation of cultural differences 
and its resulting abuses. All three sought to bring to the 
fore a recognition of what they saw as the universal dignity 
of humanity. Herein li~s what they perceived to be the 
overall advantage to cultural r~lativism. 
The early anthropologists refer to three different 
disadvantages of cultural relativism. Both Boas and 
Benedict discuss the difficulties of assuming cultural 
relativism. Benedict also points out that problems can 
occur for those anthropologists who experience reverse 
ethnocentrism. Herskovits briefly mentions the problems 
that can occur if the different uses of cultural relativism 
are not kept logically distinct. 
* * * 
In the next chapter, the definitions, applications, 
advantages and disadvantages of cultural relativism will be 
examined in the current literature of intercultural 
communication. 
CHAPTER III 
CULTURAL RELATIVISM 
IN THE INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION LITERATURE 
The data obtained to providing information about 
cultural relativism in the intercultural communication 
literature were the result of an extensive literature 
search. 148 books, journal articles and papers were 
ultimately selected as the most likely works to contain 
reference to cultural relativism. From these 148, 44 works 
were selected to comprise the body of intercultural 
communication literature upon which this study is based. 
For brevity's sake, where these forty-four works are 
referred to as a whole, the phrase "ICC references" will be 
used. 
The criterion for selecting the forty-four works was 
quite straightforward. Any intercultural communication work 
containing the term "cultural relativism," or some close 
variation thereof, was included. The purpose of this 
criterion was to screen for those works in which cultural 
relativism is specifically signified as such by the authors. 
This restriction was seen as important because many of 
the works in the intercultural literature do not contain the 
term "cultural relativism," but they do include concepts 
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which might be termed "cultural relativism." Because of the 
absence of a concept label (i.e., "cultural relativism") in 
these works, there was no way of knowing if these authors 
would themselves view these various concepts in their 
writing as "cultural relativism." 
Once the body of ICC literature was established, it 
was subsequently examined for the four categories of data 
delineated previously in the section on method: 
1. authors' definitions of cultural relativism 
2. authors' applications of cultural relativism (i.e. 
using cultural relativism in a discussion about methods for 
improving communication skills or how cultural relativism 
can be developed through training) 
3. advantages of cultural relativism presented by the 
authors 
4. disadvantages of cultural relativism presented by 
the authors 
DEFINITIONS 
Overview 
The definitions of cultural relativism found in the 
sample consist of those stated explicitly by the authors or, 
ones which are clearly implied by the surrounding text. Of 
the 44 works containing the term "cultural relativism" (or 
related term), only 13 works (30%) actually contain 
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definitions of cultural relativism (8 stated, 5 clearly 
implied) . 
A description of the range of definitions found is 
presented in the following paragraphs. Variations within 
each group which emerged are identified. The distribution 
of definitions within the themes was found to be as follows: 
Theme J!l: Cultural Diversity (3 works) 
Theme 1!2: Cultural Validity (2 works) 
Theme lP: Attitudes Toward Difference (4 works) 
Theme 1!4: Contextualism (4 works) 
Presentation of the Data 
Definitional Theme #1: Cultural Diversity. Gudykunst 
and Kim explicitly state that cultural relativism is "the 
fact of cultural diversity" (1984, 203). Two other works 
clearly imply this definition. Pedersen refers to cultural 
diversity when he describes the ''relativist framework" in 
which cultures are differentiated from one another by 
divergent attitudes, values and assumptions ... " (1974, 55). 
Howell emphasizes the "fact" of diversity when he says, in 
his definition, that 
... everything we live by is relative. 
Somewhere on Spaceship Earth is a culture which 
finds our treasured values to be unwholesome 
and gives high priority to goals and practices 
we reject {1977, 8). 
Definitional Theme #2: Egual Cultural Validity. Two 
of the definitions in the ICC literature explicitly address 
this theme. Bochner defines cultural relativism as 
... the doctrine that all practices are valid if 
they are sanctioned by the indigenous norms and 
traditions of their society (1981, 14). 
In a similar vein, Tai, who presents her definition 
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three times, says cultural relativism is the view that other 
cultures are just as valid as our own (1986, 28), that it 
means " ... no one culture is better or worse than any 
other ... " (1986, 88), and also that " ... all cultures are 
equally valuable ... " (1986, 88). 
The obvious commonality between these definitions is 
the reference to the universal, equal validity of all 
cultures. Bochner, however, confines his definition to the 
validity of cultural practices, whereas Tai refers to whole 
cultures. Further, Bochner states the validity of said 
practices derives from the societies to which they belong. 
Tai states no source of validity, though she implies that it 
is an inherent characteristic of culture. 
Definitional Theme #3: Attitudes Toward Difference. 
Four of the definitions in the sample correlated with this 
definitional theme. Stewart, Danielson and Foster 
explicitly define cultural relativism as: " ... a perspective 
which recognizes that differing sets of values and 
assumptions exist ... " (1979, 44). 
M. Bennett, using the term "ethnorelativism", says 
this means "different cultures are perceived as variable and 
viable constructions of reality" (1986, 64). 
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He uses the term "ethnorelativism" to clearly express 
cultural relativism as the opposite of ethnocentrism (1986, 
46). He defines ethnocentrism as: " ... 'assuming that the 
world-view of one's own culture is central to all reality'" 
(1986, 33). Further, ethnocentrism, in contrast to 
ethnorelativism, involves experiencing cultural difference 
as "threatening" (1986, 46). 
Ethnorelativism, as the opposite to ethnocentrism, is 
the "assuming" that "reality" varies with culture or, to put 
it another way, that one is aware of, and accepts, the 
existence of different cultural realities. It involves 
" ... stages of greater recognition and acceptance of 
difference ... " (1986, 27). Furthermore, these perceived 
differences, unlike in the various ethnocentric stages, are 
experienced as ''non-threatening" (1986, 46). 
In two works, implied definitions were found. Wendt 
refers to cultural relativism as the understanding, respect 
and tolerance of other cultures (1982, 583). Mayer refers 
to cultural relativism as a perceptual process where a 
person is "ready to accept the potentiality of numerous 
frames of reference .... and is able to vouch for the 
workability of each frame of reference" (1980, 34). 
Definitional Theme #4: Contextualization. Four of 
the works in the sample addressed this theme. Three 
explicit definitions were found. Sitaram and Haapanen 
present the following definition: 
cultural relativism ... the study of the 
values of others within the framework of that 
culture rather than in comparison with our own 
values (1979, 150). 
Sitaram and Cogell define cultural relativism similarly, 
referring to it as a "method" of studying values (1976, 
177) . 
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Samovar and Porter also define cultural relativism in 
terms of contextualization, but, instead of values, they 
refer to concepts of right and wrong, valued in a particular 
culture as ''truth." These " ... should be meaningful to us 
only in the relative sense of what is accepted or believed 
within a given context" (1976, 12). 
Tzeng doesn't give an explicit definition of cultural 
relativism. However, in his discussion of relativism, he 
says that "judgment (or adaptation) of a given (absolute) 
conception" of a culture must be made within the context of 
that culture rather than in comparison to one's own culture 
(1983, 245). 
The commonality of these four definitions is that 
concepts and/or values are identified as needing to be 
understood or made meaningful only in relation to their 
respective cultural contexts. 
APPLICATIONS 
Overview 
Authors of works in the intercultural communication 
literature sample use cultural relativism in their 
discussions in many different ways. The thematic range of 
applications, and the topical variations within each 
thematic group, are noted as follows: 
Theme #1: Causes of Cultural Relativism (15 works) 
a. Cultural relativism resulting from a formal 
learning context (9 works) 
b. Cultural relativism resulting from an 
informal learning context (6 works) 
Theme #2: Consequences of Cultural Relativism (23 
works) 
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a. Applications pe~taining to the communication 
process (13 works) 
b. In Professions Involving Face-to-Face 
Interactions (5 works) 
c. In Research (2 works) 
d. Pertaining to Culture Shock (1 work) 
e. Pertaining to Judgment Formation (lwork) 
Theme #3: Theoretical Dimensions (6 works) 
a. Monocultural Y.2. Multicultural Speech 
Perspective (2 works) 
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b. Human Rights and Intercultural Theory 
(1 work) 
c. Viability of Cultural Relativism (3 works) 
Presentation of the Data 
Application Theme #1: Causes of Cultural Relativism. 
The fifteen works encompassed by this theme divide into two 
topics--formal learning and informal learning. 
A. Formal Learning 
Nine works utilize cultural relativism in discussions 
pertaining to formal learning. Four variations within this 
group were identified: measuring relativism, 
teaching/training outcomes, training models, and ethical 
questions. 
1. One author refers to measuring relativism. Tzeng, 
in his discussion of intercultural training, describes how 
the use of a certain data collection format ("Atlas") 
" ... may pose as an objective criterion for assessing the 
trainee's progress in developing cultural relativism on 
various issues" (1983, 244-5). 
2. Five authors refer to cultural relativism as a 
teaching/training outcome. Furnham and Bochner state that 
in training: 
The aim is to compare and contrast two 
cultures, look at various behaviours from the 
perspective of each society, and thus develop a 
sensi ti vi ty to and awareness of cultural 
rel a ti vi ty, leading to the view that very few 
human values, beliefs and behaviours are 
absolute and universal and that what a 
particular individual believes to be true and 
good will depend on the norms prevailing in 
that person's society, norms that other 
societies may reject (1986, 237). 
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J. Bennett discusses training outcomes which educators 
generally anticipate will result from self-awareness 
training, one of which is cultural relativism (1985, 164). 
Mayer uses cultural relativism (termed "ethno-
relativism") in contrast to ethnocentrism to provide further 
insight into ethnocentrism. He says that ethnorelativism 
can be taught, and tested for (1980, 35). 
Howell presents cultural relativism in the context of 
exploring whether or not intercultural communication can be 
taught in the classroom. Relativism, he emphasizes, is a 
key insight resulting from the study of intercultural 
communication (1977, 8). 
Harris and Moran, in discussing managers with cross-
cultural sensitivity, explain that cross-cultural 
experiences and formal cultural study can result in cultural 
understanding, which makes us aware that behavior and 
culture are relative (1979, 202-3). 
3. Two authors describe training models for 
developing cultural relativism. M. Bennett uses cultural 
relativism ("ethnorelativism") in the context of a 
theoretical model which depicts an "ethnocentrism-
ethnorelativism" continuum, useful for training, to 
" ... guide the seguencing of concepts and techniques to match 
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some typical progression of development in students" (1985, 
28) • 
Stewart, Danielson and Foster discuss the 
"American/Contrast American" simulation model for 
intercultural communication training and the importance of 
depicting American culture accurately in the model. This is 
because developing cultural self-awareness (i.e. awareness 
of one's QliU cultural assumptions and values) is the basis 
for developing the perspective of cultural relativism (1979, 
44) • 
4. One work by Paige and Martin focuses on ethical 
guestions associated with the development of cultural 
relativism in training/teaching contexts: 
It is our view, therefore, that it is not the 
normal condition of human beings to be 
culturally relativistic, appreciative of 
contradictory belief and behavioral systems, or 
nonjudgmental when confronted with alternate 
cultures .... The ethical issue at question 
becomes the degree to which the trainer is 
aware of the expectations for personal change 
inherent in cross-cultural training programs 
and is prepared to assist the learner who 
begins to suffer stress and anxiety as a result 
of training. We are not arguing against 
training directed at promoting personal 
change ... (1983, 44). 
They discuss the ethical issue of trainer responsibility 
toward trainees, and say this is critical because training 
can be " ... potentially threatening, even damaging ... " 
because it challenges one's own cultural ways {1983, 44). 
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b. Informal Learning 
Six works describe cultural relativism as resulting 
from unstructured or informal culture-learning. Three 
variations occur within this group: exposure to teaching 
methods and content of intercultural communication, exposure 
to other cultures, and mediation. 
1. Asuncion-Lande indicates cultural relativism is an 
indirect result of exposure to the methods and content of 
intercultural communication teaching and research. She says 
this as important implications for bilingual and bicultural 
education: 
The content and methods employed in research 
and in teaching intercultural communication 
make one aware of the rel a ti vi ty of one's own 
group's standard (1975, 66). 
2. Three works discuss how cultural relativism may 
result from a person's exposure to another culture. 
Barnlund and Nomura, in discussing cultural adjustment 
within a new culture, point out that cultural relativism may 
result from conceptual learning about a culture, but this 
may not always occur because cultural relativity is not 
easily acquired. Experiential learning in addition to 
intellectual learning may be needed as well (1985, 360-361). 
Brislin, in describing the effects of sojourns, says 
one of the effects is "an understanding of cultural 
relativity" (1981, 104). 
Adler, in discussing mediators, says that cultures are 
a source of renewing a relativistic perspective for 
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mediators. He explains that a ''multicultural person" needs 
to " ... rely heavily on cultures to maintain his own 
relativity" (1974, 370). 
3. Two authors say relativism results, or should, from 
mediation. McLeod emphasizes that 
... mediating activities should result in some 
kind of benefit for the two cultures between 
which he is mediating. The success of the 
mediating person must be measured in terms of 
his effect on the people of the two or more 
cultures with which he is familiar... (1981, 
50) • 
She says one of the effects of mediation should be the 
acquisition of a relativistic outlook by the people involved 
in the mediating. 
Bochner, in his discussion of mediation, discusses how 
the "disengaged" (versus the ''engaged") mediator helps 
others form culturally relativistic attitudes (198la, 306). 
Application Theme #2: Conseguences of Cultural 
Relativism. Authors addressed cultural relativism as it 
pertained to conseguences in five areas: ( 1) in 
communication, {2) in professional work, {3) in research, 
(4) pertaining to culture shock, and (5) pertaining to 
judgment formation. The references to cultural relativism 
in twenty-one works are encompassed by this theme (48% of 
the ICC literature). 
a. Consequences in Communication 
Fourteen works employ cultural relativism in 
discussions of how it affects and facilitates the 
intercultural communication process in various ways. 
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1. Szalay presents cultural relativism as the key 
process factor which distinguishes intercultural from 
domestic communication. It involves a bridging of 
differences through cultural self-awareness, a knowledge of 
the other culture, and adaptation to the other's cultural 
frame of reference. This facilitates effective 
communication (1974, 2). 
2. Gudykunst discusses how predictions are part of 
the communicative behavior. He says the accuracy of such 
predictions about the other communicator are influenced by 
how we draw distinctions, "i.e., are they made 
ethnocentrically or from a 'cultural relativist' position?" 
(1977, 25). Gudykunst says that cultural relativism 
increases prediction accuracy and thus, facilitates 
intercultural communication interactions. 
3. Samovar and Porter say that " ... to be guilty of 
ethnocentrism is to doom intercultural communication to 
failure" (1988, 388). For effective communication to occur, 
one needs, among other things, to have " ... a universalistic, 
relativistic approach to the universe (1988, 388). 
4. Pusch describes cultural relativism as one of the 
skills needed for effective functioning in a multicultural 
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environment. She refers to it as something you can learn to 
"accept". It is one of the aims of intercultural training 
to help facilitate this acceptance. (1981, 95). 
Cultural relativism leads to ("suggests") several 
other concepts: (1) cultures cannot be judged from an 
absolute moral or ethical reference point; (2) evaluations 
are relative to their context of origin; (3) No values, 
ethics or morals of a culture can be "judged as inherently 
superior or inferior to another's" (1981, 4). 
But, why these derive from "cultural relativism" and, 
in turn, exactly how cultural relativism, as distinct from 
the concepts it ''suggests", is effective in the 
communication process is not clear. 
5. Brislin, Landis, and Brandt state that a " ... move 
toward a relativism in such perceptions ... " of appropriate 
roles and norms would facilitate more situationally 
appropriate behaviors. This, they suggest, is " ... critical 
for long-term effectiveness in intercultural situations ... " 
(1983, 6). 
6. Samovar and Porter discuss how cultural relativism 
helps facilitate communication through more accurate 
judgments about social reality, whereas absolute values can 
distort such judgments, and thus, impede communication 
(1976, 12). 
7. M. Bennett identifies cultural relativism as 
essential for the development of empathy in the 
intercultural communication process (1977, 163). 
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8. Sitaram and Haapanen identify cultural relativism 
as the "solution to ethnocentrism'', and thus, the path to 
better intercultural communication. Ultimately, the 
solution to ethnocentrism is communication that is " ... free 
of ethnocentrism as wt:ll as relativism." No further 
definition is given by these authors of this use of 
"relativism." They do say that this level of communication 
"beyond relativism'' involves sharing the best aspects of 
cultures for others to borrow and become enriched by (1979, 
158-59). 
9. Sitaram and Cogell see ethnocentrism as probably a 
major barrier to intercultural understanding because it 
distorts the meaningfulness of values. He discusses the 
problems created by ethnocentrism (i.e., judging others' 
values by one's own cultural standards), and states that 
cultural relativism may be the answer to the problems of 
ethnocentrism (1976, 176-77). By implication, there is a 
positive affect on communication because ethnocentrism is 
reduced, or eradicated. 
10. Tai employs cultural relativism in a number of 
ways. It is primarily used in her discussions on improving 
intercultural communication interactions. She sees cultural 
relativism as a way of overcoming ethnocentrism. She also 
mentions it with regard to cultural differences and how 
cultural relativism helps in bridging differences in 
intercultural cultural communication {1986, 29). 
Particularly noteworthy is her discussion of the relevence 
of cultural relativism for a Japanese approach to 
intercultural communication (1986, 87-8). 
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11. Barna discusses stereotyping and how this is one 
of the stumbling blocks to successful intercultural 
communication interactions. In educational settings, one 
way of overcoming stereotyping may be to give examples of 
cultural relativism. However, the overcoming of 
stereotyping may still be difficult (1976, 294). 
12. Gudykunst and Kim state that cultural relativism 
facilitates better cross-cultural understanding in 
communication situations (1984, 5). 
13. Gudykunst and Kim's second reference to 
relativism is found in their explanation of their concept of 
"communication distance" and speech patterns, where they 
describe how cultural relativism is part of a continuum of 
attitudes {ethnocentrism--cultural relativism) {1984, 97). 
Of special note is their discussion of the different 
kinds of relativism which, because there are a variety of 
terms and definitions, creates much confusion about cultural 
relativism. They differentiate between "cultural 
relativism" and "ethical relativism" and then, identify 
several sub-categories of "ethical relativism" {1984, 201). 
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Interestingly, their reference to ethical relativism ~atches 
that which some of the other authors in the ICC literature 
call "cultural relativism." 
14. Bochner, in discussing mediation, says that 
emphasizing cultural relativism, and studying of different 
cultures, helps dispel the myth of western superiority 
(1973, 34). He says it should be one of the key foci of 
intercultural education (1973, 36). 
b. Consequences in Professional Work 
Cultural relativism is discussed in five works in the 
context of how it helps various professionals whose work 
involves face-to-face intercultural communication. 
1. Hofstede (1983, 89) discusses cultural relativism 
in the context of foreign management practices, and how 
cultural relativism leads to more effective management. 
2. Stewart discusses how cultural relativism helps 
foreign student advisors become more effective in their work 
with foreign students (1972, 14). 
3. Pedersen discusses the two polarized schools of 
theory in the mental health profession, one assuming a fixed 
description of mental health, applicable to all cultures, 
the other based on cultural relativism where " ... each socio-
cultural context defines its own norms of mental health" 
(1974, 55). 
4. Barnlund discusses the importance of collaboration 
among communication specialists for ethicial dialogue, and 
76 
how such collaboration depends on relativism. Such 
collaboration is made difficult though, because " ... the 
cultures which might make important contributions to such an 
ethical dialogue are far from equal in power and 
influence ... " (1978, 11). 
5. Bochner discusses the importance of cultural 
relativism to the process of mediation, and how it is a 
''necessary" trait for a mediator (198lb, 3; 1981c, 14). 
c. Consequences in Research 
Cultural relativism is discussed in two works in 
relation to intercultural communication research. 
1. Hofstede discusses how ethnocentrism impedes 
cross-cultural research whereas, in contrast, cultural 
relativism is necessary for it (1978, 390). Relativism 
affords greater " ... tolerance for people and groups with 
deviant ideas" (1978, 395). 
2. Hofstede here uses cultural relativism as the 
basis for his comparative research on work values and the 
quality of work life (1984, 389). 
d. Conseguences Pertaining to Culture Shock 
One work refers to cultural relativism in terms of how 
it seems to lessen culture shock. Taft says cultural 
relativism is the reason why a multicultural person is less 
likely to suffer culture shock than a rnonocultural person. A 
multicultural person " ... probably has already learned to 
accept the relativity of cultures" (1981, 79-80). 
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e. Conseguences Pertaining to Judgment Formation 
Smart advocates the need for an individual to become 
aware of one's own relativity, and then, get beyond it to a 
creative synthesis of cultural ways. This doesn't mean one 
gives up evaluation. Rather, evaluation is temporarily held 
back to gain understanding to avoid the premature judging of 
others (1968, 25-6). Ultimately, he hopes the results will 
be " ... that people will form wiser judgments through their 
cross-cultural contacts but without forcing others to agree" 
(1968, 25). 
Application Theme #3: Theoretical Dimensions. Six 
works utilize cultural relativism in terms of various 
theoretical dimensions. They divide into three types of 
applications. 
a. A Monocultural vs Multicultural Speech Perspective 
1. Owen (1971) addresses communication accuracy vs 
distortion in the speech communication field. He says the 
adoption of cultural relativism would enable the field to 
improve by becoming multiplistic--recognizing the 
situational and cultural basis of ocmmunication behaviors 
and competence. This contrasts with the present-day, 
monocultural approach in the speech field, dominated by a 
white, middle class communication perspective (Owen 1979, 
1-3) . 
According to Owen, few have recognized the need to 
study " ... the cultural relativity and 'situational 
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appropriateness' of communicative behavior ... " (1979, 1). 
He says that many communication skills are culture-specific 
(1979, 3). Skills generally prescribed in communication 
classes reflect white, middle class values and behaviors, 
making the others not having this background appear 
communicatively incompetent. " ... Virtually all of the 
authors writing about interpersonal competence have made the 
error of prescribing appropriate roles and behaviors based 
on the dominant culture's values" (1979, 3). "Adopting a 
posture of cultural relativism ... " would help communication 
education be more pluralistic rather than monocultural 
(1979, 3). 
2. Barna says that many axioms throughout social 
science are culture bound and relative, even when cross-
cultural data are used (1979, 6). She raises the question 
of whether or not the use of "culture-bound, relative" 
theoretical orientations is ethical, particularily in the 
teaching of intercultural commmunication. She suggests that 
such teaching maxims used " ... as if they are valid for all 
cultures" should be scrutinized (1979, 11). 
3. Wendt identifies cultural relativism as part of 
the intercultural perspective (1982, 583) and explores 
whether or not a universal idea such as human rights is 
consistent with the intercultural communication perspective. 
He concludes that since this perspective renders 
" ... understanding, respect, and tolerance of other 
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cultures ... " as having universal application (1982, 583), it 
is consistant with "human rights'' which involves a universal 
regard for human life (1982, 586-7): 
... as long as intercultural communication 
theory contains the universal respect for 
differences, that viewpoint has to incorporate 
human rights (1982, 587). 
4. Isomura and Stewart explore the question of the 
viability of cultural relativism. They ask whether or not 
cultural diversity and relativism are idealistic or 
realistic concepts, in terms of the world today. Stewart 
says that some people assume that communication and 
industrialization "unravel diversities of cultures" (1976, 
115). He says he does not see there is necessarily a link 
between these and a loss of pluralism. He compares human 
societies to flora and fauna which have diversified because 
of response to a homogeneity of environmental conditions. 
He sees societies similarly maintaining their integrity and 
thus, maintaining cultural diversity (1976, 116). 
5. E. Glenn (with C. Glenn) disallows the validity of 
cultural relativism for application in the modern-day world. 
He discusses how relativism applies to distinct, independent 
cultures. However, because cultures are no longer isolated, 
"ethical cultural relativism" is no longer viable: 
The recognition of the cognitive autonomy of 
culture implies a relativistic approach to 
ethics. However, ethical cultural relativism 
can stand only in the context of cultural 
independence and the lack of contact between 
cultures with different moral standards. 
obviously, is not the case nowadays 
317) . 
This, 
(1981, 
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6. Ferguson discusses how cultural relativism is not 
relevent for culture learning. 
Cultural relativism has become a bad 'word', 
largely as a result of this particular unit. 
Actually, it was beside the point in the unit, 
as it is beside the point in Culture 
Learning ... We do not here aver that the student 
must learn that within each culture the values 
and attitudes of a given moment are absolute or 
that they are of no concern to us .... The aim, 
then, is empathy and understanding, not to go 
out and change another culture, nor, on the 
other hand, to simply nod our heads and say, 
"Good for them." 
What is more important is to learn how other 
peoples express themselves as they do and to 
understand why they act as they do .... the aim 
of culture learning ... [is] international and 
intercultural understanding, communication and 
harmony (1977, 9-10). 
ADVANTAGES 
Overview 
Out of the total of 44 works, 36 works (82%) associate 
only advantages with cultural relativism. Several works 
mention more than one advantage. Six authors (17%) refer to 
cultural relativism as a viable concept as well as including 
observations as to limits or problems they perceive with it. 
One author says it is not relevant to culture learning. 
Another says it used to be useful, but is no longer, given 
the integration of cultures that has occurred. 
The advantages which authors present regarding 
cultural relativism grouped into three themes. The topics 
which the data addressed within each theme are listed 
accordingly. 
Theme #1: Facilitation of Internal, Attitudinal 
Changes (13 works) 
a. Reduces ethnocentrism (4 works) 
b. Reduces discrimination (1 work) 
c. Helps overcome stereotyping (1 work) 
d. Increases enjoyment of difference (1 work) 
e. Helps development of empathy (1 work) 
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f. Facilitates acceptance of behavioral variety 
(1 work} 
g. Helps provide greater figure/ground 
elasticity (1 work) 
h. Increases tolerance of, and openness to, 
people of other cultures (2 works) 
i. Helps to correct mistaken notion of Western 
superiority (1 work) 
Theme #2: Facilitation of Cultural Knowledge and 
Understanding (4 works) 
a. Facilitates understanding of cultural 
behaviors (3 works) 
b. Facilitates insight into diversity of 
cultural "truths" and norms (1 work) 
Theme #3: Facilitation of External, Interactive 
Results (21 works) 
a. Facilitates Functioning in Intercultural 
Situations (9 works) 
1. Systematic bridging of differences 
(1 work) 
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2. Effective functioning in a multicultural 
environment (1 work) 
3. Fosters successful intercultural 
communication (1 work) 
4. Necessary for effective culture learning 
and competence (1 work) 
5. Fosters accuracy of perceiving 
communication norms contextually (1 work) 
6. Fosters accurate and meaningful sense of 
truth {via contextualism) (1 work) 
7. Evaluation of situations contextually 
(multicultural man) (1 work) 
8. Adaptation to different context 
(multicultural man) (1 work) 
9. Helps accuracy of prediction of 
communication behaviors (1 work) 
b. Ethical Advantages (2 works) 
1. Facilitates context-sensitive teaching 
and research (1 work) 
2. As part of intercultural communication 
theory, renders theory in support of 
"human rights" (1 work) 
c. Facilitates Cultural Multiplicity (2 works) 
d. Facilitates Professional Work Involving 
Face-to-Face Interaction (8 works) 
Presentation of the Data 
Advantage Theme #1: Facilitation of Internal, 
Attitudinal Changes. 
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a. Mayer (1980, 35), Sitaram and Cogell (1976, 176-
177) and Sitaram and Haapanen (1979, 159) say cultural 
relativism helps reduce ethnocentrism. Tai states this is 
appropriate not only for Westerners, but for the Japanese as 
well, because ethnocentrism is a major impediment for the 
Japanese in intercultural communication interactions (1986, 
87-8). 
b. Asuncion-Lande says cultural relativism helps in 
the reduction of social and economic discrimination, an 
important goal in bilingual and bicultural education (1975, 
66) . 
c. Barna says that, in educational settings, giving 
examples of cultural relativism may be one way to overcome 
stereotyping, though this may not be easy. She identifies 
stereoptvping as one of the "stumbling blocks" to 
intercultural communication (1976, 294). 
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d. Howell identifies cultural relativism as 
advantageous because it leads to enjoyment of difference 
which he sees as a necessary foundation for intercultural 
communication skill building (1977, 8). 
e. M. Bennett says that cultural relativism is a 
necessary step for the development of empathy which, in 
turn, increases understanding of cultural differences (1977, 
163) . 
f. Brislin, Landis, and Brandt see cultural 
relativism as involving a move away from 
... seeing the world in terms of moral and 
behavioral absolutes. Thus, appropriate and 
necessary behaviors would become more 
situationally (culturally) specific so that the 
individual could accept a greater variety of 
such behaviors both in others and in himself. 
We would suggest that these changes are 
critical for long-term effectiveness in 
intercultural situations ... (1983, 6). 
Relativism helps create acceptance of behavioral variety. 
g. Barnlund and Nomura explain that an advantage to 
cultural relativism is that it " ... may cultivate the greater 
figure/ground elasticity that is essential for cross-
cultural rapport" (1985, 360). 
h. J. Bennett identifies the benefit of cultural 
relativism as the increase in tolerance of, and openness to, 
people of other cultures, attitudes which, she says, are 
valuable in succeeding in living abroad (1985, 166) and in 
increasing cultural effectiveness (1985, 162). 
85 
M. Bennett says that the "construing of difference" 
(ethnorelativism) is necessary for intercultural sensitivity 
and the overcoming of ethnocentrism: 
The key to ethnorelativism is the idea of 
"process." Perceiving behavior, values, and 
identity itself as a process of constructing 
reality overcomes ethnocentrism by reducing 
reification and the assumptions of 
absoluteness, centrality, and universalism that 
usually accompany reification (1986, 64). 
i. Bochner says one of the benefits of cultural 
relativism is that, through educational programs, it help to 
correct the mistaken notion of Western superiority (1973, 
34) . 
Advantage Theme #2: Facilitation of Accurate, 
Cultural Knowledge and Understanding. 
a. Gudykunst and Kim say cultural relativism 
facilitates cultural understanding of behaviors. 
"Becoming more culturally relativistic, on the 
other hand, can be conducive to 
understanding .... Cultural relativism suggests 
the only way we can understand the behavior of 
others is in the context of their culture" 
(1984, 5). 
b. Furnham and Bochner say that sensitivity to and 
awareness of cultural relativism can provide insight into 
the diversity of cultural truths and norms (1986, 237). 
c. Hofstede states that cultural relativism is 
necessary for doing comparative cultural research. Where 
one is ethnocentric, value systems and assumptions are 
culture-bound, and hence, biases the research. Using a 
relativistic approach, " ... the researcher should be prepared 
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to question all culture-bound value systems and assumptions, 
even his own" (1978, 390). Cultural relativism, as the 
opposite to ethnocentrism, affords a more "empirical" 
approach (1978, 397). 
d. Hofstede implies that cultural relativism provides 
a basis for obtaining accurate, cultural data about 
cultures. In seeking information through his research about 
"quality of life" in various cultures, he presumes the 
"cultural relativity of values" where " ... what one considers 
good or bad is dictated by one's cultural context" (1984, 
389) . 
Advantage Theme #3: Facilitation of External, 
Interactive Results. 
a. Facilitates Functioning in Intercultural 
Situations 
1. Szalay says cultural relativism involves 
systematic bridging of differences based on (~) self-
awareness, (g) knowledge of other's culture, and (£) shift 
of frame of reference (1974, 2). This is essential: 
To be effective, communication has to be 
adapted to the cultural background and 
experiences of our partner or audience. This 
adaptation is a fundamental requirement that 
lies at the very core of the intercultural 
communication process (1974, 2). 
This bridging process, he says, is distinct from that in 
domestic communication (1974, 2). 
2. Pusch says that cultural relativism helps 
effective functioning in a multicultural environment. A 
communication style that transcends cultural barriers 
includes a number of abilities and attitudes including 
cultural relativism (1981, 95). 
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3. Samovar and Porter say the mode of communication 
behavior which fosters successful intercultural 
communication is not only void of ethnocentrism, it requires 
willingness, empathy, tolerance and a "universalistic, 
relativistic approach to the universe" (1988, 388). 
4. Paige and Martin point out that in spite of the 
possible problems that a few trainees may experience with 
cultural relativism, it is nonetheless necessary for 
effective culture learning and competence. They also state 
it is among those " ... most frequently posited personal 
qualities associated with authentic intercultural 
competence" (1983, 43-4). 
5. Owen identifies a culturally relativistic approach 
to communication as necessary for effective communication, 
research and teaching. It involves accurately perceiving 
communication norms through contextualization (1979, 3). 
The study of communication becomes more "grounded" because 
it is based on actual communcication interaction rather than 
on theory and skills pre-determined, generally, on a single, 
cultural view (in particular, that of the dominant, white, 
middle-class) (1979, 8). 
6. Samovar and Porter say cultural relativism is a 
means for obtaining an accurate and meaningful sense of 
88 
truth as viewed in a particular culture because it is 
considered contextually. If truth is assumed to be true for 
all people, it becomes distorted (1976, 12). 
7. Adler identifies two benefits of cultural 
relativism in terms of multicultural people: they can 
evaluate situations contextually and they can themselves 
adapt to different contexts, taking on new cultural 
identities (1974, 370). 
8. According to Gudykunst, the accuracy of 
predictions that are a part of communicative behavior is 
seen as facilitated by cultural relativism (1977, 25). 
9. Taft says that if a person has accepted the 
relativity of cultures, he/she is less likely to suffer 
culture shock (1981, 79-80). 
b. Ethical Advantages 
1. Barna raises the question of whether or not the 
use of ''culture-bound, relative" theoretical orientations is 
ethical, particularily in the teaching of intercultural 
communication (1979, 6). An example would be when teachings 
maxims are used " ... as if they are valid for all cultures" 
(1979, 11). She implies that the recognition of cultural 
relativism would afford a more ethical, context-sensitive, 
approach to research and teaching. 
2. Wendt says " ... as long as intercultural 
communication theory contains the universal respect for 
differences, that viewpoint has to incorporate human rights" 
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(1982, 587). This viewpoint is central to the relativistic 
perspective of intercultural communication (1982, 583). 
It's advantage is that it supports the "human rights" 
perspective. 
c. Facilitating Cultural Multiplicity 
1. Isomura and Stewart discuss the viability of 
cultural relativism as a"realistic'' happening in the world. 
Stewart concludes that he sees cultural diversity (which 
they associate with cultural relativism) as continuing in 
spite of increased global communication. His statement 
implies he sees this as positive, though he does not say why 
(1976, 115). 
2. McLeod says if relativism were common, " ... a 
continued diversity of life-styles, values, and approaches 
to human problems would be guaranteed" {1981, 51). 
d. Advantages for Professions involving Face-to-Face 
Interactions 
1. Barnlund says cultural relativism is necessary for 
communication specialists who do cross-cultural 
collaboration (1978, 11). 
2. Pedersen says cultural relativism provides a 
multiplistic-type foundation which helps to facilitate 
effective directions in cross-cultural counseling. In 
contrast, the unilateral mental health approach impedes 
effective counseling and client understanding (1974, 55). 
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3. Stewart says that cultural relativism makes 
foreign student advisors more effective in working with 
foreign students (1972, 14). 
4. Hofstede says that cultural relativism leads to 
more effective management and" ... better ability to manage 
intercultural negotiations and multicultural organizations 
like the United Nations, which are essential for the common 
survival of us all" (1983, 89). 
5. Bochner says that mediation, based on relativism, 
benefits cultures mutually. He describes the mediator as a 
"cultural relativist," and says, 
The essence of the mediating function is to 
shape the exchanges between the participting 
societies so that the contact will benefit both 
cultures, on terms that are consistent with 
their respective value systems (198lb, 3). 
6. Relativism helps facilitate beneficial culture 
contact. Bochner states "cultural relativism of values" as 
one of the key attributes of "mediating man" (people he 
describes as important through serving as links between 
diverse cultural systems} (1973, 35). 
7. Bochner says that in mediation, cultural 
relativism is one of the 
... precious skills that are so badly needed, 
because of their unique contribution is to help 
steer mankind through a middle course, where 
the benefits of technology can be gradually 
extended to all human beings, without at the 
same time creating a bland, homogenized and 
inflexible world (1973, 36). 
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8. Harris and Moran state that cultural relativism is 
advantageous because it increases the effectiveness of the 
cross-cultural manager (1979, 203). 
DISADVANTAGES 
Overview 
Nine disadvantages regarding cultural relativism were 
identified in the ICC literature. All but two of the 
disadvantages stated by authors reflect perceived 
limitations of cultural relativism. Two of the authors 
state that cultural relativism is simply not viable. The 
data was organized according to the following themes: 
Theme #1: Difficulties of Assumption of Cultural 
Relativism (6 works) 
Theme #2: The Avoidance of Ethical Judgments 
(2 works) 
Theme #3: The Permeability vs. Impermeability of 
Cultural Boundaries (1 work) 
Presentation of the Data 
Disadvantage Theme #1: Difficulties of Assumption of 
Cultural Relativism. 
1. Barnlund and Nomura state that a disadvantage of 
cultural relativism is that it is not easily acguired (1985, 
360). It may require experiential, as well as intellectual, 
involvement (1985, 361). 
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2. Bochner says that one of the problems of cultural 
relativism is that many people have difficulty sustaining 
non-evaluation. The difficulty is such that relativism 
... can be expected to serve only as a limited 
guide to action in the practical world of 
affairs .... 
People vary in the 
committment to a doctrine 
value judgments about the 
societies (1981, 14). 
strength of their 
that avoids making 
practices of other 
3. Smart, in pointing out that relativism provides a 
wonderful challenge, also says it can be a traumatic 
experience (1968, 25). 
4. Brislin describes cultural relativism as one of the 
effects of a sojourn experience. However, upon returning 
home, a sojourner may experience difficulty relating to 
people who have had no cross-cultural experience. They may 
perceive these people as narrow-minded and, in cross-
cultural programs, they have little or nothing in common 
with these people upon which to build relationships (1981, 
316-7). Brislin thus implies that a person who has become 
culturally relative can feel isolated from others not having 
a similar relative approach. 
5. M. Bennett describes several stages of the 
development of a culturally relativistic perspective. One 
of these stages can lead to neutrality or even negativity 
toward intercultural communication education. This he calls 
"non-developmental pluralism"--the ability of a person to be 
culturally sensitive to only specific cultures. The person, 
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instead of having a general adaptability to any culture, has 
a limited ability to be culturally relative (1986, 56). 
6. M. Bennett describes various stages of cultural 
relativism which he has identified as paralleling the 
internal acquisition of cultural relativism. They represent 
levels of intercultural sensitivity which correspond to a 
person's level of comprehension and experience of cultural 
difference. "However, the concept of fundamental cultural 
difference is also the most problematical and threatening 
idea that many of us ever encounter" (1986, 27-28). Training 
for increasing one's intercultural sensitivity must be done 
"with the greatest possible care" because of this difficulty 
of accepting cultural difference (1986, 27). 
Disadvantage Theme #2: The Avoidance of Ethical 
Judgments. 
1. Gudykunst and Kim say that cultural relativism can 
be used as an "alibi" for not making necessary ethical 
judgments which must be made (1984, 203). They imply this 
is "wrong." 
2. Ferguson says that cultural relativism is neither 
an disadvantage nor an advantage. Rather, it is irrelevent. 
The goal of culture learning, he says, is to learn empathy 
and understanding, not cultural relativism. It is " ... not 
to go out and change another culture, nor, on the other 
hand, to simply nod our heads and say, ''Good for them" 
(1977, 10). In other words, Ferguson views cultural 
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relativism as involving the affirmation of cultures, and he 
feels that such evaluation has no part in culture learning. 
Disadvantage Theme #3: Permeability vs Impermeability 
of Cultural Boundaries. E. Glenn (with C. Glenn) indicates 
that cultural relativism is not useful anymore because 
culture contact exists now. Formerly, when cultures were 
independent, cultural relativism was useful (1981, 317). 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
It is clear from the data obtained from the literature 
sample that cultural relativism is neither defined nor used 
in a consistant fashion in the intercultural communication 
literature. Major differences were found to exist between 
authors' definitions, applications, and stated advantages 
and disadvantages. A wide range of variations within these 
differences were found as well. 
Definitions 
In light of the fact that great discrepancy of opinion 
exists as to the definition of "cultural relativism", it is 
noteworthy that less than one third of the authors presented 
definitions of "cultural relativism." Clearly, the 
remaining two-thirds of the authors, through their 
definitional omission, create ambiguity regarding their view 
of cultural relativism. 
It is also interesting to note that of the definitions 
which were found, two refer to characteristics of cultures 
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(diversity and equal validity), while two refer to internal 
human experiences (attitudes and factual knowledge). 
Applications 
The applications divided into three main uses of 
cultural relativism, namely, in discussions pertaining to 
causes of cultural relativism (15 works--34%), in 
discussions pertaining to consequences of cultural 
relativism (23 works--52 %) , and in discussions of cultural 
relativism as it pertains to theory (6 works--14%). 
Discussions pertaining to causes of cultural 
relativism involve either formal or informal learning 
contexts. The formal learning discussions {9 works) include 
one discussion of how cultural relativism might be measured, 
five discussions on how cultural relativism is an outcome of 
training, descriptions of two training models for developing 
relativism, and one discussion of cultural relativism as an 
ethical dimension to intercultural communication training 
programs. 
The informal learning discussions (6 works) range from 
addressing cultural relativism as a result of exposure to 
intercultural communication teaching and research, to that 
which results from contact with another culture, to 
involvement with cross-cultural mediation. 
Discussions pertaining to consequences of cultural 
relativism (1) address results in the communication process 
itself (13 of the works), (2) identify professional fields 
in which cultural relativism is beneficial (6 works), 
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(3) describe the importance of cultural relativism in cross-
cultural research (2 works), (4) discuss cultural relativism 
in terms of culture shock (1 work), and (5) present 
relativism as a means for better cross-cultural judgment 
formation (1 work). 
Six discussions pertained to theory. Two authors 
discuss how cultural relativism provides a more accurate, 
multicultural dimension to speech communication. One author 
looks to cultural relativism in intercultural theory to 
justify "human rights." Three explore the viability of 
cultural relativism as a concept--one affirms its 
usefulness, one says it is not useful and one says it is 
irrelevent to culture learning. 
Advantages 
In the ICC literature, 36 different advantages are 
associated with cultural relativism. Thirteen of the works 
(36%) referred to advantages of cultural relativism in terms 
of its facilitation of internal, attitudinal changes which 
increase a person's tolerance of cultural differences. 
Among these thirteen works, a range of attitudinal 
changes related to increase of tolerance was found. This 
includes (l)reduction of ethnocentrism, (2) reduction of 
social and economic discrimination, (3) overcoming of 
stereotyping, (4) enjoyment of differences, (5) development 
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of empathy, ( 6) acceptance of behavioral variety, ( 7) 
greater figure/ground elasticity, (8) increase in tolerance 
and openness to people of other cultures, and (9) the 
correction of the "mistaken notion" of western superiority. 
In contrast to how people perceived, four works (10%) 
cite the advantages of cultural relativism as intellectual 
knowledge about cultural behaviors and the diversity of 
cultural truths and norms. 
Nine works (25%) refer to advantages in interactive 
situations such as the (1) systematic bridging of cultural 
differences, (2) more effectiv·e functioning in a 
multicultural environment, (3) successful intercultural 
communication, 4) effective culture learning and competence, 
(5) accurate perception of communication norms, (6) accurate 
and meaningful sense of "truth" contextually, ( 7) contextual 
evaluation of situations and ability to adapt to different 
contexts, (8) accuracy of communication behavior 
predictions, and (9) reduced likelihood of suffering culture 
shock. 
Two works describe ethical advantages of cultural 
relativism, two state it facilitates cultural pluralism, and 
eight works discuss advantages for professional work 
involving intercultural communication interactions. 
Disadvantages 
Nine disadvantages were referred to in the ICC 
literature. Seven works made reference to the difficulties 
98 
associated with the assumption of cultural relativism. 
These included the following: (1) relativism is not easily 
acquired, (2) it is difficult to carry out non-evaluation 
because people's abilities differ in the degree to which 
they can do this, (3) cultural relativism can be traumatic, 
(4) people who view things relativistically can feel 
socially isolated in their different frame of reference, (5) 
people may develop only a limited form of relativism which 
is culture-specific, not a general attitude ("non-
developmental pluralism"), and (6) people differ in their 
ability to accept "cultural difference." 
Finally, one work says cultur3: relativism is 
sometimes used as an alibi for not making ethical judgments, 
which the author says must be ~ade. 
In addition to these seven disadvantages from authors 
who are, however, clearly in support of cultural relativism, 
two authors rejected relativism. One author says it is no 
longer viable because the world is too interconnected now. 
Relativism was only useful when cultures were isolated from 
each other. The other says relativism is not relevant. He 
says the goal of culture study is to learn, not to change 
cultures or approve cultures. 
Overall, 95% of the authors clearly support cultural 
relativism as a viable concept. Most authors refer to it in 
the context of face-to-face interactions, though some 
reference to its use in research is made. 
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All the authors refer to cultural relativism as an end 
to itself which has resulting ramifications for 
intercultural communication in some way. However, Smart 
(1968) and Sitaram and Haapanen (1979) speak of relativism 
as a useful stage which ideally needs to be transcended, 
resulting in wiser judgments (Smart) and a higher level of 
communication where the best of cultures are recognized and 
shared (Sitaram and Haapanen). These results parallel those 
associated with "constructive marginality'' which constitutes 
the final stage of ethnorelativism on Bennett's 
intercultural sensitivity model (1986). 
Potentially parallel ideas such as these, named with 
differing terminology, or implied or assumed and not named 
at all, seem to pervade the literature on cultural 
relativism in the intercultural communication area. An 
attempt has been made here to explore the literature within 
the limits of the four categories (definitions, 
applications, etc.}. However, comprehensive detective work 
to follow up on apparent contradictions, or misleading 
similarities, and to ferret out underlying assumptions of 
the various authors, could not be done within this one 
study. Here, a limited number of authors' ideas are 
presented as reported by the authors themselves. 
further studies to dig deeper. 
It is for 
CHAPTER IV 
CRITICISMS OF CULTURAL RELATIVISM 
IN THE CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY LITERATURE 
As the result of a review of the current 
anthropological literature, a number of works were found 
which critically analyzed cultural relativism in terms of 
its role and viability within the field of anthropology. 
The analyses and arguments utilized in these works are 
generally detailed and lengthy. However, in this chapter, 
the criticisms of cultural relativism will be summarized 
only. Should the reader wish to gain an in-depth 
understanding of any of the criticisms, he/she is encouraged 
to refer to the source material directly. 
The problems regarding cultural relativism summarized 
in this chapter reflect the general trend of criticisms 
currently prevailing in anthropology. The works from which 
they derive were selected after a fairly comprehensive 
literature search, and comprise the main body of critical 
works in the current anthropological literature. 
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DEFINITIONS 
Overview 
As was found in the intercultural communication 
literature sample, authors of the current anthropology 
literature do not concur regarding the definition of 
cultural relativism. Out of the ten works examined, seven 
contain explicit definitions, one contains an implied 
definition, and two of the works refer to cultural 
relativism as a term which signifies a family or cluster of 
ideas instead of a single concept. 
To be consistent with the format of data presentation 
of this study, definitions were grouped by theme. Three 
themes from the intercultural literature were reflected in 
some of the current, anthropology definitions: 
Theme #2: Equal Validity of Cultures (2 works) 
Theme #3: Attitudes Towards Difference (3 works) 
Theme #4: Contextualism (3 works) 
Two additional definitions were found as well: 
1. The Contingency of Customs and Beliefs (1 work) 
2. Relativism as a Plurality of Concepts (1 work) 
Presentation of the Data 
Definitional Theme #2: Equal Validity of Cultures. 
Kuttner presents two terms. He defines "radical cultural 
relativism" (he also terms this ''radical ethical 
relativism") as not just a "restraint on ethnocentric bias," 
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which is "reasonable and necessary," but the refraining from 
ethical judgment (1970, 22) and" ... holding that all 
cultures express equally valid ethical principles" (1970, 
222). The second term, "cultural relativism", reflects 
theme #3, described in the next section. 
Hartung concurs with the definition of Kuttner's first 
term, but refers to it as "cultural relativity." Hartung 
says that cultural relatlivism " ... asserts that any set of 
customs and institutions, or way of life, is as valid as any 
other" (1954, 118). 
It is interesting to note that Kuttner perceives 
cultural relativism in terms of ethical principles, whereas 
Hartung's definition has a broader scope, namely "any set of 
customs and institutions, or way of life." 
Definitional Theme #3: Attitudes Toward Difference. 
Jarvie says that "cultural relativism" means there is " ... no 
way of rationally justifying standards that transcend the 
boundaries of time society and culture .... no rational 
justification for ranking societies morally, cognitively or 
culturally" (1975, 344). 
Kuttner defines his second term, "cultural 
relativity," as "reserving judgment on alien societies" 
(1970, 220). This definition reflects the theme of 
"attitudes toward difference." 
Hippler, in spite of his strong criticism of cultural 
relativism, fails to explicitly define it. He implies, 
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however, that he perceives relativism as meaning that there 
are no standards which identify what is "optimal" for humans 
(1981, 396), nor are there standards which can be applied 
cross-culturally (1981, 395). 
Definitional Theme #4: Contextualization. Beattie 
defines relativism as the understanding of the meanings of 
the representations of other cultures in terms of their own 
contexts " ... that is, relatively to other aspects of the 
cultures of which they are a part" (1984, 14). He 
identifies two "levels" of such relativism: 
1. epistemological relativism--This refers to the 
fact of conceptual difference between cultures, " ... the 
totally different way of thinking about, apprehending 
experience, a logic of a different order from our own 
(whoever 'we' may be) ... " (1984, 14). "Absolute, extreme 
relativism" is defined here as " ... claiming that truth is 
entirely relative to context ... " (1984, 15); 
2. cultural relativism--This refers to the abstaining 
from using the conceptual categories of our own culture 
" ... in the attempt to understand the categories and 
classifications, the ways of thought, of other cultures ... " 
(1984, 18). 
The definition of another author, Stein, also reflects 
the contextualism theme, but it has a different emphasis. 
He says relativism means "cultures are to be understood as 
unified wholes that can and must be accounted for in terms 
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of themselves ("emic"), not in terms of any external frame 
of reference ("etic"). The "doctrine of relativism" 
describes each culture as "unique and self-contained," and 
views as spurious cross-cultural comparisons intended to 
explain culture by means of "underlying common 
denominators". (1986, 159) 
Turner describes relativism as the attempt to 
understand and evaluate other cultures on the other 
cultures' own terms (1982, 76). 
Additional Definitions 
1. The Contingency of Customs and Beliefs. Dimen-
Schein defines cultural relativism as "the contingency of 
customs and values" (1977, 41). The fact of cultural 
diversity is implicit in this definition, but not the whole 
of it. Dimen-Schein, in her discussion, makes it clear that 
she sees relativism as the variability of the circumstances 
which create the diversity of customs and values. 
2. Relativism as a Plurality of Concepts Clark does 
not perceive cultural relativism as a term with a single 
definition. To him, "Obviously 'relativism' is not the name 
of a specific and consistent set of doctrines, but the 
family resemblance between a number of ideas is sufficient 
to warrant the label" (1970, 553, reference note #1). He 
focuses in his discussion on one of these ideas which says 
" ... that a conceptual scheme fashioned in and applicable to 
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one particular culture cannot meaningfully be applied to an 
alien culture." (1970, 545) 
Nowell-Smith also refers to cultural relativism as a 
cluster of ideas rather than a single concept: 
Indeed, it seems to be more of an atmosphere 
than a doctrine, and for this reason I shall 
examine four propositions which seem to me to 
contain the essence of the doctrine rather than 
discuss particular formulations to be found in 
the literature (1971, 1). 
These propositions are as follows: 
1. There are no absolute, universal moral 
rules or values; all rules and values are 
relative to something. 
2. The mores of a society are necessarily 
right for that society. 
3. One ought not to make cross-cultural moral 
or value judgments. 
4. One ought to conform to the mores of his 
society (1971, 2). 
APPLICATIONS 
Overview 
The ten, current anthropology works for this study 
were selected to present a range of criticisms regarding 
cultural relativism in the current anthropological 
literature. Though references to causes and consequences 
occur in the arguments presented, the process of questioning 
the viability of cultural relativism as an anthropological 
construct places the discussions within Theme #3. 
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Theme #3: Theoretical Dimensions (10 works) 
a. Cultural Relativism as not Viable (6 works) 
b. Cultural Relativism as Viable in a Limited 
Way Only {4 works) 
Presentation of the Data 
Application Theme #3: Theoretical Dimensions. All of 
the current anthropology works discuss the viability of 
cultural relativism for anthropology. Six works disallow 
the viability of cultural relativism altogether. However, 
four of the works do include brief reference to ways of 
defining and/or using relativism which are viewed as viable. 
The various topics which the criticisms address are 
described in the following. 
a. Cultural Relativism as Not Viable 
Stein (1986}, Hartung (1954), Jarvie (1975}, Hippler 
(1981), Turner (1982), and Clark (1970) all present cultural 
relativism as not viable. 
Stein does a psychological analysis of the anxiety 
problems he perceives regarding cultural relativism which 
ultimately keep anthropologists from fully understanding 
their subject matter. 
Taking a philosophical approach, Hartung and Jarvie 
explore philosophical problems of logic and "rationality," 
focusing particularily on the ideas of "tolerance" and moral 
judgments. 
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Hippler, in replying to a challenge to one of his 
previous articles, focuses on relativism and its lack of 
criteria for evaluating cultures as the core issue needing 
to be addressed. 
Turner, in his overall discussion, seeks to establish 
a universal value system for anthropology. To develop his 
position, he examines both cultural relativism and 
ethnocentrism, and argu.::s that their "particularistic" value 
systems are inappropriate for the field of anthropology. 
"Anthropology, particularily its applied forms, needs a 
universalistic value position'' (1982, 76). He discusses as 
an alternative to relativism a universal ''ecosystem" of 
values. 
Clarke also criticizes the particularism of 
relativism. However, he does so within a different topic, 
namely, the inadequacy of the "basic needs" concepts for a 
"science of culture." 
b. Cultural Relativism as Viable in a Limited Way 
Only 
Beattie (1984) presents his criticisms of cultural 
relativism (primarily, the unavoidability of ethnocentrism) 
within his overall discussion of the problem in social 
anthropology of understanding other cultures. He does 
indicate, however, that relativism serves as a reminder to 
anthropologists about the difficulties and problems of 
cultural bias regarding terms and concepts (1984, 9). He 
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implies degrees of relativism, and focuses his criticisms on 
the problems of ''extreme" relativism. 
Kuttner {1970), like Hartung and Jarvie, does a 
philosophical analysis of the problems of ''tolerance" and 
moral judgments. However, his approach parallels that of 
Beattie in considering relativism in degrees, where 
"extreme" relativism is not seen as viable, but a modified 
relativism has value as a restraint against bias {1970, 
221) • 
Nowell-Smith (1971) uses a philosophical approach 
also, but focuses on the topic of moral judgments. She 
gives a detailed discussion of how relativism is generally 
not viable because of its faulty logic. She does include a 
very brief, contrasting description of relativism as an 
empirical thesis (as opposed to "moral" or "conceptual") 
which she sees as a possible viable use of cultural 
relativism (1971, 15-16). 
Dimen-Schein (1977) refers to relativism in her book 
The Anthropological Imagination. In three short sections, 
she distinguishes between cultural relativism as a 
methodology and cultural relativism as a moral system, and 
highlights problems therein. Her criticisms are focused on 
relativism used as a moral system. However, she explains, 
where relativism is limited to methodology, or used only as 
a reminder about cultural bias, it can be useful {1977, 41). 
The author descibes an ongoing inner tension between 
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cultural bias, awareness of cultural bias, and our changing 
ideas. This, she indicates, fosters a healthy relativism 
(1977, 42-3). 
ADVANTAGES 
Overview 
As can be seen in the previous section, only four 
authors perceived possible applications of relativism which 
resulted in positive results in research. 
Theme #2: Facilitation of Cultural Understanding 
a. Helps Understanding of Cultural Behaviors 
b. Helps Insight into Diversity of Cultural 
Truths and Norms 
Presentation of the Data 
Advantage Theme #2: Facilitation of Cultural 
Understanding. 
a. Helps Cultural Understanding 
Beattie (1984, 9) and Kuttner (1970, 221) refer to 
cultural relativism as a reminder of cultural bias. Bias 
can distort the data one collects. Thus, the accuracy of 
one's results is enhanced if one is aware of possible bias. 
They see this advantage resulting from a limited or modified 
relativism only (as opposed to an "extreme" form). Implicit 
here is the idea of a continuum of degrees of relativism. 
Reduction of bias helps one obtain more accurate information 
about culture. 
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Dimen-Schein also refers to relativism as a corrective 
for bias, but only when one does not seek to "reconcile our 
culturally given ethnocentric morality with the 
anthropological demand for detachment." These, she says, 
occur separately. The greater one's detachment, the greater 
one's ability to be relativistic. Relativism "keeps us 
humble by reminding us, quite reasonably, that our own way 
of life is not the only or the best way to live" (1977, 41-
43). 
b. Helps Insight into Diversity of Cultural Truths 
and Norms 
Nowell-Smith and Dimen-Schein state that cultural 
relativism, as a method, can be useful. 
Nowell-Smith states that relativism can facilitate the 
empirical study of morals. One could address, 
descriptively, questions such as "How do people get their 
moral ideas?" and How do moral ideas arise and change? 
(1971, 15-16). 
In a similar, but broader vein, Dimen-Schein implies 
that contextualism, as a general methodological directive of 
cultural relativism, directs our attention to specific 
questions which help us gain insight into fundamental, 
cultural differences such as truths and norms. "Since 
cultures vary according to circumstances we must discover 
what those circumstances are and what pattern they produce" 
(1977, 41). 
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DISADVANTAGES 
Overview 
Two of the intercultural communication disadvantage 
themes were were found among the criticisms of cultural 
relativism in the current anthropological literature. Five 
disadvantages were found which fell outside the thematic 
framework. 
Because the criticisms are organized thematically, 
authors having several criticisms ~ay be referred to within 
several different thematic groups. The intention of this 
organization was to present the range of criticisms in the 
literature, not a summary of the authors' works, per se. 
The range of themes are as follows: 
Theme #2: The Avoidance of Ethical Judgments 
(4 works) 
a. Alienation from One's Own Cultural Value 
System (1 work) 
b. Prevention of Cross-Cultural Ranking 
{3 works) 
Theme #3: The Permeability vs. Impermeability of 
Cultural Boundaries (2 works) 
Additional Disadvantages found in the Current Anthropology 
Literature: 
1. The Illogical Logic of Relativism (4 works) 
a. Circular Reasoning (3 works) 
b. Faulty Linear Reasoning (1 work) 
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2. The Justification of Personal Acts (2 works) 
3. Reality as a Discoverable Entity vs. Reality as a 
Cultural Construct (1 work) 
4. Particularism vs. Universalism (2 works) 
5. Reverse Ethnocentrism (3 works) 
Presentation of the Data 
Disadvantage Theme #2: The Avoidance of Ethical 
Judgments. Three authors address this theme--Kuttner, Stein 
and Hippler. The reference to relativism used as an alibi 
for not making judgments, though in the intercultural 
communication literature, was not found in the current 
anthropology literature reviewed. However, two additional 
topics were found, as indicated below. 
a. Alienation from One's Cultural Value System 
Kuttner's first criticism is that extreme cultural/ 
ethical relativism alienates one from one's own cultural 
value system. Such relativism "has passed the mark set by 
utility and has a crippling effect on progress" (1970, 221). 
The subject of ethics is of great importance to anthropology 
for it is" ... an expression of the highest activity a 
culture can manifest" (1970, 221). He continues: 
Failure to evaluate at this level is not just 
heroic neutrality, but a retreat from the 
standands of one's own culture. Ethics are not 
neutral. Adherence to an ethical system 
requires choice and partisanship. Reserving 
judgment is not an example of objectivity but 
an indifference to the implicit values of the 
observer's culture. Radical ethical relativism 
carries with it many damaging notions ... (1970, 
221) . 
Kuttner describes two problematic consequences of 
extreme relativism in everyday life: 
1. "It first of all questions the ability of any 
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participant in a culture objectively to defend the ethical 
values of his own society" (1970, 221). 
2. "It suggests that agreement between cultures on 
ethical matters cannot be reached by rational methods if 
different patterns have already evolved" (1970, 221). 
Kuttner refers to the goal of tolerance maintained by 
relativists and argues that one can have allegience to one's 
cultural ethical system without being intolerant of alien 
systems. Furthermore, 
Science may not discover absolute truths, but 
our ethical truths have a longer history and a 
wider acceptance than any other prevailing 
system. The trivialities of Africa and the 
introspective mysticisr.i of Asia have not 
enriched our lives to the degree that our 
culture has enriched the societies of others 
(1970, 222). 
Kuttner concludes his discussion: 
Scientists ought to be loyal to their cultures, 
even if tolerant of other Societies. The fact 
that we are studying them, and not they are 
studying us, ought to foster the idea that we 
have moved a bit further up the ladder of 
social organization than the others .... we 
should not pretend that other life-styles are 
immune to the same searching analysis we devote 
to our imperfection (1970, 224). 
Kuttner's arguments are exemplary of the confusion 
between "cultural relativism" and "ethical relativism." For 
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example, he uses the terms "radical cultural relati v·ism" and 
"ethical relativism" interchangably. Apparently, to 
Kuttner, the term "cultural relativism" does not embrace 
moral issues but, somehow, an ''extreme" degree of relativism 
does. 
b. Prevention of Cross-Cultural Ranking 
Kuttner's second criticism is that relativism prevents 
cross-cultural, hierarchical ranking of values. He states 
that relativism "denies the universality of any ethical 
theme, and thereby elevates to equal importance all ethical 
themes" {1970, 221). 
It is noteworthy that Kuttner makes a point of stating 
that he is not suggesting that " ... radical cultural 
relativism bars the scientist from ~aking a system of 
classification of ethical beliefs" (1970, 221). But, he 
feels it prevents placing ethical systems into a hierarchy, 
and clearly, he does not agree with this. 
Stein concurs with this criticism, although he refers 
to cultures at large, not just ethical beliefs. Like 
Hartung, he says that relativism permits the discovery of 
differences via the cross-cultural comparative method, but 
he points out that, to him, relativism has the restriction 
that "differences found between cultures must not be used to 
disrupt the status equality that prevails between cultures 
{though the modern West is an exception, since it must be 
shown to be less equal ... )" {1986, 164). In this last 
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comment, he presents his view that relativism has an 
inappropriate bias against the modern West. 
Hippler argues that, in the realm of research, 
cultural relativism fails "to explain the world and 
especially to explain the differential capacity of different 
cultures to change and adapt ... " (1981, 394). He says that 
relativists have " ... apparently abrogated the capacity for 
judgment concerning what they view" (1981, 394). He 
emphasizes that it is necessary for anthropologists to ask 
questions about human potential and the problems of 
attaining maturity, individually and culturally. This 
requires "standards of maturity and growth" which relativism 
denies through its rejection of a cross-cultural approach: 
The inevitable outcome of a refusal to apply 
theory cross-culturally is solipsism, and this 
is precisely what anthropology has fallen into. 
(1981, 395) 
In contrast to the "tedious butterfly collecting that 
characterizes our present relativist paradigm" (1981 395), 
Hippler proposes a criterion for evaluation, where cultures 
are considered "better or worse depending upon the degree to 
which they support innate human capacities as those emerge" 
(1981, 395). 
Cultural relativism is a dead letter. If we 
do not wish our discipline to remain in the 
depths of sterility inherent in relativistic 
nonsense, or to express the continual 
adolescent rebelliousness of Marxism, we must 
be willing to address afresh our sacred totems 
(1981, 396). 
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Hippler emphasizes that the explanatory inadequacy of 
relativism "has led to an increasing adoption of Marxist 
thought in anthropology" (1981, 394). It is clear from 
Hippler's comments ("the continual adolescent rebelliousness 
of Marxism" and "its high nonsense content") that Hippler is 
not overenthousiastic about Marxism. Still, because it 
allows for the cultural evaluation relativism rejects, he 
sees it as the lesser of two evils: 
Marxist thought, whatever its high nonsense 
content, is at least not rel a ti vis tic and in 
addition satisfies both the needs of many 
anthropologists to attack their own culture 
while at the same time recognizing the reality 
of fundamental and far-reaching differences in 
capacities from culture to culture (1981, 394). 
Marxism, thus, is viewed as better than relativism because 
it at least allows for, and provides, a basis for ethical 
judgments. 
Disadvantage Theme #3: The Permeability vs 
Impermeability of Cultural Boundaries. Two authors' 
criticisms reflect this theme. Beattie argues that 
relativism draws fixed boundaries around cultures and 
requires a person to be wholly within the boundaries of one, 
or another, culture, to achieve understanding. 
Understanding requires shifting cultures in order to shed 
cultural bias which prevents understanding. Beattie makes 
two arguments: 
1. There must be some commonalities among cultures or 
communication could not happen at all. 
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2. He says it is impossible for a person to 
completely shed a culture. 
Beattie argues that whereas extreme epistemological 
relativism claims truth is relative, this cannot be wholly 
so, or we would be unable to bridge cultures at all {1984, 
15) . 
Beattie presents relativism in the context of a 
discussion on understanding other cultures, in particular, 
in terms of understanding ideas and beliefs. He analyzes 
understanding in terms of facts, social actions, and 
conceptual systems. Cultural r~lativism is examined, and 
criticized in terms of conceptual systems--"what people 
think"--concepts, beliefs, m2aning. 
Unlike actions which one can see, ideas and beliefs 
must be inferred (1984, 10). The author asks two key 
questions about cross-cultural understanding of ideas and 
beliefs, one associatied with the term "epistemological 
relativism" and the other, with the term "cultural 
relativism." Since Beattie says these are simply different 
levels, both are included in this summary. He asks: 
Can we say anything valid at all about the 
concepts and beliefs systems, symbolic or 
otherwise, current in cultures other than our 
own? ... Can the meanings ... be adequately 
understood in 'our', that is in the 
anthropologist's, terms? Or do they have to be 
understood entirely in their own contexts, that 
is relatively to other aspects of the cultures 
of which they are a part {1984, 14)? 
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"Epistemological relativism" addresses the question of 
whether there are " ... totally different ways of thinking 
about, apprehending, experiencing, a logic of a different 
order from our own" (1984, 14). "Cultural relativism" 
refers to the using of " ... categories particular to our own 
culture in attempting to understand those of other cultures" 
(1984, 14). 
Beattie states that extreme relativism 
(epistemological) " ... appears to be claiming that truth is 
entirely relative to context" (1984, 15). Beattie counters 
this, stating that for communication to occur at all, some 
common assumptions must exist: 
Truth and falsity, as qualities of statements 
about what is, cannot be wholly relative to the 
cultures or languages in which the statements 
are made. Even though there is room for 
discussion as to what the minimum of such 
indispensable shared assumptions might be, 
without the 'bridgehead' they provide we should 
all be inescapably constrained to cultural 
solipsism (1984, 15). 
Extreme relativism creates a dilemma: there is no way 
to understand another culture without totally abandoning 
one's own, in order to avoid ethnocentrism. But, Beattie 
says, " ... this is an impossibility, if only because the 
thought that we think can only be our thoughts, not 
'theirs'" (1984, 17). The author argues that admittedly, 
our knowledge of another culture may be tainted by our own, 
but we can still learn something (1984, 17). 
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Whereas extreme epistemological relativism postulates 
truth as exclusively culture-bound, cultural relativism 
involves abstaining from using our cultural categories for 
understanding. Again, the author presents extremists as 
saying we must abstain (1984, 18). The author, however, 
disputes this, saying that 
... ethno- or sociocentricism is scarely 
avoidable, and certainly the problems posed by 
our ineluctable subjectivity are formidable .... 
The scholar who sets the search for truth above 
all other values can sometimes 'fight against 
his ideologies' . He rnay e·v·en win the battle, 
though, as we have seen, his victory is 
unlikely to be either clear-cut or complete 
(1984, 20). 
Beattie clearly acknowledges relativism to a degree. But, 
he rejects an extreme form of relativism which, according to 
him, isolates cultures, excluding the possibility of cross-
cultural understanding because it excludes the possibility 
of assumptions common to all humans. According to Beattie, 
some commonalities which facilitate the bridging of cultures 
through communication must exist. 
While extreme epistemological relativism requires the 
abandoning of one's culture to understand a different 
culture, Beattie argues that one cannot, in fact, do so. We 
are who we are. To this extent, our cultural boundaries are 
fixed (within us). This, however, does not prevent all 
understanding. We can understanding something, even if 
tainted with our cultural biases (Beattie 1984, 17). 
Dimen-Schein offers two arguments regarding 
boundaries. First, she says that fixed boundaries do not 
exist: 
If there is no overt statement that cultures 
actually lack visible boundaries, it becomes 
possible to think of each culture as if it were 
a solid smooth ball, spinning off by itself, 
eternally the same. Such objectification 
prevents us from seeing that fieldwork 
initiates or continues a process in which two 
ways of life mutually change one another. The 
culture concept, as constructed, cannot 
encompass change and has therefore led us to 
misunderstand pri.mi tive societies :i.s well :i.s 
our own. 
In this sense, the cor.cept of culture is not 
true to the real Horld of relationships whose 
character is processual, not static (1977, 51). 
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Hence, Dimen-Schein is saying that ''culture" is an arbitrary 
concept which has a li~ited function. Second, because there 
is no reality of separate cultures, the issue of "separate 
but equal" value systems versus the ranking of value systems 
would dissolve. Only "as long as each culture is kept 
separate and bounded in theory, each nation can be likewise 
seen as separate and 2thically accountable to no one but 
itself" (1977, 53). 
Additional Disadvantages Cited in the Current Anthropology 
Literature 
1. The Illogical Logic of Relativism. Three authors 
criticisms are encompassed by this theme--Kuttner, Hartung, 
and Nowell-Smith. 
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a. Circular Reasoning 
Kuttner says that those who advocate an extreme 
relativism err " ... by postulating a priori each system to be 
equally valid. This is in itself an ethical judgment, which 
relativism forbids us from doing" (1970, 223). Kuttner 
seems to take "equally valid" to mean "equally good." From 
this follows the equally erring prescription of "tolerance" 
which the author says means that " ... it is just as valid to 
be intolerant as to be tolerant" (1970, 223). He indicates 
this is illogical. 
Kuttner softens his criticism somewhat, saying that 
the inhibitions of extreme relativists about uttering 
ethical judgments "were washed away very rapidly when 
Fascist ideology expressed opinions not in harmony with the 
personal beliefs of liberal anthropologists and 
sociologists" (1970, 223). This change of position 
resulting from World War II is reflected, fortunately, in 
current texts which" ... now make it clear that cultural 
relativity does not mean we should be indifferent to the 
quality of other ethical systems." 
Unlike Kuttner, Hartung's criticism of the "flawed 
logic" of cultural relativism is not qualified at all. He 
says cultural relativism is ethnocentric and moral for it 
claims we should be ''tolerant." Hartung says this statement 
is illogical because it itself is a moral statement. 
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Hartung criticizes cultural relativism on two points: 
1. It deprives us "of any rational grounds for the 
making of decisions" and, 
2. " ... its recent expositions, especially those 
formulated by anthropologists, are ethnocentrically and 
surreptitiously moral" (1954, 125). 
He challenges the leap of logic from the "undeniable, 
obvious and trite fact of cultural variation" to the 
conclusion of cultural relativism, namely, in his view, 
''equal validity" of cultures and that "there is no possible 
intercultural standard for the evaluation of cultural 
variations" (1954, 120). 
He notes that one can conclude from cultural variation 
that man can live under a variety of conditions. However, 
this does not mean all customs are equally valid, "even 
though each culture may think of itself as the best" (1954, 
121). The author says that the injunction of tolerance of 
all cultural ways, inherent in relativism, is " ... simply an 
ethnocentric extension of our own liberal tradition" (1954, 
121). It is not based on scientific analysis "based upon a 
comparison of all cultures against a set of moral criteria 
equally applicable to all cultures" (1954, 121). It 
elevates the liberal view, saying it ought to be followed, 
and in this sense, it is ethnocentric. 
Furthermore, that moral diversity exists does not mean 
that all moral systems are equally valid, nor that an 
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intercultural standard might exist or be developed against 
which these differences can be judged (1954, 121-2): 
This plea for tolerance of all customs makes 
ethical concepts, for the individual, 
completely a matter of personal taste and 
preference ... Tolerance and equal validity also 
seem to imply that no moral concepts, 
regardless of their derivation, can possibly be 
given any logical or empirical authority over 
the conventions of any individual" (1954, 122). 
Hartung, thus, argues that the logic of relativism is 
faulty. 
Hartung, like Kuttner, also argues that "tolerance" is 
a suspect dimension of relativism, because: 
The factual description of cultural variation 
is no basis for either tolerance or 
condemnation unless the moral relevance of this 
variation has been referred to a standard which 
applies to all (1954, 124) 
Hartung concludes that not only does tolerance deprive us of 
"rational grounds for making choices and decisions," but it 
also affirms all ways of life as equally valid, even those 
which are intolerant. The relativist cannot logically 
insist that people be tolerant; this claim is instead itself 
an ethnocentric, moral judgment (1954, 125). 
Turner also says that the reasoning of relativism is 
circular: 
Cultural relativism has been attractive because 
of its supposedly value-free nature. On closer 
examination, however, the assertion that social 
science requires a value-free approach turns 
out to be itself a value judgment (1982, 77). 
Turner says that some relativists talk about "higher 
values" such as self-determination: 
... not one of the leading proponents of 
cultural relativism can be consistent on this 
point. Nor can anyone else, for the position 
ultimately leads to universalistic type 
statements, which are inconsistent with 
relativism (1982, 77). 
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Thus, those relativists who try to maintain their neutrality 
and also avoid justifying attrocities such as the 
consequences of Nazi Germany end up doing so by taking a 
values position. 
b. Faulty Linear Reasoning 
Nowell-Smith's basic argument is that cultural 
relativism is a confused collection of moral concepts, 
injunctions and prohibitions pertaining to intra and cross-
cultural judgment formation which is largely unsupportable. 
Cultural relativism " ... is seldom set out in detail, still 
less defended by argument, it is difficult to discover 
precisely what the doctrine is, or even what sort of a 
doctrine it is ... " (1971, 1). 
Nowell-Smith identifies four propositions as the core 
of relativism and explores each, and the relationship of 
each, in detail. The following are examples of the 
arguments presented. 
Proposition 1: "There are no absolute, universal 
moral rules or values; all rules and values are relative to 
something" (1971, 2). Nowell-Smith makes two arguments 
against this. First, nowhere has it been shown that there 
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are no rules people ought to adhere to even though, in 
practice, they do not adhere to them (1971, 3). 
The second criticism argues that if one takes the 
position that rules appropriate for one culture may not be 
appropriate for another, one takes a utilitarian stance 
since 'appropriate' implies an end or purpose which the rule 
is supposed to serve. However, utilitarianism then becomes 
a universal basis for morality, for "the diversity of rules 
in different conditions presupposes a uniformity of ends 
such as health or survival" (1971, 3). But, relativism 
rejects that there is any such basis, and therefore, cannot 
consider the diversity of moral rules in terms of 
appropriateness. 
Proposition 2: "The mores of a society are 
necessarily right for that society" (1971, 2). Nowell-Smith 
here argues that this proposition is unsupported because 
... there are societies living in similar 
conditions but having different practices, so 
that it would be difficult to argue that each 
of them has the right practices. Secondly, 
there are some customs the appropriateness of 
which depends on belief in empirical 
falsehoods ... (1971, 4). 
Proposition 3: "One ought not to make cross-cultural 
moral or value judgments" (1971, 2). 
Proposition 4: "One ought to conform to the mores of 
his society" (1971, 2). 
Basically, Nowell-Smith says that since proposition 2 
has been shown to be false, Propositions 3 and 4 which 
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supposedly follow from it, are, therefore, also false (1971, 
4) • 
In sum, Nowell-Smith finds relativism as it is usually 
presented, theoretically unacceptable. "This doctrine is 
more pernicious even than moral scepticism since, unlike 
scepticism, it can be put into practice" (1971, 16). 
Cultural relativism cannot logically serve as an alternative 
to making judgments. The fact of diversity does not 
logically lead to nonjudgmentalism. 
2. Justification for Personal Acts. Dimen-Schein 
says that a problem of the use of relativism in the area of 
individual morality is that it fails to address the 
conditions of choices of individuals. Cultural relativism 
"contains moral and methodological premises about cultures; 
it is not a moral justification for individuals" (1977, 42). 
The use of relativism to justify individual acts is 
not effective because relativism addresses issues of 
cultures, not individuals (1977, 41). There is a confusion 
of levels (group/individual). 
Hartung's criticism of cultural relativism as a 
personal moral justification has a different focus. He says 
relativism deprives us of rational grounds for making 
decisions. Society's ethics no longer have authority over 
the individual; ethical concepts become a matter of personal 
taste (Hartung, 122). Clearly, Hartung, finds this 
inadequate. 
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3. Reality as a Discoverable Entity vs Reality as a 
Cultural Construct. Jarvie's overall criticism is that 
"omni-tolerant relativism" takes away the possibilitiy of 
critical debate over questions of truth and morality which 
pertain to a discoverable reality. "Tolerance, to be 
rational, must be allied with criticism and debate (1975, 
352) . 
First, Jarvie establishes that it appears that the 
problem of relativism is "thrust upon us by social and 
cultural, moral and cognitive diversity" {1975, 345). It 
appears to be 
... a reaction peculiar to us 
'westerners'] ... many traditional 
[presumably 
societies 
contain and cope with diversity 
becoming open-minded, critical or 
still less relativistic {1975, 345). 
without 
tolerant, 
Furthermore, it appears to be not about cross-cultural 
facts, theories or morals per se, "but the criteria we bring 
to bear on substantive issues" (1975, 345). Relativism 
casts criteria as culture-specific, with no " ... clear way to 
transcend localized views" (1975, 344). Jarvie argues: 
If a statement is declared true in one culture 
and false in another, then either one culture 
is mistaken, or each one has a different 
criterion of truth, and such criteria cannot be 
ranked. { 1975, 344) 
The relativist position involves, according to Jarvie, 
several problems. The first entails a confusion of 
knowledge and belief. Relativists focus on two questions, 
"What do we know?" and "How should we behave?" {1975, 346). 
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"Because the questions are interpreted individualistically/ 
socially rather than transcendentally," the relativist sees 
answers only in terms of human beliefs and opinions (1975, 
346) which are derived from and bound to "the culture which 
has nurtured us; they have, as it were, no possible 
jurisdiction beyond those cultural units" (1975, 345). 
Jarvie says, however, that while, admittedly, people 
are caught in cultural and linguistic "nets," there is, 
nonetheless, a world "which is the way it is and not another 
way" (1975, 347). In other words, while people's answers 
may only approximate reality, all answers are not 
necessarily equally correct. For example, "localized 
mathematics, localized science and localized morality are 
simply not mathematics, science and morality in the sense we 
intend and to which we aspire" (1975, 347). Relativism errs 
because: 
... knowledge is not a special state of belief 
any more than morality is a special kind of 
opinion. What we think of as moral or immoral 
is not on that account moral or immoral. 
Moreover, our view of what is moral or immoral 
may itself be judged true or false. This is 
not just a tricky piece of self-ref erring 
argument, but a decisive reason for not 
muddling belief and opinion, truth and 
goodness. Only because we can make these moves 
are we able to argue and debate the issues of 
truth and goodness (1975, 348). 
Acknowledging the existence of a real world, even if 
our faculties can only approximate it, provides, through 
debate, a "basis for rational comparison" of differences, 
acknowledging "the diversity the relativist makes so much 
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of," in the effort "to put them to the acid test" (1975, 
348). Relativism, according to Jarvie, through its limiting 
view of context-bound beliefs, sidesteps debate, and the 
recognition of the discoverable world (1975, 351). 
A second confusion is the "muddling up of social 
tolerance with epistemological tolerance." On the one hand, 
Jarvie says, relativists employ a double standard when 
tolerance for difference is accompanied by affirmation of 
multiple truths: 
It is fine to be socially tolerant cf other 
views and their holders; wretched to declare 
them equally true in their own way when they 
are nothing of the sort (e.g. one may be aimed 
at destroying the other). On the contrary, we 
have a sort of moral duty to engage in critical 
debate on serious issues, not to fudge them 
(1975, 350). 
The crux of the problem is not the possibility of 
justification of value and cognition judgments. It is the 
exercising of critical debate about them. Jarvie's final 
criticism of relativism is that the adoption of 
... the principle of universal charity towards 
all and all that they do and believe is 
condescension of the worst kind; it takes away 
the one feature which makes concrete the unity 
of mankind, viz., its shared rationality, its 
ability to engage in critical debate over 
questions of truth and morality (1975, 352). 
Jarvie says ethnocentrism is unavoidable, but rather 
than a criticism, he sees this statement in concert with the 
relativistic view. "All human beings are products of their 
cultures, so will their answers be" (1975, 346). However, 
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he says because there is a real world, we can discover it 
{1975, 351). 
Cultural relativism fails to be a practical concept. 
"No one can actually live by it (even anthropologists--for 
if they do they become amoral)" (1975, 348). He charges 
that the "passion with which it is preached, especially 
ethically" is the indication that it cannot be lived out 
(1975, 348). 
3. Particularism vs Universalism. Two authors' works 
reflect this theme, Clark (1970) and Turner (1982). 
Clark's fundamental criticism of cultural relativism 
is that it is not appropriate for a discipline which seeks 
to have a scientific base (i.e., a means for generalizing). 
He defines relativism in terms of contextualism, and argues 
that because "terms cannot be applied, salva veritate, to 
different societies, then not even cross-cultural 
descriptions can be generated, let alone general laws" 
(1970, 545). This is not conducive to a "science of 
culture". 
The purpose of Clark's discussion is not to argue the 
problems of relativism, per se. His overall argument is 
against the usefulness of two types of criteria, "basic 
needs" and "basic problems," which have been set forth as 
the accepted basis for establishing general, universal laws 
about cultures. However, in anthropology, 
... the need to postulate such identity criteria 
has arisen, historically, out of the recent 
tendency to reject the once popular set of 
theories and beliefs associated with the name 
of 'relativism' (1970, 545). 
While Clark disagrees with two of the attempts in 
current theory to find "the underlying similarities of 
superficially different cultures" (1970, 545)) for the 
purpose of making cross-cultural descriptions and 
identifying general laws, neither does he offer an 
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alternative. But, it is clear that he concurs with the move 
away from relativism as a necessary requirement for the 
development of theory within a "science of culture." 
Turner argues that the ccntextualism of cultural 
relativism is manifested, among applied anthropologists, as 
a "live and let live" credo which "when applied to behavior 
that has global ecological implications, is becoming 
increasingly anachronistic in a world of limited resources" 
(1982, 79). The particularism of relativism needs to be 
replaced by a more effective, anthropological, value 
position which has a broader basis such as a universal 
ecosystem. 
Turner views anthropologists as "social engineers" who 
help develop standards for cultural evaluation and change 
(1982, 77). He rejects the relativist position which, in 
perceiving cultural evaluation as only appropriate in terms 
of that culture's beliefs and practices, restricts outsiders 
from criticizing the goals of that culture (1982, 76). 
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Furthermore, relativism, " ... instead of making it 
possible for someone to escape ethnocentrism, may only 
involve exchanging one kind of ethnocentrism for another 
kind" (1982, 77). He argues that the practice of 
anthropologists becoming cultural insiders to shed the 
"ethnocentric viewpoint of outsiders" merely means taking on 
the ethnocentrism of that culture and thus, bound within a 
particularistic framework. 
4. Reverse Ethnocentrism. "Reverse ethnocentrism" 
refers to the negative evaluation of one's own culture, and 
the positive evaluation of other cultures (Bennett, 1986, 
2 8) • It aptly describes the criticisms rendered by three 
authors, Turner (1982), Hippler (1981), and Stein (1986). 
Anthropology has made, Turner states, 
... important contributions to the development 
of universalism in many areas, but thus far it 
has made little progress toward universalism in 
values. The lack of progress has not been due 
so much to an absence of al terna ti ves as to a 
distate for dealing with value judgments, 
particularly its own (1982, 78). 
Turner says anthropologists "romanticize non-Western 
cultures while criticizing the industrial ones from which 
anthropologists come" (1982, 77). With the exception of 
using cultural relativism "for initial fieldwork among a 
group of people," Turner warns that cultural relativism can 
lead to serious "unresolvable difficulties" for the 
anthropologist (1982, 76). 
Similarily, relativists practice, Hippler says, 
... a kind of nonrelativistic relativism where 
anything and everything done in or by some non-
Western culture is viewed as good or at least 
neutral with clear judgmental and 
nonrela ti vis tic emphasis, and everything done 
in or by Western society is seen as bad. That 
is, we have come to say, "all cultures are 
equal, except for Euro-American ones which are 
inferior and evil" (1981, 394). 
However, according to Hippler, the truth is generally the 
reverse situation: 
... Euro-American culture is vastly superior in 
its flexibility, tolerance for variety, 
scientific thought, and interest in emergent 
possibilities to any primitive society extant. 
(1981, 395) 
The many repeated tests based on Piaget's observations, 
133 
Hippler writes, support the higher growth and maturation of 
Euro-American societies. 
He says relativists have tremendous anxiety of such 
results, fearing, he says, misuse of them for the support of 
"racist theories or as excuses for oppression" (1981, 395). 
To ignore the importance of exploring questions of human 
potential is not, Hippler says, objective or useful (1981, 
396} . 
Stein also refers to the role anxiety plays in an 
extensive critique. He lambasts cultural relativism with 
the argument that relativism serves a psychological role for 
anthropologists, one which buffers them from anxiety: 
As an anxiety-reducing ideology, relativism 
holds that no universal common denominators can 
be found, thereby preventing any increase in 
anxiety .... Relativism has thus grown to be 
anthropology's paramount defense against 
arriving at an understanding of its subject 
matter while purporting to be doing so. Only 
as the self-mystifying shroud of relativism is 
lifted and dispelled can truth about man be 
pursued (1986, 174). 
In studying and "tolerating" other cultures, 
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anthropologists are experiencing wish fulfillment of aspects 
of themselves which are not safe to express in their own 
"modern" societies (1986, 171). 
The escape from anxiety is achieved through reverse 
ethnocentrism. Stein describes three different situations 
in which relativists positively evaluate other cultures, and 
negatively evaluate their own. 
The first pertains to the transformation of guilt 
feelings about Western ethnocentrism and scientific 
imperialism: 
Among relativists, guilt feelings are 
transformed via projection into accusation of 
others who are ethnocentric. At a more 
primitive level, the relativist symbolizes his 
inner splits through a dualistic system that 
portrays the modern West as evil and the 
primitive as innocent (1986, 169). 
The second involves status anxiety: 
The pluralistic world of the primitive becomes 
the idyllic world of ascribed status 
(officially at least) dominates modern Western 
life .... In the projectively constitutive 
"family of man," all become equal siblings 
where there is no rivalry, no parental 
favoritism or neglect .... The primitive becomes 
the ideal self ... one that will always mirror 
the anthropologist's specialness (1986, 164). 
The third situation is that of separation anxiety: 
The idealization of the past, the celebration 
of tribal wholeness, and the nostalgia for lost 
cohesion (projectively identified with the 
"primitive," are distinctive features of 
doctrinal relativism (1986, 172). 
Anthropologists use relativism as a way of addressing the 
experience of "emotional separation from their family of 
origin" (1986, 172). 
Stein describes the relativ~st as devaluing Western 
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culture and prizing "primitive culture" through the doctrine 
of relativism to solve these "anxieties." 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The current anthropology works reviewed for this study 
were found to vary as to definitions, applications, 
advantages and disadvantages of cultural relativism. 
Definitions 
Three of the four intercultural communication themes 
were found, as well as two additional definitions. 
Definitional Theme #2 (Equal Validity of Cultures) 
encompassed two works, and Theme #3 (Attitudes Toward 
Difference) and Theme 4 (Contextualism) each encompassed 
three works. Two additional definitions were found which 
were not encompassed by the intercultural themes: "The 
Contingency of Customs and Values" and "Relativism as a 
plurality of Concepts." 
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It is interesting that two of the authors (Beattie and 
Kuttner) indicate that relativism is a continuum of greater 
and lesser degrees of relativism. The other eight authors 
seem to refer to relativism as a single conceptual entity. 
Applications 
In examining the discussions of the viability of 
cultural relativism, six works were found to focus on 
explaining why it is not viable, and four describe the 
conditions in which relativism could be considered not 
viable, and the limitations within which it could be seen as 
useful. 
Advantages 
Of those works which outline limited uses, three 
authors refer to relativism as beneficial as a reminder of 
cultural bias. Two works refer to the usefulness of 
cultural relativism as a method. 
Disadvantages 
The review of these ten anthropological works 
generated a wide range of criticisms of cultural relativism. 
The limitations of this study prevented a comprehensive 
search of all the anthropological literature for a complete 
accounting of all the different criticisms, and the number 
of anthropologists which rally behind each. However, the 
criticisms include here are representative of the general 
critical trend. 
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This trend seems to include criticisms of every 
manifestation of cultural relativism in human behavior. 
Cultural relativism is not seen as having just problems of 
logic, or a weakness in one of its concepts. The perceived 
problems are conceptual, attitudinal, methodological and 
moral. In other words, relativism has been criticized as a 
thought construct, as an attitude, as an action-process, and 
as an action having implications in a social context. 
The conceptual difficulties identified include dispute 
over the definition of "reality" (it is argued that it is a 
discoverable entity, as opposed to a humanly created one), 
and the definition of the concept of "culture" (i.e., what 
are the boundaries of culture and how do they affect our 
theories). 
An even deeper, more fundamental conceptual challenge 
to the logic of relativism points to the heart of the 
structure of cultural relatvism as unsound. Both circular 
reasoning and faulty linear reasoning are given as arguments 
against its viability. 
In turn, some authors use the faulty logic point to 
argue that the attitude of "tolerance," one of the key goals 
of relativism for some, is a questionable goal. Authors 
also criticize relativists for allegedly negatively 
evaluating their own cultures while positively evaluating 
other cultures. 
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The methods which result from the thought and 
attitudes of the relativists are challenged on several 
fronts. One is that relativism is lacking as a method 
because it does not allow for the ranking of cultures, or 
the establishing of evaluative criteria with which to 
compare and rank information. Relativists are also seen as 
failing to universalize which, it is argued, is necessary 
for the methodology of a science. 
A number of the critical issues brought out by the 
authors focus on the problems of cultural relativism as a 
moral philosophy. Some authors negate cultural relativism 
entirely on this basis. Others describe cultural relativism 
as valid as a conceptual tool, but not as a moral guide. 
* * * 
The criticisms in anthropology have generated a lively 
debate. Works supporting cultural relativism, as well as 
ones which specifically rebutt the criticisms of cultural 
relativism, are prevalent in the anthropological literature. 
Though a discussion of these remain outside the scope of 
this particular study, the reader is referred to the 
following for a view into the other side of the debate: 
Bidney (1979), Bose (1969), Bourdillon (1986), Geertz 
(1984), Hanson and Martin (1973), Jimenez (1981), Neki 
(1976), Opler (1968), Pastner (1982), Reser (1981; 1982) and 
Taylor (1969). 
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These authors, supportive of cultural relativism, 
reflect a cultural range. Bose and Neki are connected with 
professional institutions in India; Bourdillon teaches at 
the University of Zimbabwe; Jimenez is published in a 
journal from Poland, Reser is connected with the University 
of Queensland, and Bidney, Geertz, Hanson and Martin, Opler, 
Pastner, and Taylor are connected with American academic 
institutions. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter examines the intercultural communication 
data in light of the findings pertaining to cultural 
relativism obtained from the early and current anthropology 
literature. Explanations for various correlations and 
discrepancies between the literature groups are offered and, 
where relevent, there is discussion as to how the different 
fields of study might assist one another in addressing 
various issues. 
The format for presenting the conclusions of this 
study is consistent with the previous chapters. 
Observations and issues are addressed in relation to each 
respective category (definitions, applications, advantages 
and disadvantages), and organized by theme. Each point 
discussed focuses on how the intercultural literature 
compares to the early and current anthropology literature, 
and includes a brief discussion of the possible reasons for 
the concurrences, or lack, thereof. 
A visual, multi-dimensional profile of all of the data 
is presented in Table I. Table II, which immediately follows 
Table I, provides the coding key for the various works from 
D
EF
 I
N
! 
T
 ID
N
S 
1
. 
C
u
lt
u
ra
l 
D
iv
e
rs
it
y
 
2
0
' 
2
5
' 
31
 
2
. 
E
q
u
al
 
C
u
lt
u
ra
l 
V
a
li
d
it
y
 
1
3
, 
4
2
, 
D
, 
G
 
I.
 
A
tt
it
u
d
e
s 
T
ow
ar
d 
D
if
fe
re
n
c
e
 
8
, 
2
1
, 
3
9
, 
4
4
, 
E
, 
f
, 
G
 
4
. 
C
l>
n
te
x
tu
a
li
sm
 
3
3
, 
3
5
, 
3
6
, 
4
3
, 
A
, 
J 
~
.
 
S
u
b
je
c
ti
v
is
m
 
ii
 
6
. 
C
o
n
ti
n
g
en
cy
 o
f 
C
u
st
o
m
s 
an
d 
B
e
li
e
fs
 
c 
7
. 
C
u
lt
u
ra
l 
R
e
la
ti
v
is
m
 
a
s 
a 
P
lu
r
a
li
ty
 
o
f 
C
o
n
ce
p
ts
 
tl
, 
H
 
T
A
£
lL
f 
C
U
LI
U
R
A
L 
R
~
L
A
T
I
V
I
S
M
 
DA
TA
 
PR
O
FI
L
E
 
A
PP
L 
!C
A
T 
IO
N
S 
1.
 
C
a
u
se
s 
o
f 
C
lJ
lt
u
ra
l 
R
e
la
ti
v
is
m
 
a
. 
fo
rm
a
l 
L
ea
rn
in
g
 
1
, 
a
, 
1
1
, 
2
1
, 
2
5
, 
2
7
, 
m
, 
39
., 
4
3
 
b
. 
In
fo
rm
a
l 
L
ea
r1
1i
n
g 
&
, 
1
, 
2
, 
6
, 
1
1
, 
1
4
, 
2
8
 
2
. 
C
o
n
se
q
u
en
ce
s 
o
f 
C
u
lt
u
ra
l 
R
e
la
ti
v
is
m
 
a
. 
In
 
C
o
m
m
u
n
ic
a
ti
o
n
 
' 
3
' 
8
' 
1
0
, 
1
5
' 
1
9
, 
2
0
, 
3
2
, 
j 
3
' 
3
4
' 
3
5
' 
3
6
, 
4
0
, 
4
2
 
b
. 
In
 
In
te
r
a
c
ti
v
e
, 
P
ro
fe
ss
io
n
al
 
W
or
k 
5
, 
1
2
' 
1
3
, 
2
3
' 
3
1
' 
3
8
 
c
. 
In
 
R
es
ea
rc
h
 
&
 ' 
•'
 
a,
 
7
2
, 
2
4
 
d
. 
C
u
lt
u
re
 
S
ho
ck
 
4
1
 
e
. 
Ju
d
gm
en
t 
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 
&
,*
,8
,3
7
 
3
. 
T
h
e
o
re
ti
c
a
l 
D
im
en
si
o
n
s 
a
. 
M
on
oc
ul
tu
ra
l 
v
s.
 
M
ul
ti
cu
lt
ur
al
 ~
i
"
"
 
&
 , 
• 
a
, 
4
, 
2
9
 
b
. 
H
um
an
 
R
ig
h
ts
-
4L
1 
c
. 
Q
u
e
st
io
n
 
o
f 
V
i<
.1
h
il
it
y
 
o
f 
C
u
lt
u
r
a
l 
R
e
la
ti
v
is
m
 
1
. 
N
ot
 
V
ia
b
le
 
1
8
, 
B
, 
D
, 
E
, 
r,
 
I,
 
J 
2
. 
L
im
it
e
d
 
V
ia
b
il
it
y
 -
A
, 
C
, 
G
, 
H
 
3
. 
V
ia
b
le
 
-
ii
, 
26
 
''· 
N
o
t 
H
el
ev
a
n
t 
-
1
6
 
A
IJV
l\N
 I 
A
l;f
 S
 
1.
 
fa
c
il
it
a
ti
o
n
 
o
f 
In
te
r
n
a
l,
 
A
tt
it
u
d
in
a
l 
C
h
an
g
es
 
a
. 
R
ed
u
ce
s 
E
th
n
o
c
e
n
tr
ic
ls
m
 
&
, 
•
, 
a,
 
'1
7
, 
3
5
, 
3
6
 
b
. 
R
ed
u
ce
s 
D
is
c
ri
m
in
a
ti
o
n
 
&
 I 
• 
o 
2 
c
. 
R
ed
u
ce
s 
S
te
re
o
ty
p
in
g
 
3 
d
. 
In
c
re
a
se
s 
E
nj
oy
m
en
t 
o
f 
D
if
fe
re
nc
e 
• 
' 
7
5
 
e
. 
H
el
p
s 
D
ev
el
o
p
m
en
t 
o
f 
E
m
pa
th
y 
8 
f.
 
H
el
p
s 
A
cc
ep
ta
n
ce
 
o
f 
B
e
h
a
v
io
ra
l 
V
a
ri
e
ty
 
15
 
g
. 
H
el
p
s 
fi
g
u
re
/G
ro
u
n
d
 
E
la
s
ti
c
it
y
 
6 
h
. 
In
c
r
e
a
se
s 
T
o
le
ra
n
ce
 
&
 , 
•
, 
e
, 
1
, 
e 
i.
 
C
ou
nt
er
s 
W
es
te
rn
 S
u
p
er
io
ri
ty
 N
ot
io
n 
&
 , 
•
, 
a
, 
1
0
 
2
. 
F
a
c
il
it
a
ti
o
n
 o
f 
C
u
lt
u
ra
l 
U
n
d
er
st
an
d
in
g
 
a
. 
H
el
p
s 
U
n
d
e
rs
ta
n
d
in
g
 
o
f 
C
u
lt
u
ra
l 
B
e
h
a
v
io
r
s 
&
, 
*,
 
0
, 
2
0
, 
2
2
, 
2
4
, 
A
, 
C
, 
G
, 
H
 
b
. 
H
el
p
s 
In
si
g
h
t 
in
to
 
D
iv
e
rs
it
y
 
o
f 
C
u
lt
u
ra
l 
T
ru
th
s 
an
d
 
N
or
m
s 
&
 ' 
• 
' 
Ii
i,
 
1 
7
, 
c 
3
. 
fa
c
il
it
a
ti
o
n
 
o
f 
E
x
te
r
n
a
l,
 
In
te
r
a
c
ti
v
e
 
R
e
su
lt
s 
a
. 
F
a
c
il
it
a
te
s 
Jn
te
rc
u
lt
u
ra
l 
F
un
ct
io
ni
ng
 
•
, 
1,
 
19
, 
2
9
, 
3
0
, 
3
2
, 
3
3
, 
34
, 
4
0
, 
41
 
b
. 
E
th
ic
a
l 
A
d
v
an
ta
g
es
 
-
4
, 
4
4
 
c
. 
F
a
c
il
it
a
te
s 
C
u
lt
u
ra
l 
M
ul
t 
lp
l!
c
lt
y
 
•
, 
2
6
, 
1
8
 
d
. 
F 
ac
i i
i t
at
 e
s,
 
Jn
te
ra
ct
he
, 
Pr
of
es
si
cr
el
 lt
>!
I<
 
')
' 
1
0
 I 
1 
1 
I 
1
7
' 
? 
1 
' 
7 
3
' 
3
1
 '
 
3A
 
fl
 l 
'oA
llV
A
N
 I
 At
;
~
 '
i 
1
. 
D
if
fi
c
u
lt
ie
s
 
o
f 
A
ss
u
m
p
ti
on
 
o
f 
C
u
lt
u
ra
l 
R
e
la
ti
v
is
m
 
&
, 
•
, 
6
, 
8
, 
1
3
, 
1
4
, 
!>
7 
2
. 
A
v
o
id
an
ce
 
o
f 
ft
h
ic
a
l 
Ju
dl
Jl
"'
nt
s 
G
, 
1
6
, 
7
0
, 
l
, 
G
, 
3
. 
P
e
rm
e
a
b
il
it
y
 
v
s.
 
Jm
µ
er
m
ea
b
il
lt
y
 
o
f 
C
u
lt
u
ra
l 
B
o
u
n
d
ar
ie
s 
1
8
, 
A
, 
C
 
4
. 
T
he
 
Il
lo
g
ic
a
l 
L
o
g
ic
 
o
f 
C
u
lt
u
ra
l 
R
e
la
ti
v
is
m
 
8
, 
0
, 
G
, 
H
 
5
. 
J
u
s
ti
fi
c
a
ti
o
n
 
o
f 
P
er
so
n
al
 
A
ct
s 
C
, 
D
 
6
. 
R
e
a
ii
ty
 
a
s 
D
is
ce
rn
a
b
le
 
v
s.
 
R
e
a
li
ty
 
as
 
C
u
lt
u
ra
l 
C
o
n
st
ru
ct
 
F 
7
. 
P
a
r
ti
c
u
la
r
is
m
 
v
s.
 
U
n
iv
er
sa
li
sm
 
B
, 
J 
B
. 
H
ev
er
se
 
E
th
n
o
ce
n
tr
lc
is
m
 
•
, 
f
, 
I 
I-
' 
it
:.
 
I-
' 
TA
BL
E 
II
 
D
A
TA
 
PR
O
FI
L
E
 
C
O
D
IN
G
 
KE
Y 
EA
RL
Y
 
A
N
TH
R
O
PO
LO
G
IS
TS
 
IN
TE
R
C
U
LT
U
R
A
L 
C
O
M
M
U
N
IC
A
TI
O
N
 
A
U
TH
O
R
S 
* 
B
e
n
e
d
ic
t 
1
. 
A
dl
er
 
(1
97
4)
 
2
3
. 
H
of
st
ed
e 
(1
98
3)
 
&
 B
o
as
 
2
. 
A
su
nc
io
n-
L
an
de
' 
(1
97
5)
 
24
. 
H
uf
st
ed
e 
(1
98
4)
 
a 
H
e
rs
k
o
v
it
s 
3
. 
B
ar
na
 
( 1
97
6)
 
25
. 
H
ow
el
l 
(1
97
7)
 
4
. 
B
ar
na
 
(1
97
9)
 
26
. 
Is
om
ur
a/
S
te
w
ar
t 
(1
97
6)
 
5
. 
B
ar
nl
un
d 
(1
97
8)
 
27
. 
M
ay
er
 
(1
98
0)
 
6
. 
B
ar
nl
un
d/
N
on
ur
a 
(1
98
5)
 
28
. 
M
cl
eo
d 
(1
98
1)
 
7
. 
B
en
ne
tt
, 
J.
 
(1
98
5)
 
29
. 
O
w
en
 
(1
97
9)
 
8
. 
B
en
ne
tt
, 
M
. 
(1
97
7)
 
30
. 
P
ai
ge
/M
ar
ti
n 
(1
98
3)
 
9
. 
B
en
ne
tt
, 
M
. 
(1
98
6)
 
31
. 
P
ed
er
se
n 
(1
97
4)
 
1 O
. 
B
oc
hn
er
 
( 1
97
3)
 
32
. 
Pu
sc
h 
(1
98
1)
 
1
1
. 
B
oc
hn
er
 
( 1
98
1a
) 
33
. 
S
am
ov
ar
/P
or
te
r 
(1
97
6)
 
1
2
. 
B
oc
hn
er
 
( 1
98
1b
) 
34
. 
S
am
ov
ar
/P
or
te
r 
(1
98
8)
 
1 3
. 
B
oc
hn
er
 
( 1
98
1c
) 
35
. 
S
it
ar
am
/C
og
de
ll
 
(1
97
6)
 
1
4
. 
B
ri
sl
in
 (
19
81
) 
36
. 
S
it
ar
am
/H
aa
pa
ne
n 
(1
97
9)
 
1
5
. 
B
ri
sl
in
/L
an
d
is
/B
ra
n
d
t 
37
. 
Sm
ar
t 
(1
96
8)
 
(1
98
3)
 
16
. 
F
er
gu
so
n 
(1
97
7)
 
38
. 
S
te
w
ar
t 
(1
97
2)
 
1
7
. 
Fu
rn
ha
m
/B
oc
hn
er
 
(1
98
6)
 
39
. 
S
te
w
ar
t/
D
an
ie
ls
o
n
/ 
F
o
st
er
 (
19
79
) 
1
8
. 
G
le
nn
, 
E
./
G
le
nn
, 
C
. 
(1
98
1)
 
40
. 
S
za
la
y 
(1
97
4)
 
1
9
. 
G
ud
yk
un
st
 
(1
97
7)
 
41
. 
T
af
t 
(1
98
1)
 
2
0
. 
G
ud
yk
un
st
/K
im
 
(1
98
4)
 
42
. 
T
ai
 
( 1
98
6)
 
2
1
. 
H
ar
ri
s/
M
or
an
 
(1
97
9)
 
43
. 
T
ze
ng
 
( 1
98
3)
 
2
2
. 
H
of
st
ed
e 
( 1
97
8)
 
44
. 
W
en
dt
 
(1
98
2)
 
CU
RR
EN
T 
A
N
TH
R
O
PO
LO
G
IS
TS
 
A
. 
B
e
a
tt
ie
 
(1
9
8
4
) 
B
. 
C
la
rk
 
( 
1
9
7
0
) 
c
. 
D
im
en
-S
ch
ei
n
 
(1
9
7
7
) 
D
. 
H
ar
tu
n
g
 
(1
9
5
4
) 
E
. 
H
ip
p
le
r 
(1
9
8
1
) 
F
. 
Ja
rv
ie
 
(1
9
7
5
) 
G
. 
K
u
tt
n
e
r 
(1
9
7
0
) 
H
. 
N
o
w
el
l-
S
m
it
h
 
(1
9
7
1
) 
I.
 
S
te
in
 
(1
9
8
6
) 
J.
 
T
u
rn
er
 
( 
1
9
8
2
) 
.....
. ""' L> 
143 
which the data was obtained. Thus, for example, references 
in Table I to Ruth Benedict's writing are represented by a 
"*" (see column 1 of Table II), and the symbol "20" in 
Table I refers to Gudykunst and Kirn (1984) (see column 2 of 
Table II) . 
The profile graphically portrays the thematic 
framework generated from the intercultural communication 
literature and is used, in this study, to organize the data 
in all three literature groups. The items of data in the 
early and current anthropology literature which were found 
to fall outside this framework have been listed in the 
profile as well for comparative purposes. Definiton #5 is 
from the early anthropology literature, as is Disadvantage 
#8. Definitions #6 and 7, and disadvantages #4-7, are from 
the current anthropology literature. 
DEFINITIONS 
Overview 
One of the most striking findings of this study is the 
number of different definitions of cultural relativism found 
in the all of the literature reviewed. Definitions were 
found to be stated in all of the current anthropology 
literature reviewed whereas only a small percentage of the 
intercultural communication authors provided definitions. In 
the early anthropology literature, two of the three 
"founders" of cultural relativism in anthropology had 
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different definitions. The third early anthropology author, 
Boas, who has been acclaimed as the earliest proponent of 
relativism in anthropology, was found to not even use the 
term "cultural relativism." 
Discussion of the Findings 
Definitional Theme #1: Cultural Diversity. Of the 
three early anthropologists, only Benedict (1934) explicitly 
defines cultural relativism as ''Cultural Diversity". None 
of the current anthropologists state this definition, but it 
was found in three of the intercultural communication works. 
Benedict's choice of definition likely reflects the 
focus of her application of cultural relativism. Much of 
her work was devoted to making people aware of the different 
consequences of positive and negative evaluation of cultural 
differences. The pressing need she felt for the 
"consciousness raising'' regarding cultural diversity stemmed 
from the extent to which she perceived Euro-American 
cultures exercising their power based on erroneous, 
ethnocentric premises about cultures. 
This definition is probably absent from the current 
anthropology literature reviewed for this study because 
cultural diversity has been so fully incorporated into the 
current anthropology theory (very likely thanks to 
Benedict), that it is no longer seen as having significant 
conceptual use. Perhaps, also, in contrast to Benedict, 
anthropologists assume the concept is prevalent in the world 
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at large, or, if not, they may not see the role of 
anthropologists as one of doing "consciousness raising" of 
the public. 
Of the percentage of intercultural communication 
authors who actually defined cultural relativism, one-fourth 
use the definition of "cultural diversity." This may 
reflect a theoretical inheritance from Benedict. It also 
may reflect an emphasis on drawing attention to diversity. 
Much of the work in intercultural communication is devoted 
to helping people adjust to and understand different 
cultures. One of the major barriers identified in the 
intercultural communication literature is the degree to 
which people seem to lack an awareness, and understanding, 
of cultural differences. 
Definitional Theme #2: Egual Cultural Validity. A 
second definition found for cultural relativism, "Equal 
Cultural Validity," presents somewhat of a historical 
puzzle. Not one of the three early anthropologists espouse 
this concept, either as a definition for cultural relativism 
or as a theoretical assumption. Yet, two of the current 
anthropology authors and two of the intercultural 
communication authors present this definition. 
It is very possible that several concepts in the early 
literature have been misinterpreted, in particular, 
Benedict's discussions of cultures as human constructions, 
all equally possible, and therefore, having no inherent good 
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or bad qualities. This is not the same as saying that all 
cultures are "equally valid", in other words, "equally 
good," a concept Benedict would undoubtedly have disputed. 
Indeed, she describes how people have to critically examine 
their cultures and advocate changes when directions taken by 
cultures are seen as harmful for mankind. Her emphasis is 
that people have the potential to choose and influence 
directions for their cultures, and rather than going along 
with the status quo, should actively do so. 
Definitional Theme #3: Attitudes Toward Difference. A 
large percentage of both the current anthropology and the 
intercultural communication authors' definitions were 
encompassed by definitional Theme #3. Again, no 
definitional concurrence exists with the early 
anthropologists. However, unlike definitional Theme #2, 
this concept is present in their works. This connection may 
well reflect an indirect historical connection between the 
theory of the early anthropologists and more recent views on 
cultural relativism. 
"Attitudes Toward Difference'' certainly reflects the 
intercultural communication focus on communication 
interaction, and the role that internal attitudes have upon 
communication behaviors and experiences. The intercultural 
communication emphasis is on a person's construal and 
evaluation of cultural "differences." The mor.: a person can 
perceive, and accept (though not necessarily like) cultural 
differences, the more successful will be his or her 
intercultural communication experiences. 
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The three current anthropologists do not develop this 
definitional theme in terms of an internal, attitudinal 
process which influences interactions. Rather, they refer 
to it as a stance of non-judgment toward cultural phenomena. 
In one case, it is considered judgmental restraint; in two 
others, it is a statement of the absence of standards which 
makes one unable to judge. 
The difference in orientation between the 
intercultural communication and current anthropology 
definitions reflects the emphases of the two respective 
disciplines. The former is more concerned with facilitating 
intercultural interactions, and the latter focuses, instead, 
on evaluating, comparing and ranking information. 
Definitional Theme #4: Contextualism. This 
definitional theme, like Theme #3, also is present as a 
concept in the early anthropology literature, but not 
utilized as a definition by any of the three authors 
reviewed for this study. Thus, it too, indicates possible a 
possible theoretical, historical link. 
Four of the intercultural communication authors' 
definitions are encompassed by this theme. Two refer to the 
study of values in terms of the respective culture's 
context. One focuses specifically on concepts of right, 
wrong, and truth as meaningful only if considered 
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contextually. One takes a broader view, and says concepts 
in general need to be understood contextually. 
The definitions of the two current anthropologists are 
somewhat different. One says it means not using our own 
conceptual framework to understand the categories, 
classifications and thoughts of another culture. While this 
is implicit in the intercultural definitions, it reflects 
the author's concern with personal restraint pertaining to 
intellectual processes. 
The second anthropologist's definition refers to 
relativism as the viewing of cultures as unique, unified 
wholes, thus underscoring the author's view of relativism as 
emphasizing the self-contained aspect of individual 
cultures. 
The difference between the definitions of the two 
literature groups seems to reflect, again, the intentions of 
the authors. While the intercultural communication authors 
are concerned with the information results achieved from 
contextualization, the two current anthropologists emphasize 
two different premises upon which they perceive relativism 
to be based - personal restraint and the characteristic of 
cultures as self-contained wholes. Each of these premises, 
in turn, becomes the object of each anthropologists' 
criticism. 
Additional Definitions from the Anthropology 
Literature. Three, current anthropology definitions did not 
coincide with the intercultural communication themes. 
However, the concepts of two of the three can be found 
throughout the early anthropology and intercultural 
communication literature. These are the definitions of 
"Subjectivism" and "Contingency of Customs and Beliefs." 
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Perhaps the reason Herskovits' definition of 
"Subjectivism'' (1948) is not found in the intercultural 
communication area is that subjectivism is very likely 
considered, now, as obvious and, therefore, seen as failing 
to provide substantive theoretical direction where 
previously it represented new conceptual ground. 
"The Contingency of Customs and Beliefs" seems to 
serve as a basic assumption in the writings of the early 
anthropologists and the intercultural communication authors. 
It is difficult to say why the idea of the ever-changing, 
human creations of ''cultures" has not been not used in these 
areas as a definition. Perhaps, it represents too great a 
conceptual leap for the uninitiated. Or, the early 
anthropology authors and intercultural communication authors 
may have found it more important to their work to draw 
attention, through their definitions, to the fundamental 
concepts underlying this definition. 
The third additional definition in the current 
anthropology, "Cultural Relativism as a Plurality of 
Concepts," is not present at all in either the early 
anthropology or intercultural communication literature 
150 
probably because people were, and are, not aware of the 
confusion of the term. But the concern with the plurality 
of concepts now connected with cultural relativism brings to 
the fore the need for clarification. 
APPLICATIONS 
Overview 
Two significant findings occurred from the examination 
of the applications of cultural relativism in the three 
literature groups. First, many similarities were found 
between the early anthropology literature and that of 
intercultural communication. Second, the criticism focus of 
the current anthropology literature was found to barely 
exist in the early anthropology and intercultural 
communication literature. 
The extent to which the current anthropology 
criticisms reflect anthropology as a whole cannot be 
determined, because the works reviewed for this study were 
intentionally chosen for their critical viewpoint. However, 
the ease with which critical works could be found among the 
current anthropology literature indicates that cultural 
relativism is a significant issue in anthropology. 
In contrast, the lack of critical focus in the other 
two literature groups indicates a lack of critical concern 
regarding cultural relativism. There seems to be, instead, 
overwhelming and unquestioning support in the early 
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anthropology and intercultural communication literature for 
cultural relativism. The possible reasons for this 
discrepancy are discussed in the ''Theme #3" section to 
follow (Theoretical Dimensions). 
Discussion of the Findings 
Application Theme #1: Causes of Cultural Relativism. 
One-third of the intercultural communication authors refer 
to cultural relativism in terms of how it could be acquired 
or further developed. This large percentage of authors 
indicates the perceived significance of cultural relativism 
for the intercultural communication process. 
Of the early anthropologists, only Boas describes the 
process involved in acquiring cultural relativism. Neither 
Benedict nor Herskovits address this theme, probably because 
their definitions refer to relativism as pre-existing states 
which cannot be "caused" (cultural diversity and 
subjectivism). 
None of the current anthropologists ref er to this 
theme. Perhaps, this is because their focus is to discuss 
what is wrong with cultural relativism, not what causes it. 
Application Theme #2: Consequences of Cultural 
Relativism. None of the current anthropologists directly 
discuss the consequences of cultural relativism. The few 
consequences that were referred to as advantages are 
considered in the following section. The primary purpose of 
the current anthropology articles is not to address the 
consequences of relativism but rather, to describe the 
theoretical issue of whether or not the concept is even 
viable in, and of, itself (Theme #3). 
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Most of the intercultural communication authors and 
all of the early anthropology authors do discuss 
consequences. Not surprisingly, most of the intercultural 
communication discussions pertain to the topic of 
consequences in communication. Of the three early 
anthropologists, Benedict refers to communication in a 
general way, in her references to improved social relations. 
Whereas Boas and Herskovits describe benefits for theory and 
research methodology, Benedict emphasizes the influence of 
cultural relativism in interactive situations. 
None of the early anthropologists discuss interactive 
professional work whereas six of the intercultural 
communication authors do. This may reflect the fact that 
the use of cultural relativism in interactive situations 
wasn't specifically addressed in professional work until the 
intercultural communication area developed. 
The discussion of research is the primary application 
of cultural relativism in the early anthropology works, 
reflecting the research emphasis of the field. Although one 
would expect a research emphasis in intercultural 
communication, only a few works were found to discuss 
cultural relativism in terms of research. This may be a 
serious lack in the literature, and one which should be 
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addressed. Perhaps, because most intercultural 
communication authors see cultural relativism as having an 
interactive role, they do not feel it has a research role. 
However, this is unlikely, given that communication 
researchers can hardly avoid human interaction. 
A connection between cultural relativism and culture 
shock is described by only one intercultural communication 
author. This may suggest an application of cultural 
relativism that could be further explored in the 
intercultural communication field. Or, perhaps other 
intercultural authors have rejected this application. From 
the literature reviewed, this is difficult to determine. 
The absence of this topic from the anthropology references 
again suggests the difference in focus between the two 
fields. However, given the fact that anthropologists do 
live in different cultures, and interact with people from 
those cultures, the experience of culture shock is probably 
not uncommon amongst anthropologists. Therefore, 
implications of cultural relativism for culture shock may be 
an important topic for anthropologists to explore further. 
The final application topic which emerged in this 
theme, the role of cultural relativism in judgment 
formation, was a central topic to all of the early 
anthropologists. Only one intercultural author addresses 
this topic, and none of the current anthropologists do. 
/ 
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Why does only one intercultural communication author 
see cultural relativism as integral to judgment formation, 
while no others (in the study) elaborate on this? Judgments 
in intercultural communication situations are perhaps 
ref erred to most frequently in references on "ethical 
relativism". Though some of these appear identical to some 
of the cultural relativism references, they were not 
included in this work because the focus here was to 
delineate "cultural relativism.'' The topic of ethical 
relativism remains for another study. 
Application Theme #3: Theoretical Dimensions. The 
three early anthropologists dedicated much of their work to 
describing how cultural relativism influences the 
theoretical base of anthropology and what methodological 
implications result. One of the characteristic features of 
their approach was their emphasis en taking other cultural 
perspectives into account at the point at which 
anthropologists sought to determine the meaning of cultural 
behaviors. 
This approach is typical of intercultural 
communication methodology as well. However, two of the 
intercultural communication authors advocate a more 
extensive integration of multiculturalism in intercultural 
communication theory. They use cultural relativism as the 
basis for their arguments in advocating that communication 
theory must itself become pluralistic in its criteria. The 
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occurrence of this topic in both the early anthropology and 
intercultural communication literature suggest possible 
historical connections in their views on theory. 
The use of cultural relativism to develop a 
multicultural base for theory is not an application in the 
current anthropology literature reviewed for this study. 
The focus of each selection reviewed for this study is to 
point out what's wrong Hith ~ultural r~lati~i3m. It would 
be interesting, however, to find out if some of the 
anthropological literature not reviewed in this study 
discuss this topic, to determine if there are any parallels 
between the intercultural communication area and current 
anthropology regarding a need for a multicultural 
theoretical base. 
One intercultural communication author uses cultural 
relativism in intercultural communication as a theoretical 
justification for his human rights arguments. While the 
idea of the dignity of all humankind is pervasive throughout 
both Boas' and Benedict's works, they did not specifically 
address human rights. They did refer to problems they 
perceived as resulting from imperialism, but not in terms of 
human rights. 
However, the early anthropologists' use of cultural 
relativism as a reason for changing attitudes toward 
cultural differences is very like the basis for some of the 
human rights discussions today (e.g., Annaim 1937; Donnely 
1984; 1985). 
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It is difficult to say whether or not Boas or 
Benedict would have agreed with this application. Further 
research would need to be done to see if some of the 
anthropologists who advocate the use of anthropology for 
social change also write about human rights and cultural 
relativism. 
The viability of cultural relativism, the final topic 
which emerged among the application themes, was the primary 
focus of all of the current anthropology articles (by design 
of the study) , and the focus of only a few of the 
intercultural communication and early anthropology authors. 
The ease with which the current anthropology works 
could be found suggests that cultural relativism is a 
significant issue in anthropology. Conversely, the almost 
complete lack of discussions on relativism in the early 
anthropology and intercultural communication literature 
suggests a high degree of acceptance of, or at least non-
concern with, cultural relativism. 
The liveliness of the debate on relativism in 
anthropology today poses the question of whether, perhaps, 
there shouldn't be some critical query in intercultural 
communication. It is possible that because the different 
areas have different goals, cultural relativism may be 
useful in one area, and not the other. For example, 
comparison and ranking of data is done in anthropology, but 
not in intercultural communication which focuses primarily 
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on the description and facilitation of intercultural 
communication interactions. As revealed in an examination 
of the various criticisms on cultural relativism in the 
current anthropology literature, some authors see cultural 
relativism as impeding the goal of comparing and ranking 
data. In contrast, almost all the intercultural 
communication authors see cultural relativism as important 
in facilitating intercultural communication interact~ons. 
According to this line of thinking, anthropology has one 
use, intercultural communication another. 
However, the case is not so clear cut because 
anthropologists do engage in intercultural interactions. 
Thus, the question faces them as to whether cultural 
relativism is indeed important for assisting these 
interactions. 
Three intercultural communication works contain very 
brief references to the viability of cultural relativism. 
One says it is irrelevent to culture study because approval 
of all cultures is not the goal of culture learning. Other 
intercultural communication authors may agree, but this 
could not be determined from this study because of the 
dearth of elaboration of views on cultural relativism. This 
argument is present among the current anthropology 
criticisms, however. 
One intercultural communication author says that 
relativism was useful when cultural boundaries were 
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distinct, but lost its usefulness when cult~res in the 
modern world became so interconnected. This idea is further 
pursued in the discussion of disadvantage Theme #3 which 
follows. 
Herskovits is the only early anthropology author who 
makes a point of discussing the viability of cultural 
relativism. He is the only author among the early 
anthropology and intercultural communication authors who 
acknowledges in his writing that critical debate over 
cultural relativism exists. Though outside the scope of 
this study, an examination of how his arguments fit into the 
debate in anthropology might help initiate some discussion 
about cultural rela~ivism in intercultural communication. 
ADVANTAGES 
Overview 
The advantages of cultural relativism perceived by the 
intercultural communication authors ranged from internal 
benefits comprised largely of greater openess toward, and 
tolerance of, cultural differences, the facilitation of more 
accurate, less biased, knowledge about culture, and actual 
interactive results in the form of improved communication 
and the support of culture difference. 
The early anthropologists addressed these same themes 
as well, although their emphasis was on how cultural 
relativism helps facilitate more accurate cultural knowledge 
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and how it helps curb bias in research. The few advantages 
cited in the current anthropology literature reviewed for 
this study do not refer to internal or interactive results. 
Like the early anthropologists, they reflect a research 
orientation, emphasizing the curbing of bias and certain 
methodological applications. 
Discussion of the Findings 
Advantage Theme #1; Facilitation of Internal, 
Attitudinal Changes. The attitudinal changes resulting from 
cultural relativism which were found in the intercultural 
communication literature are varied and include the 
reduction of ethnocentrism, discrimination and stereotyping, 
the increase of the enjoyment of difference, the increase of 
empathy, an improved ability to accept behavioral variety 
and to shift figure/ground concepts, the increase of 
tolerance, and the negating of the notion of Western 
superiority. 
Some of these changes perceived as resulting from 
cultural relativism are described in the early anthropology 
literature. Others, such as stereotyping, empathy and 
figure/ground elasticity, are not discussed in the early 
anthropology literature in relation to cultural relativity. 
The broader range of results identified in the intercultural 
literature may reflect later theoretical developments. 
The topics found in Herskovits' writing are fewer 
still, probably because his focus is research, not human 
relations. Thus, for example, he does not refer 
specifically to discrimination, whereas Boas and Benedict 
do. 
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Advantage Theme #2: Facilitation of Cultural Knowledge 
and Understanding. All of the early anthropology authors, 
three of the intercultural communication authors, and one of 
the current anthropology authors cite cultural relativism as 
necessary for the understanding of cultural behaviors. It 
is interesting that all of the early anthropology authors 
see cultural relativism ~s central to cultural 
understanding. This, again, seems to stem from their 
commitment to cultural relativism and its usefulness. Of 
course, since most of the current anthropolgists included in 
this study negate cultural relativism altogether, their lack 
of reinforcement on this advantage is understandable. 
However, it is difficult to determine why there are so few 
references to this topic in intercultural communication. It 
may be that this advantage is assumed as obvious, or it may 
reflect inadequate discussion of cultural relativism on the 
part of most intercultural communication authors. 
The one current anthropologist who was found to agree 
with this advantage suggests the heuristic potential of 
cultural relativism for generating questions which arise 
because of a multiplistic outlook. This helps the 
understanding of cultural behaviors because it helps draw 
attention to certain questions which then influence the 
direction of study. 
161 
A second topic pertaining to cultural understanding 
also received scant attention from the intercultural 
communication and current anthropology literature, but was 
fully embraced in the early anthropology literature. This 
topic, pertaining to insight into diversity of cultural 
truths and norms, differs from the understanding of cultural 
behaviors in its focus on a culture's views of reality and 
morality. All of the early anthropology authors saw 
cultural relativism as facilitating this insight. Only one 
author in each of the other literature groups referred to 
this advantage. Perhaps this reflects a prevailing attitude 
today that these are obvious to perceive, and not in need of 
attention in the literature. Or, perhaps most of the 
authors in these two groups perceive truth and morality as 
not varying from culture to culture. It seems likely that 
the answer lies somewhere in between these speculations, but 
a more definitive answer would require more research into 
the views of both literature groups. 
Advantage Theme #3: Facilitation of External, 
Interactive Results. Most of the intercultural 
communication authors refer to one or more topics pertaining 
to this theme. Only one early anthropologist describes this 
advantage. None of the current anthropologists do. This 
distribution, no doubt, results from the different emphases 
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of anthropology and intercultural communication. However, 
because anthropologists do engage in face-to-face 
intercultural interactions, the area of intercultural 
communication may have an approach involving cultural 
relativism which could be beneficial to anthropologists. 
However, given the cursory treatment of cultural relativism 
in the intercultural literature, more elaboration of their 
views on cultural relativism is needed for the consideration 
and possible benefit of other social scientists. 
DISADVANTAGES 
Overview 
Three disadvantage themes were found in the 
intercultural communication literature. Only the first was 
found to have much support from the intercultural 
communication and early anthropology literature. One 
additional disadvantage was cited in the early anthropology 
literature and four were found in the current anthropology 
literature. 
Discussion of the Findings 
The comparison of the data from each of the 
literature groups pertaining to the disadvantages is 
presented under each of the respective headings. 
Disadvantage Theme #1: Difficulties of Assumption of 
Cultural Relativism. As can be seen in Table l, there is 
support in the early anthropology literature for the 
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intercultural communication disadvantage theme #1 which 
describes the difficulty of becoming relativistic. This 
thematic correlation between the intercultural communication 
authors and the early anthropologists again suggests a 
similar theoretical orientation between these two literature 
groups. For example, authors in both groups point to the 
tenacity of the enculturation process and the difficulty of 
shedding one's ethnocentrism, as impediments to assuming 
cultural relativism. 
Benedict (1934) talks about the fear of difference as 
one of the emotional factors behind ethnocentrism and how, 
in contrast, appreciation of cultural differences helps one 
be more tolerant. In the intercultural communication 
literature, Bennett (1986) also discusses this. By means of 
his model of intercultural sensitivity, he describes 
different levels of acceptance of cultural differences which 
people can experience. He, and most (but not all) of the 
intercultural authors base their approach for reducing 
ethnocentrism on the idea of increasing awareness of, and 
tolerance for, cultural differences. Bennett, like 
Benedict, says that, in contrast to ethnocentrism, cultural 
relativism involves a positive attitude toward differences. 
This use of the word ''positive" refers to a comfortableness 
with, and, therefore, a lack of fear of, the experience of 
"difference." (A negative attitude, according to these two 
authors, would involve fear of difference.) This contrasts 
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with the evaluative interpretation of "positive" which 
results in the idea that "differences" must be perceived as 
"good." 
The current anthropologists do not refer to this theme 
of "difficulty of assumption" at all. This may be partly 
because six of the ten authors, using different criticisms, 
declare cultural relativism nonviable altogether. Of the 
four authors who qualify their criticisms with descriptions 
of limited forms of relativism which might be viable, none 
are concerned with the process of how relativism is 
acquired. Hence, they don't discuss any difficulties 
associated with acquiring relativism. 
This is another example of where perspectives from 
intercultural communication on cultural relativism might be 
fruitful for current anthropologists, by providing an 
understanding of how people develop more positive attitudes 
toward difference. However, this perspective from 
intercultural communication would be useful for only some of 
the anthropologists who support relativism. As demonstrated 
by the current anthropology authors included in this study, 
discrepancies exist as to what is meant by cultural 
relativism. Thus, a process-oriented, intercultural 
communication perspective might not be helpful for 
anthropologists (or intercultural communication people) who 
define relativism as "contextualism." As discussed in the 
intercultural communication definitions, "contextualism" as 
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a definition of cultural relativism is not an attitude; it 
is a method of obtaining information. Reducing fear of 
differences would not necessarily help anthropologists 
become culturally relativistic if they perceived relativism 
to be the examination of cultural behaviors and values in 
terms of cultural context. 
Disadvantage Theme #2: The Avoidance of Ethical 
Judgments. The second theme of ''The Avoidance of Ethical 
Judgments" was not found in any of the early anthropological 
literature. In fact, all three authors support judgment. 
Both Boas and Benedict refer to the need for culture change. 
They see anthropologists as instrumental in providing a data 
base on which ''beneficial" judgments could be made. 
Boas (1962), with his orientation for thorough data 
collection, advocates social changes, but not immediate 
ones. He first wanted in-depth data from a wide range of 
cultures in order to determine possible universals on which 
to base evaluation. His caution against the use of any one 
particular value system as the measure for all, is clearly 
meant as a temporary step until enough cultural data was 
collected. 
Benedict (1934) describes a pressing need for culture 
change, especially among Euro-American cultures which she 
perceives as dangerous in their ethnocentrism. She refers 
to the ethnocentric potential of any culture, but identifies 
that of the Euro-American cultures as especially problematic 
because of its power-base. This is clearly an ethical 
judgment. Her advocacy of tolerance as an approach to 
cultural difference does not make Benedict view all 
difference as "good." 
Herskovits (1958) makes a point of distinguishing 
between the anthropologist as researcher, and the 
anthropologist in society. The former tries to be as 
objective as possible, while the latter must necessarily 
act. He views the role of anthropologists as descriptive 
information gatherers, not social change agents. Thus, 
Herskovits saw the use of ethical judgments as changing 
depending on the role of the anthropologist. 
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Several of the current anthropology authors, who 
perceive cultural relativism as involving the view that all 
cultures are equal, say that such a view prevents the 
evaluation and ranking of data. They feel that this impedes 
the comparison of data. Herskovits (1958) challenges these 
critics who want critera with which to evaluate and asks 
"Whose criteria?" and on what basis are these criteria to be 
selected? 
Like Herskovits, the current anthropologist Nowell-
Smith (1971) applies cultural relativism to research. She 
says moral injunctions do not logically follow from cultural 
diversity and that research should be empirical, not 
evaluative. She suggests that cultural relativism be used 
to address such questions as how values differ cross-
cul turally, and why people see them as valuable. 
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Where do the intercultural communication authors stand 
in this controversy pertaining to research methodology? Are 
researchers expected to do descriptive work from as non-
evaluative a perspectiv~ as they can or, should they have 
criteria against which to compare and rank data? 
Hof stede is one of the few who offers even brief 
insights into the assu~ptions underlying methodology. He is 
very definite when he states that cultural relativism is 
essential for empirical research. It helps restrain bias 
because one questions one's values and assumptions (1978), 
and it facilitates the obtaining of more accurate 
information about culture (1984). 
Because the general premise of restraining evaluation 
in interpersonal interactions prevails in the intercultural 
communication area, it is likely to be operational as part 
of the research methodology as well. Furthermore, the 
primary focus of intercultural communication is to discern 
differences (and similarities, according to some authors) 
between communication behaviors of people from different 
cultural backgrounds, not to compare and rank data. Hence, 
the conflict apparent in the anthropology methodology as to 
whether or not to evaluate data does not appear in the 
intercultural literature. 
However, that discussion can be found in the 
anthropological literature pertaining to methodology, and 
the assumptive base of methodology, is important to note. 
Such discussion is present in both the current and early 
literature reviewed. In contrast, little discussion was 
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found in the intercultural communication literature as to 
how research is conducted, and why it is conducted that way. 
(In contrast, the intercultural literature addresses 
extensively the question of how intercultural interactions 
should be optimized, and what intercultural communication 
training should comprise. But it begs the question of how 
the data on which theory and training is based was 
obtained.) 
The assumptive base of research methodology should be 
clearly stated in the literature of an area of study, 
especially when it is an applied area which draws from 
several fields as intercultural communication does. Earlier 
in this discussion, the need for a description of the 
historical and theoretical sources of concepts was 
identified. Here, we find yet another lack of 
clarification, namely, of the research methods and goals of 
intercultural communication. 
Disadvantage Theme #3: The Permeability and 
Impermeability of Cultural Boundaries. The third 
disadvantage theme which emerged from the intercultural 
literature pertains to cultural boundaries. This theme was 
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not found in the early anthropology literature. Only a few 
authors refer to it in the intercultural literature. Glenn 
(1981) says the change in the usefulness of cultural 
relativism has been contingent upon the existence of 
distinct cultural boundaries. Formerly, boundaries were 
quite distinct, but through increasing culture contact, much 
interdependence and culture blending has occurred. As a 
result, relativism no longer applies. It is unclear what 
Glenn raeans by this. Does he define relativism as 
contextualism, such that behaviors, for example, can no 
longer be considered in relation to the cultural context 
because this context is no longer clearly confined by 
boundaries? Or, does he mean that the idea "all cultures 
are equally valid" no longer applies, because distinct 
cultures no longer exist? Does he mean, perhaps, that 
people are not culture bound any more because cultural 
boundaries are more fluid? 
Bennett (1986) takes a different tack. One of the 
basic assumptions of his "ethnocentrism-ethnorelativism" 
continuum, which serves as the basis for his intercultural 
sensitivity model, is that how people construe cultural 
boundaries influences their intercultural sensitivity, and 
reflects their level of cultural relativism. Thus, for 
example, someone who is fully ethnocentric has firmly fixed 
cultural boundaries. At the opposite end of the scale, at 
170 
the stage of ''constructive marginality," a person who is 
fully relative consciously reconstrues cultural boundaries. 
The key difference between these two views on cultural 
boundaries seems to be that Glenn sees boundaries as real, 
and as something which can change with time by means of 
historical events. Bennett sees cultural boundaries as 
conceptual, based on attitudes toward cultural differences. 
At one end of his ~ontinuum, some people construe cultures 
to be "us" and "them." Differences are seen as fixed. At 
the other end of the continuum, people are capable of 
conceptually reorganizing and recreating cultural 
boundaries, and participating in them. 
These questions relate to those raised in the current 
anthropology literature. Beattie (1984) reflects Glenn's 
assumption of fixed reality. He describes what he perceives 
to be the fixed cultural boundaries of cultural relativism 
and says that, according to this relativistic formula, 
communication cannot occur unless a person completely shifts 
to the cultural context of the other person. He argues, 
however, that between these fixed cultural contexts, people 
somehow do communicate. Therefore, some kind of boundary 
permeation must occur, even if we can't get rid of our 
ethnocentrism. 
Dimen-Schein (1977) is closer to Bennett in assuming 
that cultural boundaries are a mental construct. She says 
that because there are no actual, "fixed" cultures, there is 
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no "separate but equal cultures" problem, nor is there a 
problem of ranking cultures becaus~, in actuality, there are 
no cultures to be considered equal or to be ranked. 
The general impression from the majority of the 
intercultural literature is that culture is viewed as a 
fixed entity, as Glenn and Beattie suggest. However, 
Bennett is not alone among authors in describing reality as 
a construct. Perhaps many other intercultural authors 
reflect this position, but they either do not state the 
assumptions they have which support their particular view of 
"culture", or they are not specific to what extent they see 
reality {and hence, "cultures'') as construed. 
It would be informative for theory clarification in 
intercultural communication if a study were done which 
determined assumptions such as this by both authors and 
practitioners of intercultural communication. Lack of such 
fundamental definition leaves ideas wide open for both 
misinterpretation, criticism, or both, regarding cultural 
relativism. 
Additional Disadvantages Found in the Current Anthropology 
Literature 
1. The Illogical Logic of Cultural Relativism. In 
the current anthropology literature, several authors fault 
cultural relativism for inconsistant or inadequate 
reasoning. What are the implications of this criticism for 
intercultural communication? 
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First, before one takes the logic outlined in the 
anthropology criticisms and holds it up against the logic of 
cultural relativism used in the intercultural communication 
literature, two questions should be considered. First, is 
the logic used by the current anthropologists the same as 
that which operates in the reasoning of cultural relativism 
used in the intercultural area? Second, should this 
anthropology logic be the same as the reasoning pertaining 
to cultural relativism which is used in intercultural 
communication? 
The first question is difficult to consider because of 
the lack of discussion in the early anthropology and 
intercultural communication literature to draw on. 
Exceptions are found in the writing of Herskovits and 
Bennett. They are fairly thorough in presenting 
assumptions, defining terms and outlining how cultural 
relativism operates within their overall conceptual 
frameworks. 
Other than a brief reference by Herskovits, no 
discussion of the possible faults in the logic of cultural 
relativism appears anywhere in the early anthropology or 
intercultural communication literature reviewed in this 
study. 
Herskovits' (1958) allusion to the logic of cultural 
relativism does not criticize the logic itself. Rath~r, he 
cautions that misuse of cultural relativism will lead to 
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conceptual error. He says that if the different 
applications {methodological, philosophical, and practical) 
are not kept distinct, unfounded criticism, and/or 
unnecessary confusion can result. In other words, he 
suggests that cultural relativism as a methodology is not 
the same as cultural relativism as a philosophy, or as used 
in a practical context. 
Regretfully, Herskovits does not elaborate upon his 
caution. The problem of shifting applications is, however, 
pursued further in Nowell-Smiths' article. But nowhere, in 
the early anthropology or intercultural communication 
literature, is the logic of cultural relativism actually 
examined, beyond what Herskovits and Bennett have offered. 
Hence, the question of how the logic between anthropology 
and intercultural communication compares must remain 
unanswered for now. 
The second question of whether or not the logic of 
cultural relativism should concur between anthropology and 
intercultural communication can be explored, but even this 
is somewhat limited. For example, on the one hand, one 
might assume that if the same language is being used, and 
the same general intellectual traditions, the logic for idea 
development should be indeed consistent. If this is the 
case, the logic of scientists of the same background should 
be the same, even between fields of study. But even here, 
the lack of discussion in the intercultural literature is 
restrictive. 
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On the other hand, perhaps fields of study can benefit 
from multiple forms of logic, or at least some degree of 
variation. This question is especially important in light 
of the fact that people from many cultural backgrounds are 
involved in the social sciences. Do they adhere to a 
uniform logic system intrinsic to "social science" or to 
each social science discipline, or do they contribute 
variations of logics? What about the research and 
application of intercultural communication and anthropology 
carried out in different cultures and in different 
languages? Is the logic of that culture employed? What 
happens to the "logic" of, for example, cultural relativism? 
These questions are quite pertinent to intercultural 
communication because of the self-reflexive nature of this 
area of study. It has the potential, for example, of asking 
questions about other cultures' perspectives which, in turn, 
can render a different picture of itself. 
The extent to which multicultural perspectives on 
cultural relativism exist cannot be determined from the 
scanty literature on cultural relativism in intercultural 
communication. However, because intercultural communication 
involves in its work the understanding of different cultural 
perspectives, the extent to which such multiplicity operates 
within its own theory is certainly important to pursue. 
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Were one to have such information, the first question 
regarding the similarity, or difference, between the logic 
of anthropology and that of intercultural communication 
could be addressed more informatively and accurately. 
Cultural relativism might prove to be a highly flexible and 
useful concept cross-culturally. On the other hand, 
whatever usefulness, if any, it is perceived as having may 
be found to be culture-bound. 
Clearly, this is a ~ich area for further study. The 
literature review reveals that too few authors have defined 
cultural relativism, let alone discussed their assumptions 
and their goals, for any analysis to be done at this time. 
Cultural relativism may not be the only concept so cursorily 
addressed. 
2. The Justification of Personal Acts. Two of the 
current anthropologists criticize cultural relativism for 
its use as a justification for personal acts. Dimen-Schein 
(1977) says that this use of relativism for moral 
justification is ineffective because it does not address the 
conditions of choices of individuals. Relativism addresses 
issues of cultures. Hartung (1954) says cultural relativism 
takes away the authority of society and renders ethics a 
matter of personal taste. 
The differences between these two views seems to be 
explained by how each perceives cultural relativism. Dimen-
Schein defines relativism as the process of cultural 
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constructs. Hartung defines it as the fact of the equal 
validity of cultures. Dimen-Schein makes a point of saying 
that because culture is merely a conceptual construct, the 
issue of "equal validity of cultures", and hence, moral 
dilemmas, is non-existant. There are no cultures, per se, 
she says. We arbitrarily draw the boundaries. Hartung, on 
the other hand, sees distinct, cultural boundaries, and 
feels that the authority of the society we are in should 
have influence over our choices. He clearly does sees 
cultural relativism as not viable because, to him, it 
equalizes all cultures. 
The early anthropologists views seem to reflect Dimen-
Schein' s position. Perhaps, because they focus on 
developing theory and methods for understanding cultures, 
cultural differences and people in relation to their 
cultures, they apply relativism in terms of cultures, not 
individuals. Herskovits states specifically that a 
relativistic, minimally-evaluative position is to be applied 
in the research context, not in the context of the 
anthropologists as citizen (1958). 
In intercultural communication, cultural relativism 
does pertain to individuals. However, relativism pertaining 
to personal acts, and thus morality, is generally referred 
to as "ethical relativism'' and, as such, is not included in 
this study. However, overlapping of definitions and 
applications of both terms can be found. 
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The criticism of the justification of personal acts is 
not insignificant in terms of intercultural communication. 
However, in the intercultural communication literature, the 
multiplicity of choices rendered by a relativistic 
perspective is not seen as an excuse to justify any personal 
acts. Generally, the problem perceived is the dilemma of 
having several ethical choices which derive from different 
cultural contexts, where an individual cannot see a basis 
for choosing one to which a committment to act can be made. 
Bennett (1986) is one of the few authors who refers to 
ethical choice in the context of ''cultural relativism" (as 
opposed to "ethical r.;;;la ti 11ism") . In his description of his 
"ethnocentrism-ethnorelativism continuum," he says that 
different stages of relativism involve different bases for 
personal acts. For example, a person at the "pluralistic" 
stage will likely see multiple bases for ethical decision 
making, not knowing how to choose. This stage somewhat 
reflects Hartung's concern. He says that such decisions are 
left to choice, with no authority from society for choosing. 
Bennett, however, says that a person must move 
through, and beyond, this stage to those where one is 
increasingly relativistic and, at the same time, able to 
make ethical committments. The key, he says, is that such 
committments are made on a basis other than ethnocentrism. 
Other authors (such as Barnlund) echo Bennett's 
identification of problems of ethical choices, as well as 
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his solution. However, while Bennett offers a conceptual 
scheme for understanding the correlation of problems with 
stages of cultural relativism, the solutions to these 
problems, especially those involving the non-ethnocentric 
basis for choices, need to be addressed more 
comprehensively. What basis is a non-ethnocentric basis? 
Why is it chosen? Why is it effective? What are its 
implications? Does a change in communication situations, 
and a change of communicators' roles change the basis on 
which decisions are made? If the goals of the communication 
interaction change, can the ethical framework? These are 
questions for which answers are very much needed, because 
the basis upon which individuals justify their personal acts 
has implications for the ability of a person to act and also 
for those with whom one is interacting. 
3. Reality as a Discernable entity vs Reality as a 
Cultural Construct. From the writing of the early 
anthropologists, it appears that they all perceived 
"cultures" as reflecting differing perceptual screens which 
variably reflect a single, existing reality, a perspective 
which has been referred to as "multiplicity'' (Perry 1970). 
A different view of reality is "constructivism" 
(Berger and Luckman 1967). Certainly, throughout history, 
there have been philosophers who have referred to reality as 
a "conceptual construct." Reality is created conceptually; 
it is not based on any existing reality (as opposed to the 
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multiplistic idea that cultural realties are merely 
reflections of an existing ''reality"). Berger and Luckman 
(1967} were largely responsible for drawing attention to 
this concept in the social sciences, and relating it to 
social science theory. This may explain why some of the 
more current writers have subscribed to this assumption, but 
the early anthropologists did not. On the other hand, had 
they considered such an idea about reality, perhaps they 
still might have chosen to take a multiplistic rather than a 
constructivistic view. Without a detailed study of their 
philosophical orientations, it would be difficult to say. 
With the exception of Dimen-Schein, the current 
anthropology authors seem to share a multiplistic 
philosophical position about reality. Jarvie focuses his 
criticism of cultural relativism on the problems he see 
emerging from a position which considers reality as a 
construct, such that multiple, differing realities exist. 
He says that such realities, with their context-bound 
beliefs, deny the possibility of debate about reality and 
truth. 
Again, we are faced with the question of boundaries. 
Jarvie (1975) argues that relativism creates a situation 
where there is a myriad of beliefs which are context-bound, 
and hence, not applicable to other cultures. No discussion 
can occur because the beliefs are not meaningful across 
cultural boundaries. 
This position stands squarely opposite to that of 
intercultural communication, which is concerned with the 
very communication of beliefs across cultural boundaries. 
All intercultural communication authors address this. 
However, only some can be identified as having the 
constructivist perspective on reality which Jarvie 
challenges. 
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A constructivist perspective is not uncommon in the 
field of communication as a whole, and the very 
communication problem which Jarvie raises in the 
anthropology field, which does not typically address the 
communication process as part of its study, is addressed by 
some of the communication literature, as well as by works in 
the intercultural communication literature which support the 
constructivist perspective (i.e., Barnlund, 1975; Bennett 
1986). That is, they address, from a constructivist 
perspective, the problem of communication across "cultural 
boundaries". When applied to intercultural communication, 
constructivism implies the active creation of alternative 
world-view aspects by individuals for the purpose of 
communication. 
However, the bottom line is that Jarvie is not arguing 
the problems of communication about reality he sees in the 
constructivist position so much as he is arguing that there 
is, indeed, a reality. This is another issue altogether. 
It is an issue likely to be present in intercultural 
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communication as well (multiplicity versus constructivism), 
but one not addressed in terms of the field as a whole. 
3. Particularism vs Universalism. The early 
anthropologists, and the intercultural communication 
authors, seem to incorporate both particularistic and 
universalistic approaches into their work. Boas, for 
example, sought to first collect data from a myriad of 
cultures, and only when he had enough data which was 
analyzed in term of context, was he, then, interested in 
looking for possible universals. Barnlund, too, though 
concerned with understanding meaning in context, writes 
about the need for universals. 
No apparent conflict seems to exist in either the 
works of the early anthropologists or in those of the 
intercultural communication authors between their emphasis 
on contextualism and the making of cross-cultural 
generalizations about communication behavior. 
However, the current anthropologist, Clark (1970), 
says that contextualism (particularism) and universalism are 
at odds. He sees relativism as rejecting any basis of 
criteria for cross-cultural comparison, and the 
establishment of general, universal laws. 
This discrepancy seems, again, to be one of 
definitions and boundaries. Clark defines relativism as 
contextualism, but, in light of his discussion, he seems to 
perceive cultural boundaries as impermeable and absolute. 
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In contrast, one of the basic assumptions in intercultural 
communication is that communication can occur across 
cultural boundaries because cultural boundaries are 
conceptual, and hence, flexible. 
The use of concepts cross-culturally in intercultural 
communication is possible because they are considered useful 
for organizing ideas about communication to facilitate the 
communication process itself and to identify variations of 
communication behavior within different cultural groups. 
They are not used for making comparisons or for ranking 
data. Thus, concepts about communication phenomena such as 
"non-verbal behavior" and ''proximics" are applied 
universally, but the meaning of the behaviors thus 
identified is considered in the particular contexts. 
Another current anthropologist, Turner (1982), argues 
that particularism prevents the criticizing of cultural 
goals at a time when cultural goals can have global 
implications. 
Interestingly, Boas and Benedict, advocates of the 
very concept Turner criticizes, would have agreed with 
Turner. Both sought cultural understanding based on the 
particularism of contextualism, but they also advocated for 
insight into commonalities of human behavior based on this 
information. Their universals (and they did not think these 
had to apply to all people everywhere, just represent a 
general trend) were approximations based on the temporary 
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withholding of judgment. It is at this juncture that they 
saw anthropologists in a position to address the pressing, 
global problems of society. "Cultural relativism" is what 
brings them to this point. It was not seen by them as an 
end to itself. 
However, these early anthropologists were amidst a 
world being rapidly reshaped by imperialism. They 
interpreted the central world problem to be the abuses of 
power based on unconscious, and strong, ethnocentrism. 
Decades later, Turner focuses on problems which have become 
aggravated to crisis proportions. But, here too, he sees 
anthropologists as able to make a contribution. 
Like Boas and Benedict, many of the intercultural 
communication writers also present what they perceive as 
pressing global, social problems (Barnlund 1978). Many of 
them use cultural relativism to achieve certain interactive 
goals, but employ a different approach when they discuss 
solutions to world problems. Thus, a simultaneous use of 
particularism and universalism does not occur. This 
parallels Boas and Benedict. Smart (1968), for example, 
says we must move past cultural relativism, utilizing what 
insights about cultures we've gained from it, but then 
synthesizing them, and forming new judgments on a new basis. 
Smart's development concept echoes Bennett's continuum 
of relativism, but the state he says is achieved by engaging 
in cultural relativism and then, leaving it behind, is the 
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very place described by Bennett as the final stage of 
relativism, which, like Smart's ''beyond relativism" state, 
involves synthesis. For the purpose of clarity, it would 
help to know if the two authors are giving the same state 
two different labels or, if they are describing different 
states. However, the brevity of Smart's reference prevents 
further comparison. 
In spite of examples of relativists who incorporate 
both particularist and universalist approaches, Turner's 
query still stands as to how both can occur at once. It is 
here suggested that the early anthropologists, and most of 
the intercultural communication authors, use (or try to use} 
cultural relativism as an approach to achieve certain goals 
such as successful intercultural communication interaction, 
or information about cultures. Do some maintain a 
relativistic perspective while engaging in value formation 
and committment in terms of themselves and society, or do 
they all change approaches at this point like Smart does? 
Using Bennett's model as a possible explanatory tool 
for the moment, one could speculate that the ability to 
achieve particularism and universalism simultaneously, if it 
is possible, may well depend on the degree of cultural 
relativism one has developed. 
Is current anthropologist, Turner (1982}, correct on 
faulting those relativists who do shift approaches when 
their goals change? For instance, if someone calls the 
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shift "relativism" when it is not, then Turner's point of 
inconsistency is accurate. But, the question begs another. 
What form of relativism are we talking about? What if the 
person simply shifts degrees of relativism, as Bennett's 
model indicates can occur? Then, inconsistency does not 
occur. 
A final point is helpful pertaining to the 
particularism/universalism theme. Is it legitimate to shift 
from using relativism for some goals but not others? Again, 
this depends on one's interpretation of relativism. If it 
is a moral guide, then there might be an argument for the 
need for consistency. However, if relativism is an approach 
to understanding differences, then it seems there is no 
"immorality" or inconsistency in changing approaches. 
In sum, Clark's and Turner's points may have 
relevance, but within their assumptive and definitional 
framework of cultural relativism. As we have seen, many 
authors' uses of relativism fall outside this framework. 
4. Reverse Ethnocentrism. This disadvantage theme is 
mentioned in the early and current anthropology literature. 
Three of the current anthropologists charge relativists with 
devaluing their own cultures and positively valuing other 
cultures, instead of being "tolerant" of all cultures as 
relativists claim others should be. Benedict referred to 
this phenomenon and said that, while attractive in the 
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frenzy of modern life to view other cultures as better, in 
actuality, this viewpoint is detrimental to the ethnologist. 
While both she and Boas draw attention to the 
ethnocentric dangers of powerful countries as well as the 
merits of the then non-industrial cultures, their focus on 
the negative aspects of the former, and some of the positive 
aspects of the latter, are clearly a matter of the emphasis 
which they felt was necessary to combat the misconceptions 
about culture they perceived prevailing in their own 
societies. 
Bennett {1986) refers to reverse ethnocentrism also, 
describing it as one of the possible reactions a person can 
experience when exposed to cultural difference. However, he 
views it as one of the defensive stages of ethnocentricism, 
not as a state reflecting degrees of acceptance of 
difference, which he terms ''ethnorelativism." 
These references indicate that the three current 
anthropologists are, indeed, not alone in observing this 
attitudinal phenomenon. However, the criteria used by these 
authors for determining whether or not various 
anthropologists truly are reverse ethnocentric, and the 
extent to which they see this attitude as pervasive, is not 
known. A review of the intercultural communication 
literature on cultural relativism indicates that this is not 
characteristic of intercultural communication relativists at 
all. However, most of the references to relativism are so 
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brief, that further study would have to be done to determine 
if, and how many, intercultural communication authors are 
reverse ethnocentric. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
From the research of the intercultural communication 
literature, the original concern of this study was 
substantiat~d. The concept of cultural relativism is 
extensively used in the intercultural communication 
literature, but it is explicitly defined by only a small 
percentage of authors, and those definitions are 
inconsistent. Authors refer to it in all of the various 
applications of the field (training, intercultural 
interactions, and research), but the exact role relativism 
plays in the methods of each of these is articulated by only 
a few authors. That almost every intercultural 
communication author viewed cultural relativism as useful 
for intercultural communication is highly suggestive that a 
positive orientation is characteristic of the area of 
intercultural communication literature, in general. 
However, whether or not practitioners of intercultural 
communication concur is another matter, and a very important 
one. If practitioners do not perceive cultural relativism 
to be viable, then a serious split between theory and 
practice exists within intercultural communication. Further 
study of the degree to which authors and practitioners 
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concur on their views of cultural relativism would help the 
clarification and development of intercultural theory which 
is so very much needed. 
The review of the early anthropology literature done 
in this study suggested strong theoretical connections 
between this and the intercultural communication literature. 
However, no mention was found in the intercultural 
communicaton literature as to how cultural relativism became 
a part of intercultural theory, or what its theoretical 
roots are. This is a serious gap in the literature, and one 
that needs to be addressed in order to have some kind of 
grounding of the conceptual framework of intercultural 
communication. As previously noted in this chapter, such 
historical research, by revealing connections with already 
established theory, could help fill in some of the 
theoretical gaps in the intercultural communication 
literature, or would at least identify areas needing 
discussion. 
The review of the current anthropology literature 
which criticizes cultural relativism, had two, overall 
results. First, the focus of the criticisms, such as logic, 
and the challenging of various concepts, revealed areas in 
the intercultural communication literature which were weak 
in presentation of the intercultural use and definition of 
concepts, or which were absent entirely. Thus, such 
concepts as "reality" and "boundaries" and "culture" which 
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are key to the use of cultural relativism in intercultural 
communication came into relief as concepts needing 
clarification. Without a picture of the assumptive and 
conceptual basis of authors, confusion as to what they mean, 
and potential for criticism, prevails. 
A second result was that, by contrasting some of the 
anthropological literature with the intercultural 
literature, a better understanding of the differences 
between the two areas emerged. These differences included 
the kinds of topics considered within the fields, the 
methods used, the goals sought, and the varying roles 
perceived for the social scientist. In addition, similar 
views were found between the fields, suggesting that similar 
methodological and theoretical issues exist in both. 
The only absolute difference found in the two 
literature groups pertained to goals. Some of the 
anthropologists felt that implicit in their discipline was 
the evaluation and resulting comparison of data. This was 
not found as a goal within the intercultural communication 
literature reviewed for this study, which is likely 
representative of intercultural communication in general. 
The other differences occurred largely in emphasis. 
But this is significant because it suggests that each of the 
areas has much to offer the other, at least, pertaining to 
the cultural relativism issue. Thus, for those 
anthropologists who ponder how communication can occur 
190 
across cultural boundaries within a relativistic 
perspective, he or she can look to the research in 
intercultural communication for some insights. Conversely, 
anthropology, as the study of culture, is a rich resource 
for those in intercultural communication who need in-depth 
understanding of cultures. 
Finally, questions pertaining to the responsibilities 
of social scientists, in theory making, in research, and in 
interactive situations, apply to people in both areas. As 
we have seen, each of the areas, early anthropology, 
intercultural communication, and current anthropology, vary 
in their goals and emphasis. This could prove mutually 
beneficial as ethical concerns emerge pertaining to topics 
not emphasized in one ar~a of study, but addressed 
extensively in another. For example, the research focus of 
anthropology has generated extensive discussion on cultural 
relativism, ethics and research. As far as the literature 
reviewed for this study indicates, similar discussion has 
not occurred in intercultural communication. But, because 
research is part of the intercultural communication area, 
questions on ethical issues, though maybe not the same ones 
as in anthropology, should be asked and discussed as well. 
The ground already covered in anthropology could well prove 
helpful to intercultural communication. 
Similarly, intercultural communication could provide 
anthropologists with some insights pertaining to 
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intercultural interactions which would help them address 
communication issues. 
If intercultural communication specialists engaged in 
dialogue with anthropologists about cultural relativism for 
the purpose of clarifying the perimeters of cultural 
relativism for each field, different questions emerging out 
of the particular orientation of each field may provide new 
insights for the other field, and new directions of inquiry. 
As demonstrated by this study, "cultural relativism" 
has been used in the intercultural communication literature, 
and in both the early and current anthropology literature, 
to refer to many different concepts, each of which has been 
used in different ways, with varying advantages and 
disadvantages associated with them. Rather than 
perpetuating the confusion which has resulted from the 
multiple definitions, uses and evaluations of cultural 
relativism, a beneficial step in both intercultural 
communication and anthropology would be the renaming of the 
many concepts which have been assigned the label of 
"cultural relativism." For example, cultural relativism 
defined as contextualism could be called "contextualism." 
Cultural relativism defined as cultural diversity could be 
called "cultural diversity.'' While this may seem like a 
trivial point, the sorting out, and relabeling, of concepts 
has very specific advantages. 
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First, a discussion specifically about ''contextualism" 
(as opposed to "cultural relativism"), for example, could 
actually pursue the merits and applications of 
contextualism, rather than wallow in a muddle of confusion, 
because each communicator would know the other is talking 
about contextualism. If two people discuss "cultural 
relativism", at the present, one is very likely to be 
talking about contextualis~, and the other about cultural 
diversity. 
Second, as we have seen from the discussion of the 
disadvantages of cultural relativism, the disadvantages 
relate directly to an author's particular definition of 
cultural relativism. Authors who does not define cultural 
relativism as ''equal cultural validity," for example, may 
find themselves being criticized for a supposed fault of 
"equal cultural validity" such as the disallowing of the 
evaluation of data, a criticism which does not necessarily 
apply if, in fact, those authors are actually using a 
different definition such as "attitudes toward difference." 
The cataloging and renaming of concepts would make it 
possible to focus on the uses and merits, and the legitimacy 
of the assumptions of, each concept, in light of the 
particular goals and methods of a particular discipline. 
In intercultural communication, in particular, this 
would alleviate both the unfortunate confusion which 
surrounds the term ''cultural relativism," and the criticisms 
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which may not be relevant to the specific definition of 
cultural relativism chosen for the purposes of intercultural 
communication. An example of such a definition of cultural 
relativism for intercultural communication might look like 
the following: 
cultural relativism: the potentiality of the 
variability of meaning between differing communication 
contexts 
This definition is based on the intercultural 
communication principle that "culture" is a perceived group 
whose members bond through shared meaning created, 
sustained, and changed by, group members. "Culture" is 
considered, here, as communication at large. 
Some of the other concepts now being used as 
definitions of "cultural relativism" could be termed as 
follows: 
1. Neutral or positive attitudes toward difference--
"ethnorelativism" (in contrast to negative attitudes toward 
difference which would be "ethnocentrism") 
2. The interconnectedness of cultural elements--
"contextualism" 
3. The fact of cultural diversity--"cultural 
diversity" 
4. The perceiving and understanding on the part of an 
individual in terms of a "perceptual screen" comprised of 
both personal and cultural dimensions--"subiectivism 
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5. The workability (viability) of cultures--"cultural 
validity" 
6. The equal "goodness" of all cultures--"cultural 
equality" 
7. Culture as ongoing, created, contingent process--
"cultural process" 
A very different definition than the one suggested 
here for "cultural relativism" may be selected for the area 
of intercultural communication, but failure to specifically 
define cultural relativism, at all, will leave those 
involved in the area of intercultural communication with no 
focus, amidst a multitude of questions about cultural 
relativism, such as: 
Is cultural relativism a concept, a theory, a method, 
a doctrine, a thesis, a proposition, an assumption, an 
ethical guide, or what? Is it a "fact," or an attitude 
which can be experienced in degrees? Are we to call it 
epistemological relativism, ethnorelativism, ethical 
relativism, moral relativism, extreme relativism, or what? 
Is it applicable to research, to interpersonal relations, to 
geo-political strategies, or to philosophy? Is it moral, 
conceptual, or empirical? Does it mean the same thing if we 
use the term "relative," "relativistic," "relativism," or 
"relativity?" For whom is it useful? under what 
conditions? why? 
The current anthropologist, Hippler, says: 
... we must simply for the sake of intellectual 
honesty bring our old rangga of cultural 
relativism out into the light of day where we 
can see it for the threadbare rag that it is 
(1981, 397). 
Herskovits champions relativism and says it is: 
... the most fruitful approach to the problem of 
the nature and significance of differential 
values in culture that has yet been devised 
(1951, 31). 
The debate in anthropology (and in other areas as 
well, such as psychology and philosophy) about cultural 
relativism has been, and seems to continue to be, lively. 
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None exists in intercultural communication. Yet, it seems 
important to explore the question of whether or not the 
challenges to relativism are indeed relevant to 
intercultural communication. If they are, the implications 
strike the very assumptive and methodological core of 
training and theory in intercultural communication. If, 
however, upon careful analysis, the criticisms can be 
persuasively met, whereby cultural relativism is 
persuasively defended, the area of intercultural 
communication may prove to have some insights and 
perspectives with which to help clarify and validate 
cultural relativism elsewhere. 
The goal of this study was not to argue a position, 
one way or another. The burden of proof as to the relevence 
of cultural relativism for the intercultural communication 
area rests on future studies. "Descriptive approaches often 
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provide concrete facts describing the situation on the basis 
of which reasonably definite plans can be made for further 
action" (Helmstadter 1970). It is hoped this study has 
taken an effective step toward this end in describing and 
assessing the status quo of cultural relativism in the 
intercultural communication literature. 
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